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V. CHEREDNICHENKO

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POLITVIDAV UKRAINI
KIEV — 1975

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Hinweis

In einzelnen Fällen wurde es versäumt,
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clearly hear the angry roar of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who attempt to veil the truth about the Soviet Union. Their roar has now become a hoarse whisper. Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists for many years now have no homeland, neither can they be said to be history-makers. There is only one road they can take: the road to ignominy and oblivion.

World imperialism using for its ends espionage, counter-espionage, anti-Soviet ideological centres and other subversive organizations, for over fifty years is the source backing the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. Their main methods are ideological diversion, provocation, terror and espionage.

Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, servile to the will of their imperialist bosses, anti-communists, continue their attempts to weaken the status of our country on the international scene, divide the working people on national grounds and the social and political unity of the Soviet people, sow political enmity among peoples of the socialist countries and use nationalism to undermine the socialist system.

"Above the hostile anti-communist cacophony one can clearly hear the angry roar of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who attempt to veil the truth about the Soviet Union. Their roar has now become a hoarse whisper. Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists for many years now have no homeland, neither can they be said to be history-makers. There is only one road they can take: the road to ignominy and oblivion.

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The Ukrainian people as all the Soviet people, scornfully reject attempts by the imperialists and their nationalist hirelings aimed at sowing suspicion and enmity among the peoples of our country, and at dividing the monolithic unity of our Soviet society.”¹

In this book, we hope, the reader will learn the truth about the nationalist traitors.

THE SINISTER ALLIANCE

Following the end of the Civil War of 1918-1920, the remaining Ukrainian bourgeoisie and nationalists fled the country and settled first in Poland and Czechoslovakia, then in Germany, France and other countries of the West. There, they founded several bourgeois-nationalist parties and organizations, which formed a strong and active phalanx of counter-revolutionary émigrés.

The most extremist of these bodies was the “Ukrainian Military Organization” (UVO) headed by Y. Konovalets, A. Melnyk and some other Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries. It was set up in September, 1920. The organization’s headquarters were in Berlin, where UVO received a powerful backing from the authorities of the Weimar Republic. Berlin was also a very convenient city from which to maintain contact with organizational branches in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Lithuania and later, in the USA and Canada. Operational leadership was also conducted from UVO headquarters in Berlin.

In 1923 one of Abwehr chiefs, Col. Gempp suggested that Yevhen Konovalets and his aide-de-camp Roman Jary should furnish intelligence information for reichsmarks in return.¹

¹ V. Cherednichenko. Natsionalism proty natsii. Kiev, Politvidav Ukrainsi, 1970, p. 173. Other sources state that UVO began collaborating with the German military intelligence as early as 1921 (A. Dalzin. German Rule in Russia 1941-1945. London — New-York, 1957, p. 114).

"Instead of concentrating on revolutionary activity, the organization's leadership (*Provid*) channelled their efforts into wheedling out funds and spending them," admitted later an UVO bigwig. "MI — espionage — was also converted into a means of extorting money for money's sake. Since the organization was engaged in espionage as early as 1923, spying was conducted in such a manner as to receive from it the biggest profit possible. It meant bearing minimum operational expenses and selling information at the highest possible price because the money was mainly needed to provide a fat and comfortable existence for the *Provid*... In short, the so-called military organization is a spying syndicate".¹

It was namely concerned with collecting for the German military intelligence data on the armed potentiality of Poland and the Soviet Union. But nationalist spies in the Soviet Union had small chances for such activity, since the state security and plain Soviet citizens were always on the alert.

Later on, UVO, besides gathering military intelligence, branched out into other fields of espionage. On July 6, 1926 high-ranking UVO chiefs, entrusted by the German Intelligence, held a closed-door conference in Berlin at which it was decided to enlarge the scope of espionage activities to cover political and economic affairs of countries potentially belligerent to Germany.²

As early as 1923 the German Intelligence Service established a special training centre for UVO members in Munich. Early in 1924 another centre for training spies, provocateurs, saboteurs and terrorists was opened in Germany.

¹ Archives of Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine Institute on Party History. Fund 6, Specification 2, File 36, Sheets 35—38.

² Quoted from *Пора сказати правду про наші визвольні змагання добитися волі для галицької землі. 1918—1939* (Time to Tell the Truth about our Liberation Effort to Gain Freedom for the Galician Land in 1918-1939) by S. Shevchuk. Toronto, 1965, p. 22.

A third espionage school for Ukrainian nationalists was opened by the German Intelligence in 1928 in Danzig.

The allotment and assignments of trained spies was decided by the Intelligence Branch of the 1st German Army, which was then stationed in Königsberg. This branch was headed by Captain Weiss. Another German espionage centre was located on Leon Sapieha Street in Lvov, where it functioned under the cover of Hartwig & Co. of Danzig.

In Western Ukraine (then under Poland) UVO set up several bases for its agents. Lvov was chosen as the seat of the UVO Territorial Centre.

The UVO Territorial, Regional and district centres had special intelligence branches which, according to Polish police reports, operated "very efficiently". The subversive activities of UVO/German agents in Poland seriously troubled the Polish government. Several spy-rings were broken up and their members were tried at open hearings.

However, subversive anti-Polish activities did not prevent Konovalets and his associates from doing business with important high-ranking Polish government officials and intelligence officers. Thus, for big money Konovalets and Jary sold out a group of German agents led by Oberleutnant Rauch from the Abwehr.

But as time went by, UVO, with its limited range of spying and terroristic operations could no longer satisfy the growing demands of both the German and Polish intelligence services. The nationalists were given new tasks aimed at hindering the spread of progressive ideas and opposing revolutionary movement in Western Ukraine. But these tasks went far beyond UVO powers. That is why it was decided to remodel UVO into an organization that could exert ideological influence and political pressure on the population of Western Ukraine.

The changes resulted in the emergence of the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" [OUN]. The fascist ideology was adopted by OUN. Konovalets was "elected" its

leader. He wielded absolute power in the organization. Both Konovalets and Melnyk, who assumed leadership later, never referred to themselves in the first person. The usual mode of address was: "the leader has studied the matter...", "the leader has decided...", etc.

In March, 1934 Konovalets was officially conferred the title of "leader", which was an allusion, a myopic reflex to the ideology, politics and practice of fascism, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists' act of homage to German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. Then this "leader of Ukrainian nationalists" became the "absolute ruler of the nation"! The "leadership" cult made Konovalets "head of state" and on July, 1938 OUN propaganda proclaimed him a "hero"; anything barely relating to this continentscale adventurer was declared to be "holy and sacred".

The "leader" dictated personally the OUN policies and practice and exercised control over its activities.

OUN saw in Konovalets its law-giver, whose unlimited power extended over all the activity of Ukrainian nationalists. He personally decided questions of life and death not only of nationalists subordinate to him, but also those, who had nothing to do with OUN, who had displeased him in some way or expressed disagreement with Ukrainian nationalism.

Straining for power, Hitler declared a *guerre à mort* with communism to be the superior goal of his life. Copying him, the Ukrainian nationalists announced similar slogans: "world communism and Ukrainian nationalism", wrote the newspaper "Meta", "are two phenomena having nothing in common and practically irreconcilable. In every confrontation both fight to the last man. There is no such thing as Ukrainian communism, so Ukrainian nationalism must be prepared to employ every means in the struggle against communism, not excluding mass extermination, when millions of human physical entities could be the victims."¹

¹ "Meta", No. 15, Lvov, 1932.

In nationalist literature, intended for the mass reader, tribute was payed to Degrelle,² De-la-Roche³ and other fascist leaders. Neither ink nor paper was spared to describe these "great individuals", "their teachings" and "their glorious historical steps" against democracy and socialism.

The nationalists vied with one another in translating, printing and distributing fascist trash among Ukrainians living in Western Ukraine, wrote laudatory reviews, and prefaces, and warmly thanked the "highly esteemed authors" for their kind permission to translate their "works" into Ukrainian, for their "generosity", etc.³ Hitler and Mussolini were proclaimed "the greatest titans of human thought" and "geniuses" whose teachings, they said, not only opened up boundless vistas for their nations, but ushered in "a new era" for the whole world.⁴

The Italian and German press responded to almost every "work" of the Ukrainian nationalist pen-pushers. In connection with the appearance of one such "work" (*Mussolini. Man and Rank* by M. Ostroverkh) the reactionary Italian newspapers "Il Messagero" and "Anno" wrote in May, 1934: "A book about Mussolini has been printed in Lvov... The noted publicist Doctor Dmytro Doncow wrote the preface which, with its pure fascist style, deserves to be reprinted in toto."

Referring more than once to the Ukrainian nationalists as the rampart of the West against the Slavic world the fascist magazine "Antieuropa" preached for a complete merger of the fascist phalanx with the nationalist "élite". "When it comes to matters concerning the East", German fascist

¹ Degrelle was the leader of Belgian fascists and Obersturmbahnfuehrer of the SS. He was sentenced to death by a Belgian court in 1944 for treason. Later escaped to Spain.

² De-la-Roche was a French fascist leader.

³ B. Mussolini. *Доктрина фашизму* (Doctrine of Fascism), Lvov, 1937.

⁴ "Utchitelske Slovo", No. 17, Lvov, 1938.

ideologist Alfred Rosenberg wrote in his book "The Future Course of German Foreign Policy", "Germany's attention should be fixed on the nationalist movement in the Ukraine". Rosenberg considered the consolidation of relations with Ukrainian nationalists as an important factor in Germany's future struggle for a *lebensraum* in Eastern Europe.

With the establishment of a fascist regime in Germany, the entire efforts of the Hitler political, economic, war and spying machine was directed at unleashing a new world war.

In January, 1934 on orders of police and security service Chief Inspector Diels, and Col. Reichenau, the OUN headquarters in Berlin were merged into a branch of the Gestapo.

The German Intelligence paid for the training of detachments of Ukrainian nationalists along the lines of Hitler's storm troopers at a special military camp in the suburbs of Berlin. A special "academy" — a centre for training spies, saboteurs and terrorists — was also opened at Mecklenburgstraße 75 in Berlin. In 1938, Abwehr sponsored another centre in Chiemsee (Bavaria) to train Ukrainian nationalists in espionage and sabotage, and a spy school in Tegel (Berlin area).¹

Similar centres also existed in the village of Saubersdorf, near Weiner-Neustadt, in Breslau and other places.

Abwehr's centre in Quinze was reputed to be the best. Here agents received excellent instructions in the use of the "most advanced" methods of sabotage, the newest explosives and special weapons. The Quinze centre was regarded by many to be the best of its kind in the western hemisphere and most of the Ukrainian nationalists were trained here.

In preparing to unleash World War II, the Third Reich demanded that their intelligence services exploit more fully the Ukrainian nationalist agency.

The matter was considered at a conference called by Reichsleiter A. Rosenberg on December 24, 1938. Arno Schikedantz, the vice-director of the foreign political department of the Nazi Party (APA), Admiral Canaris, the intelligence chief, Lt.-Col. Lahusen, the director of the Abwehr sabotage department and his first secretary Major Stoltze took part. Admiral Canaris presented a detailed report on what had been done by the German military intelligence with OUN. Following Canaris report, Rosenberg suggested that it would be desirable to use the services of other émigré nationalist groups who had also demonstrated their intention to loyally serve fascism.

Admiral Canaris fully upheld the thought expressed by the Reichsleiter and said he had long considered it necessary to establish direct ties with the ex-hetman Skoropadsky in order to gauge and make fuller usage of the hetmanite organization.

After the conference Canaris ordered Major Stoltze to get in touch with Skoropadsky and with his son in order to learn about the connections and influence Skoropadsky had in other countries, and later decide how to use these connections and Skoropadsky himself in the interests of Abwehr. Skoropadsky readily supplied Stoltze with the information he obtained and with the names of people he considered could be employed by the Nazis.

Stoltze brought Admiral Canaris to his second meeting with Skoropadsky. The latter tried to create the impression of having agents in the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and other countries, and alleged that they had been working in the interests of Nazi Germany for already some years. To put the espionage work on a broader footing Skoropadsky demanded from Canaris large sums of money, but the demand was declined since Canaris was certain that

¹ W. Brockdorff. Geheimkommandos des Zweiten Weltkrieges, München, 1967, S. 66.

Skoropadsky was merely bluffing about his connections and influence in Ukraine.

The fiasco with Abwehr did not dishearten Skoropadsky since his organization was financed by the Gestapo and the intelligence service of Hitler's foreign affairs ministry. "...The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Gestapo maintain contact with the Hetman, who always manifests his loyalty towards Germany. In order to assure him and his family an income commensurate to his position, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs pays him a considerable maintenance allowance in addition to the monthly honorarium (1,000 reichsmarks — *author*) accorded to him by the late president Field Marshal von Hindenburg in 1928..." wrote von Rintelen, a high-ranking official of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in May, 1940.¹ The hetman's subordinates were also engaged in political espionage by the foreign political department of the Nazi Party.

The Polish Intelligence Service did not lag behind the Nazis in employing Ukrainian nationalists as agents. A large number of OUN bosses were paid agents of the Polish Intelligence. Among those employed were M. Senik-Hrybivsky, one of the top nationalist bosses, R. Baranovsky, I. Serant, A. Chemerinska and others. The Lvov newspaper "Dilo" in condemning the total involvement of OUN Provid with the Polish Intelligence, remarked that it was very difficult to determine who actually assumed leadership in the OUN: a spy, a provocateur, or an idealistically disposed king of the underworld.² OUN/Polish agents were infiltrated into Soviet Ukrainian territory. OUN was also employed by the Polish Intelligence Service to combat the workers' and peasants' revolutionary movement in Western Ukraine, then under Poland.

¹ Das Nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Sowjetunion 1939-1940. Washington, 1948, p. 163.

² "Dilo", Lvov, June 23, 1934.

The eminent Ukrainian writer Yaroslav Halan, who actively participated in the revolutionary struggle had this to say: "OUN as an agency under Hitler's intelligence service... works most intimately with the Polish military intelligence, too. The Polish police, instructed by the Nazis, now is in complete harmony with OUN; it seeks out revolutionaries and OUNites kill them... The terrorism is assuming awesome proportions. People are dragged from their beds and brutally murdered in front of their families. Their property goes up in smoke. Western Ukraine is under the heel of true blue fascism."¹

Following the instructions of their masters, the OUN Provid set up operational bases in countries neighbouring the USSR. Apart from Poland other countries considered suitable for their purpose were Bulgaria, Lithuania and Manchukuo (Eastern Asia).

Later, one OUN boss M. Stepanjak wrote about it: "In an attempt to achieve its ends OUN proclaimed in its programmes that it would find support in "the majority of the nation" and preached the idea of "the great Ukrainian national revolution". In actual fact OUN adapted its policy to the Nazi plans. OUN counted not so much on "internal forces", a myth of their own making, as on the Axis war plans and in particular the war Germany was preparing to unleash on the USSR. OUN activity prior to the war pursued but one goal — to attract the attention of the imperialist powers and fascist regimes to the so-called "Ukrainian problem" in order to materialize OUN ambitions on its own little role in world affairs. OUN easily came to terms with the German Reich, fascist Italy and Japan as such that were prepared to unleash an imperialistic war and especially one against the Soviet Union."²

¹ "Radyansky Lviv", 1949, No. 11, p. 56.

² "Ukraina", No. 17, April 1971.

It is interesting to analyse the source of OUN income, since without a solid financial backing OUN would not be capable of carrying out its subversive activities.

The easiest way would be to look up OUN ledgers. However they did not exist. The sources of income were veiled in deepest secrecy and only a handful of the most trusted workers from OUN headquarters were in the secret. Konovalets, Melnyk and Bandera were the only omnipotent managers of the OUN treasury.

Despite the complete absence of records, the financial sources of this anti-popular organization can be traced. Surviving documents and papers from the archives of Abwehr, Gestapo, the Polish Intelligence Service, the Nazi Party, the German foreign affairs ministry and other official bodies of former German satellites throw some light on the financial operations of UVOD-OUN. Scarce as they are these documents give us the possibility to follow these operations and pen-point sources.

UVOD initial capital consisted of money, gold, diamonds and other valuables seized by Ukrainian nationalists during their raids and pogroms in the course of the Civil War in Ukraine. Martynets, an OUN leader, mentions the "expedient brought from Ukraine by Sich Sharpshooters", while progressive American historians M. Sayers and A. Kahn write about two suitcases crammed with valuables that were quickly cashed in by Ukrainian nationalists.¹

Another source of income was outright thievery in Poland.

In one decade UVOD and OUN committed the following crimes:

1923 — a foiled attempt to rob the government treasury in Cracow;

¹ V. Martynets. *Українське підпілля від UVOD до OUN* (Ukrainian underground from UVOD to OUN), Winnipeg, 1949, p. 33; M. Sayers, A. Kahn. *Secret War Against America*, Moscow, 1947, p. 95.

1924 — an UVOD gang staged an armed attack on the General Post Office in Lvov and got away with 92,000 zloty;

1925 — the hold-up of a mail coach in Bogorodchina gave UVOD 56,000 zloty, while in Dolina 7,000 zloty were taken from a safe belonging to the regional administrative offices;

1928 — the robbery of post-offices in Lvov, Kaluzh, Dolina and in the village of Dunaev;

1930 — the hold-up of a mail-coach near the town of Baborka in which the guard was shot dead. The OUN mobsters got away with 26,000 zloty;

1931 — OUN members robbed a Jewish bank in Borislav, a post-office in Truskavets, mail coaches near Birche and in Pechenizhin;

1932 — an OUN gang staged an armed robbery at a post-office in Gorodok and got away with 3,000 zloty;

1933 — OUN robbed a savings bank in the town of Korchin.¹

Over 75,000 korunas were extorted from Ukrainian emigrants in Czechoslovakia in the 20's and 30's.²

Large sums also came from the USA and Canada.

The main contributors were Ukrainian settlers in these countries. To arrange regular collections Konovalets sent to America one of his associates M. Senik-Hrybivsky, who was briefed before his departure by Major von Foss from Abwehr on ways of involving the Ukrainian nationalists in the USA and Canada in espionage activities.³

M. Sayers and A. Kahn in their book "Sabotage! The Secret War against America" published in New-York in

¹ V. Martynets. Op. cit., pp. 68—69; "Dilo", November 21, 1935.

² Ibid.

³ M. Sayers, A. Kahn. Op. cit., pp. 91, 97-103; M. Terlytsa. *Прапануки погані. Українські націоналісти в Канаді* (These Bad Great grand-children: Ukrainian nationalists in Canada), Kiev, 1960, pp. 105, 110, 111, ff.

1942 dedicated a whole chapter to the subversive activities of the German agent Senik-Hrybivsky in the United States. They name him as the "organizer of terror". In 1931 Senik-Hrybivsky, then Konovalets' right-hand man, arrived from Berlin to create in the USA, on orders of the German Intelligence, "the Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukrainian Statehood" (ODVU). Two years later, when the Nazis were in power, Senik-Hrybivsky comes back to the United States to organize ODVU cells throughout the country.

Financed by the Nazis, Senik-Hrybivsky organizes ODVU cells in the industrial centres of America, heavily populated by Ukrainians. These cells, quoting M. Sayers and A. Kahn, were directed by the German/Ukrainian nationalists, who disseminated Nazi propaganda and collected intelligence. This was done to begin, on orders, coordinated sabotage for Germany.

In many instances Ukrainian Americans who had joined these ODVU cells were unaware of their leaders' affiliations.

ODVU agents, who failed to receive training in espionage and sabotage in Germany, quoting M. Sayers and A. Kahn, were given special instructions books by Senik-Hrybivsky. One such instructions book came into the possession of Sayers and Kahn.

From it they learnt how Senik-Hrybivsky instructed ODVU agents to build up "private munitions dumps". In Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit and other American towns he organized armed groups of ODVU "snipers" and several camps where ODVU members received training. He also supervised the dispatchment to ODVU cells of secret literature printed in Berlin.

In May, 1934 Senik-Hrybivsky created an "Ukrainian flying school" in Montgomery (the state of New-York), which served as a perfect cover for the training of spies and subversive agents. After training at this school, these ODVU agents, as specialists, could be employed at aircraft

companies and at air bases, places providing unlimited possibilities for sabotage.

Senik-Hrybivsky also instructed ODVU agents to photograph strategically important industrial centres, roads, bridges, airdromes, railways and factories. Besides this, factories in Pittsburgh, Scranton, Allentown and Bethlehem, the industrial area of Detroit, the bridge-way connecting Detroit with Windsor in Canada, the industrial settlements in New Jersey, the aircraft factories in California and the border area of the USA and Mexico were all planned to be photographed.

In 1938, fearing arrest, Senik-Hrybivsky hastens to Europe. However, just before the war he returns to give last-minute instructions to ODVU agents. In Europe he joins the German Army as it transgresses into Soviet territory.¹

Yearly Konovalets, Susrko and other nationalist bigwigs took turns in visiting the USA and Canada to campaign for bigger collections. However, the Depression, the growing unemployment, the devaluation of the dollar and a decline in the number of supporters resulted in a disastrous decrease of the OUN dollar reserve. If in 1930 Ukrainian immigrants in the USA contributed over 22,000 dollars, the next year, despite the noisy fund-raising campaigns the sum diminished to 16,500 dollars and in the following years it became even smaller.²

But despite the fact large sums of money continued to come from the USA. The source would have never come to light had it not been for the scandal that rocked New-York in 1938.³

In November, 1938 New-York police arrested mobsters D. Gula, G. Secoda, V. Dennis, D. Virga and others, all of

¹ M. Sayers, A. Kahn. Op. cit., pp. 91—103.

² "Dilo", November 20, 1935.

³ "Daily Mirror", November 3, 1938; "Star", November 3, 1938; "The Telegram", November 2, 1938; "The Globe and Mail", November 4, 1938.

whom were ODVU members. In the basement of ODVU offices police uncovered a secret torture chamber.

During the investigation it was found out that Gula and his mob talked poor people into insuring their lives for large sums. For a certain period of time they paid the deposits for the clients and then murdered them ruthlessly in order to receive the insurance. Their victims "fell" from the Brooklyn Bridge, "poisoned" themselves by excessive drinking and "committed suicide". In 1930 Gula "inherited" 2,000 dollars for P. Kellinger, who "burnt to death" under suspicious circumstances. In January, 1931 a life insurance company paid Gula money for a person murdered by an "unknown" assailant. Six months later Pavlovsky, a worker, who had insured his life for 35,000 dollars was killed in a car accident. The money went to Gula. B. Kuziv, another of Gula's victims, who had insured his life for 45,000 dollars was redeemed only through Gula's arrest.

This gang resorted to other crimes to get money. In December, 1937 Gula and Sacoda kidnapped a businessman named A. Freed and demanded a ransom of 200,000 dollars from his relatives. When their demands were refused, they shot Freed and burnt his body in the furnace at ODVU offices. Afterwards, though Freed was dead, they continued talks with his relatives in an attempt to extort the ransom from them. On the morning of April 18, 1938, in Brooklyn, a certain B. Farber was leaving a city bank when four gangsters seized him and bundled him into a waiting car. Farber, blindfolded, was driven to ODVU offices, where the gangsters forced him to write a note to his family asking for 25,000 dollars. The family could afford but 1,900 dollars which the gangsters accepted.

The next victim was 19 year old Charles Miller, kidnapped on Long Island together with his friend. Both boys were driven to ODVU offices. Miller was locked up in a room on the first floor while his friend was used as nego-

tiator in the talks with Miller's parents. The Millers were forced to pay 13,000 dollars to the gangsters.

Gula's gang also made business in distilling liquor and selling it at high prices at a bar in ODVU offices, an illegal act since the Prohibition was in force in the USA.

Two members of the gang were sentenced to life imprisonment. The other two — Gula, named the Ukrainian Al Capone, and Sacoda were sent to the electric chair. Together with them one of OUN secrets sank into oblivion: the one about remittances by the criminals to Konovalets personal account in a Rotterdam bank. A considerable part of UVNO and OUN funds came from smuggling goods into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Germany and other countries.

In 1925 the Lithuanian foreign affairs ministry began to subsidize UVNO and later OUN. Every quarter the organization received 2,000 dollars.¹

It was far from enough to cover OUN deficits and Konovalets was forced to ask the Lithuanian government for extra aid. This problem was settled by Konovalets and the Lithuanian foreign affairs minister Zavnius at their meeting in Geneva in September, 1932.

The Japanese and Czechoslovak military intelligence services, as some documents reveal, also paid large sums to these Ukrainian nationalist organizations, however, Abwehr's generosity was beyond competition.

Interesting data is cited in "The Memorandum on the Ukrainian Question" by Major von Foss, who dealt with problems on the participation of national groupings in Germany's war preparations. The Memorandum dated November 19, 1933, was found in the archives of the foreign political department of the Nazi Party.

Von Foss had considerable knowledge of their doings for he had worked with Ukrainian nationalists since 1926. According to him, since 1923 UVNO and OUN received

¹ "Dilo", November 20, 1935.

regular financial support from Abwehr, UVO and OUN monthly pay amounted to 9,000 reichsmarks. Besides, remittances were given for every valuable information, every act of sabotage in the war industry of Germany's potential enemies, every act of terror.

In 1932 the German Intelligence Service, authorized by Reichswehr minister von Schleicher, increased the monthly grants to the nationalist organizations. Payment for "special operation" was also raised. Von Foss states in his Memorandum that only from the German Navy the Ukrainian nationalists received hundreds of thousands of reichsmarks for sabotage and subversive activity.

Abwehr and Goebbels ministry paid the nationalists for conducting a "psychological warfare". In the late 30's the nationalists were given subsidies to arrange radio programmes to Ukraine from Vienna intended to weaken the morale and influence the political outlook of the working people in Soviet Ukraine.

The German foreign affairs ministry also paid the nationalists but through Poland where folksdeutsch deputies to the Polish Sejm were entrusted with the job of handing over the money. One of the most active intermediaries was the German Gröbe, a folksdeutsch deputy to the Polish Sejm.

An OUN account from its headquarters covering the period from September 1, 1936 to July 31, 1937 was found in the archives of the Polish intelligence headquarters.

A survey of this account enables us to state that the subsidies given by the German intelligence to the so-called "Liberation Fund" amounted to 50,000 dollars. The Lithuanian intelligence supplied this "fund" with 35,000 dollars. A similar picture can be seen in the "Literature (propaganda) Fund", where the Germans granted an additional sum of 50,000 dollars, and the Lithuanians 22,000 dollars.

The amounts given by these intelligence organizations were bigger than those collected by nationalist activists from Ukrainian emigrants in the USA and Canada. The Or-

ganization for the Rebirth of an Ukrainian Statehood in the USA supplied only 10,850 dollars, the Organization of the Ukrainian Community in Canada gave 12,050 dollars; the United Ukrainian-Canadian Women's Society — 18,655 dollars. These were the biggest sums coming from nationalist sources.

Thus OUN's income for the years 1936-1937 amounted up to 407,439 dollars.

The account proves that most of the expenditures went to buy arms, to conduct espionage, propaganda, to post and distribute nationalist literature, to employ instructors to train OUN agents, and on the upkeep of the OUN Provid. OUN also paid couriers to travel to and from OUN head offices and its branches in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, the USA and Canada. Money from this account was also given to families of OUN members under arrest for spying for Germany and other countries.

The "Special Fund" of the account presents a certain interest. A short inscription "Paid to the addressee" in the expenditure column camouflages the fact that the money was spent on acts of sabotage and terrorism and on sinister death-dealing plots against people.

As the Third Reich drew the world closer to the Second World War, Abwehr's grants to Ukrainian nationalists became even more generous. In 1941 the OUN bank account amounted to 2,500,000 reichsmarks. The growing financial backing improved the position of nationalist bosses in intelligence circles and accentuated their desire to have a say in world politics.

After the annexation of Austria in 1938 and the takeover of Czechoslovakia, Nazi Germany overran bourgeois-gentry Poland. The unexpected aggression against Poland was preceded by a carefully planned espionage campaign in which Ukrainian nationalists participated.

On Hitler's orders an intricate spy ring was set up in Poland by the Ukrainian nationalists with potentialities, as

Hitler's SS calculated equivalent to those of two army divisions. "Now OUN plans to step up its activity for Germany on Polish territory. Special attention has been given to collecting information about troop movement in Eastern Poland with data on the strength and dislocation of troops, types of arms and the location of ammunition dumps", stated one Polish police report in the summer of 1939.¹ "OUN agents in Danzig have in their possession schemes of the railway stations in Lvov, Stanislau and Przemysl as well as some instructions concerning them", reports another paper.²

As the war drew closer the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists intensified their espionage activity. The fact is confirmed by official reports. If from 1935 to 1938 300 trials related to espionage activities were held in Poland then from March to August 1939 such trials doubled in number.³ Many of those tried were OUN agents.

Besides espionage, sabotage and propaganda much work was also directed at fermenting armed uprisings in Poland. OUN agents were instructed to initiate uprisings as soon as the war was declared. During these armed uprisings, it was ordered "to exterminate Jews and Poles".⁴

Entrusted by Abwehr OUN called upon the youth of Western Ukraine to evade, in event of war, the call-up to the Polish Army. OUN also appealed to those already enlisted not to shoot German soldiers, to wage anti-Polish propaganda and when opportunity offered, to desert to the German side.

World War II began with Germany's unexpected attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. Polish patriots heroically

¹ State Archives Volyn Region, Fund 57, Specification I, File 4672, Sheet 86.

² Ibid., Fund 45, Specification I, File 856, Sheet 222.

³ The German Fifth-Column in Poland. London, 1941, pp. 37-38.

⁴ W. Canaris. Kriegstagebuch. Aufzeichnungen über die Konferenz im Führerzug in Ilmau am 12. September 1939 in Abshagen, SS. 208-209.

defended their land. Many feats of valour were performed during the defence of Danzig, Warsaw and other Polish towns. In the face of mortal peril the Polish ruling class manifested complete indifference to the future of the country and people. Leaving the population and the army to the mercy of fate, the ruling clique fled. There arose a serious threat that Hitler's army would roll up to the borders of the USSR and that the Nazis would enslave the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. The situation evoked the natural concern of the Soviet people and government. Considering it to be their sacred duty to assist their bloodbrothers, the Soviet Government ordered the Red Army to cross the border and take the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia under its protection.

Carrying out the government orders, the Red Army moved in and freed the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia from capitalist-landowner oppression and prevented their enslavement by Nazi Germany.

Kurins (units) formed in Germany by Ukrainian nationalists and commanded by R. Suszko, J. Boidunik and J. Baranovsky actively participated in military operations against the Polish army.¹

The German Army High Command used these units mainly for punitive operations in the Carpathian Mountains such as encirclement and liquidation of Polish Army men and officers, who sought to cross the border into Hungary. In a report sent by the Ukrainian nationalists to Reichsleiter Rosenberg after the "Polish Operation", it was stated that OUN carried out in Western Ukraine "an operation which by the very threat to the Polish Army move southwest (i.e., to Hungary and Romania — *author*) weakened the fighting capacity of Polish soldiers, sowed panic among officers, and hastened the collapse of Poland... We captured 7 cannons, many heavy and light machine-guns, 3,000 rifles, 14,850 hand grenades and 54 infantry carriers".

¹ J. Armstrong. Ukrainian Nationalism, New-York, 1963, p. 42.

After the "Polish Operation" the German Army High Command dissolved these units.¹ Some were merged into a police force, others were stationed at key military installations as guards. Both were occasionally used for sentry duty along the border with Slovakia.

Having overrun Poland, the Nazis immediately filled the administrative, commercial and police bodies of the country with their OUN agents. It was hard to find an establishment without an OUN member at a key post.

Restaurants, hotels, shops and enterprises formerly belonging to Polish Jews were sold to the most eminent OUN members at low prices...²

After the reunification of Western Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine many nationalists fled to German-occupied Poland to settle in Cracow. Those previously sentenced by the Poles for espionage and other subversive work for Germany also made their way to Cracow after being released by the Nazis. Among them were the German agents S. Bandera and M. Lebed, imprisoned in 1935 for assassinating the Polish internal affairs minister Peracki. The Germans had put their stakes on these two criminals, masterminds of assassinations, of hold-ups and robbery, of arsons and cold-blooded murders. Bandera and Lebed immediately demanded high positions in OUN from Melnyk, who assumed leadership of OUN after the demise of Konovalets.³

¹ A. Drozdynski, I. Zaborowski. *Oberländer*, Poznan, 1960, S. 58.

² G. Dmitriy. *Проти хвиль. Спогади лікаря* (Counter-current. A Doctor's Diary), Canada, 1964, pp. 100, 106.

³ Convinced that Konovalets knew too much and had considerable international connections, and that it would be more difficult to control him the Nazis decided to remove him. A Gestapo agent delivered a package to Konovalets in Rotterdam in 1938. When Konovalets opened the package the bomb it contained exploded and Konovalets was killed. Later the Nazis said that Konovalets was of more use to them dead than alive. (M. Sayers and A. Kahn. Op. cit., p. 97).

Melnyk's reluctance to satisfy their demands caused a mutiny. Melnyk repeatedly applied to Berlin to interfere. At last Abwehr for the sake of appearance, met with Bandera, the mutiny leader. During a series of talks Bandera managed to convince Abwehr that he could better organize anti-Soviet activities than Melnyk. To prove this he proposed to separate from Melnyk and set up his own organization, recruiting the most reckless Ukrainian nationalists ready to carry out any assignment.

The German Intelligence Service was lured by Bandera's proposal, the more so since their plans for war against the Soviet Union included the urgent "selection" of men rated according to their experience as subversive agents, their loyalty to fascism, their initiative and energy. Therefore, the Nazis ordered their OUN resident R. Jary, who had actively supported Melnyk and at the latter's demands had even tried to soothe the heated passions and ambitions of the Bandera "mutineers", to resolutely support Melnyk's rivals. As a result of Jary's efforts the organization splitted into two camps OUN-Melnyk and OUN-Bandera or more simply the Melnykites and the Banderites.

The fact that the split in OUN was the work of the Nazis is admitted in various nationalist papers and "memoirs" by OUN leaders and specifically in the reminiscences by the Melnykite M. Kapustynsky. Thus, the Banderites and the Melnykites were just puppets in the hands of the chiefs of the Nazi secret service and Gestapo.

Besides Bandera and Jary, M. Lebed, J. Stetsko, R. Shukhevich, D. Miron, S. Lenkavsky and other trusted agents were promoted by the Germans to the leadership of the newly-baked OUN. Presenting arguments for the split Bandera stated that the OUN Provid under Melnyk, always in emigration, had alienated from the political life and had lost the sense of the real needs and ways of contemporary anti-Soviet warfare. Furthermore, explains Bandera, Melnyk personally was not authorized to be "the OUN leader" be-

cause he had come to "power" through some "mythical" testament of Konovalets, which he alleged, had never existed. All this supposedly compelled the Banderites to separate from the Melnyk group and to establish a new nationalist organization. The Banderites pledged to fight tooth and nail against the USSR. The Banderites promised their Nazi bosses to do their utmost to make their anti-Soviet subversive work more active and as far as possible to assist the Nazi special services in performing their functions.

The OUN split fanned further hatred. In the heat of argument OUN's biggest secrets were disclosed. The verbal accusations usually ended in fights, knifings and murder. Nationalist historians many times were asked to substantiate this moment in OUN history. But they failed to discover any difference between the two camps in principles, views, actions, or means of achieving their ends. As for the Nazi SS that inspired that nationalist split when acting on the old-worn imperialist principle of "*divide et impera*", it acquired a still stronger grip over both OUN camps and later used the services of both in the war against the Soviet Union. "We spent millions and worked like demons to make of Bandera another Melnyk", said a high-ranking SS official in Rovno, Miller. "We shall spare nothing to find ten more men like Bandera".¹

In the summer of 1940 Nazi Germany was ready for her thrust into the USSR. Hitler's General Staff handed over to Abwehr many new tasks. To cope with them the German military intelligence set up, besides other things, a special espionage group under the code name "A". Col. B. Stoltze was appointed commander of this group. Group "A" had to organize sabotage and terrorism in the Soviet rear and to instigate national discords on Soviet territory.

² Quoted from G. Polikarpenko. *Організація українських націоналістів під час другої світової війни*. (The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists during World War II), 1951, p. 50.

"I got in touch", Stoltze said at the Nuremberg Tribunal, "with Ukrainian nationalists employed by the German Intelligence Service and with other nationalist fascist groupings. They were recruited for these purposes. I instructed OUN bosses, German agents Melnyk (code-name "Konsul-I") and Bandera, to inspire disturbances in the Ukraine immediately following the German aggression against the Soviet Union. These measures were intended to undermine the Red Army's rear and by this, also, to convince the world that the Soviet home front was being demoralized."¹

Stoltze testified that A. Melnyk became a German agent in 1938 when he assumed leadership of OUN after Konovalets' demise. Canaris had authorized the head of the diversionary department Lahusen and Stoltze to arrange through Jary Melnyk's enrollment as an Abwehr agent.

Stoltze noted that they had no difficulty in persuading Melnyk, who diligently executed Konovalets' assignments and was well-informed about the latter's links with the German intelligence. When Lahusen and Stoltze asked for his further collaboration he readily agreed. At the very first meeting with Lahusen and Stoltze, held at a secret address in Berlin, Melnyk forwarded his plans of intensifying the espionage activities of Ukrainian nationalists and organizing disturbances in Western Ukraine, if a German-Polish war was started. Together with his master-plan Melnyk handed them a bill of expenses Abwehr would have to reimburse OUN. The extension and improvement of constant personal connections between Ukrainian nationalists in Poland on the one hand and OUN and Abwehr on the other were considered by Melnyk as a top priority task for OUN.

At later meetings with Stoltze, Melnyk suggested that a separate intelligence service within OUN should be established to stimulate subversive activities of Ukrainian

¹ *Нюрнберзький процес* (The Nuremberg Tribunal), Vol. I, Moscow, 1952, p. 372.

nationalists and improve conspiratorial ties with the German Intelligence Service. Canaris endorsed Melnyk's suggestion and such an intelligence service was set up. The Germans appointed their agent Suszko, an Ukrainian nationalist, to head it.

Melnyk, as testified Siegfried Müller, a German intelligence officer captured by the Red Army during the liberation of Prague, collaborated with both Abwehr and the Main Imperial Security Board (RSCA). In 1940 Müller worked as the secretary at the 4th Branch of the RSCA and often saw Melnyk visiting Schroeder, who headed this branch. Here Melnyk reported information received from his agents and got the necessary instructions for further anti-Soviet activity. All the spying information on the USSR Melnyk, as Müller stated, obtained from Ukrainian nationalists living in Western Ukraine and his residents in Novy Zol in Czechoslovakia.

Bandera, Melnyk's rival, was enlisted as an Abwehr agent by Lahusen and Stoltze in October, 1939. According to Stoltze, Bandera was a very active agent, though a demagogue, a careerist, a fanatic and bandit, who was ready to commit any crime and ignore all principles of human morality to achieve his own ends. Bandera was constantly in touch with Lahusen, Stoltze, Major Derring and Sonnen-führer Marketh.

OUN, wholly supported by the German Intelligence Service and led by Abwehr's twins Bandera and Melnyk, proceeded a full-scale campaign to mobilize its forces for the coming battle against the Soviet Union.

The OUN camp, including both the Melnykites and the Banderites, was an organic part of the espionage and subversive machinery of Nazi Germany and under its direction carried out anti-Soviet subversive activities till the final defeat of the Nazis by the Soviet Army in 1945.

In the summer of 1940 the German Intelligence Service sent into Ukraine a Petliurist agent named Taras Borovets

("Taras Bulba") to organize in Rovno Region armed bands of Ukrainian nationalists which would begin subversive activities in the Red Army rear as soon as Germany began war.

Early 1941 several clandestine meetings were held by the German Intelligence Service with other Ukrainian nationalist leaders, namely Andrei Livitsky, who after the death of Simeon Petliura led the Petliura counterrevolutionary camp-in-exile and Pavlo Skoropadsky who had specially come from Berlin to the so-called Governor-Generalship to be closer to the border with Soviet Ukraine and to assume direct leadership of subversive anti-Soviet activities.

To better organize and direct the subversive activity of Ukrainian nationalists in Soviet Ukraine a so-called "insurrectionary staff" manned mainly by Bandera's camp was set up in Cracow. This body also had the task of spreading such activity in the western regions of Ukraine, restoring and re-modelling the old network and creating guerrilla forces to be used in event of war.

Special spy schools training men in the use of arms and explosives, in the forging of documents, and in conspiracy were established in the so-called Governor-Generalship. Those men were organized into espionage and subversion groups in Cracow, Byelsk, Sanok and Przemysl and then infiltrated into Soviet territory. Stores of arms, ammunition and explosives were stacked along the border; much of it was Polish taken by the Nazis after Poland's capitulation.

The extent of the subversive activity of the German Intelligence Service and the Ukrainian nationalists can be seen from events of the first eleven months of 1940 when Soviet border guards arrested hundreds of German spies¹ attempting to cross the German-Soviet border. Most of them were OUN members. Just before the war the Nazis formed march groups (*noxiðni zpynu OYH* — translated hereafter as "task forces") of propagandists and canvassers from

¹ "Krasnaya Zvezda", April 14, 1965.

Ukrainian nationalists. Exactly six such task forces were formed: three from OUN-Bandera and three from OUN-Melnyk. They were to enter Ukraine together with the German Army and use their knowledge of the Ukrainian language, customs and traditions to spread disbelief and doubt about the just war of the Soviet people against the Nazis, to praise the "greatness" of Germany and the "benefit" Ukrainians could get if they quietly surrendered. These OUN "task forces" also were to organize OUN cells and with the Nazi consent draw up a police force and bodies of occupational administration consisting of OUN members. They also were to carry out subversive actions against the most active Soviet and Party members on temporarily occupied territory.

In the winter of 1940-1941 the legion "Nachtigall" was formed at an army training camp in Neuhammer and included into the "Brandenburg" Battalion. To recruit people into this legion, Bandera visited several P.O.W. camps for Poles to enlist Ukrainian volunteers. The legion was placed under the command of Abwehr's Oberleutnant A. Herzner. R. Shushkevich was second-in-command. Political control over the legionaries was exercised by T. Oberländer.

Simultaneously in the outskirts of Vienna a similar legion "Roland" with R. Jary as commander-in-chief was formed. The Ukrainian nationalists bartered with the Nazis for the formation of a nationalist quisling government as soon as the Germans occupied Ukraine.

In one of his letters to Z. Knysh Melnyk boasted that Canaris promised him to solve in his favor the question of "independence" for Western Ukraine right after the occupation of Poland by the Wehrmacht. Melnyk also asserted that Canaris' words echoed those expressed in the Chancellor's office.¹

¹ Z. Knysh. *Перед походом на Схід* (Before the campaign in the East), Vol. I, p. 100.

OUN even went so far as to draw up and consult with Abwehr the key ministerial posts of a future "government". However, these plans were foiled by the Red Army liberation march into Western Ukraine.

The Nazis thoroughly planned their *blitzkrieg* against the Soviet Union. Ordered by Abwehr, the Ukrainian nationalists also drew up their plan generally known as "The struggle and activity of OUN during the war".¹

The plan actually consisted of detailed lists of people marked to be assassinated, and deported to concentration camps, as well as indications of how, where and when to destroy, how to bring maximum harm to the Soviet people and facilitate the victory of the Nazis.

"From the very onset of war," we read in this plan, "every Ukrainian nationalist must strive by all means (whether sabotage, misinformation) to create chaos and havoc in the Soviet administration, economy and mobilization to the Red Army". For those assigned to infiltrate into the Red Army, an instruction was issued to demoralize small units within the army and use them as "insurrectionary cells" for a coup d'état.

OUN members were to carry out sabotage and diversion in the rear of the Red Army, seize post-offices and radio-stations, cut Red Army communication wires, hold bridges and important cross-roads, block railway tracks. If those attempts failed the nationalists were advised to destroy those "objects". Much attention was given to "important crossings" which were destined to destruction "only in case of top emergency or if it meant a serious loss in the operational plans of the Red Army". Such acts, it was calculated by the master-mind of this plan, "would create more damage than the loss of a whole army division".

Much attention was given to the problem of captured

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 2, File I.

Red Army men. According to the plan, Ukrainian nationalists handed over regular soldiers to the Germans and shot political officers and communists themselves. NKVS¹ men and officers were to be liquidated in the most brutal fashion: burnt alive, strangled, quartered or hung.

Scientists and cultural workers of non-Ukrainian nationality were also doomed. Jews, it was said, "must be isolated and discharged from the administration and commercial bodies" and "if the need arose to retain an employee of Jewish origin", then it was instructed to "have the militia shadow him and liquidate him for the mindest demeanor". "Assimilation" of Jews was "completely prohibited". The nationalist reign, it was stressed, must be one of terror.

A pathological hatred emanates from every syllable of this disgusting document which can justly be called a fascist textbook for barbarous genocide, subversion and banditism. It is also a good illustration of to what lengths nationalistic fanaticism can go when it loses all sense of humaneness and moral integrity.

Dazu kame die Hilfe auf den Gebieten des Meldes und Nachrichtensens (Kurzwellensender) und der politischen Propaganda im Ausland die gestützt auf die weitverzweigten und z.T. ausgezeichnet organisierten ukrain. Emigrantenvereine im Ausland (USA und Kanada) und beim Völkerbund vorgesehen und vorbereitet war. Ich möchte vor alles feststellen, dass nicht die scheinbar planlosen kleinen Sabotageakte und Attentate, die übrigens nie von Deutschland organisiert waren, die Haupttätigkeit der Ukraine. Organisation bildeten, wie das von Polen gern behauptet und wenig gut unterrichteten Stellen in Deutschland von polnischen Agenten und politischen Gegnern der OUN gern zugetragen wurde.

II. Zusammenhänge. Bei der instellung der Unterstützung sind folgende Tatsachen von Bedeutung.

1. Getroffene Vereinbarungen. Vor etwa 10 Jahren wurde zwischen dem deutschen damaligen Abw. Chef, Oberst Gempf und dem jetzigen Führer der OUN Oberst Konovalec ein schriftlicher Vertrag geschlossen, nach dem die Ukraine. Organisation materiell unterstützt wurde, dafür Abw. die über das polnische Heer gewonnenen Nachrichten zugänglich gemacht wurden.... Später übernahm die Organisation auch noch die Vorbereitung von Kampf u. Sabotageaufgaben. Die regelmässigen monatlichen Zuwendungen haben bis zu 9000 RM betragen.

Die Zusammenarbeit war erfolgreich, führte aber schliesslich zur Verhaftung eines Teils der in MD eingespannten Persönlichkeiten. Die Lage wurde für die Ukrainer Wojewódzki und Reichsrats besonders schwierig als im Jahre 1928 annähernd 10 Ukrainer wegen Landesverrats im Gefängnis sassen und aus den eigenen Reihen der Vorwurf erhoben wurde, Konovalec opfere seine Leute deutschen Interessen. In diesem für die Organisation sehr schwierigen Zeitpunkt wurde plötzlich auf Veranlassung von Minister Grone durch Oberst

¹ NKVS — Narodniy Komisariat Vnutrishnikh Sprav.

Mitgliedern Verteidiger zu stellen. Es ist dann schliesslich erreicht worden, dass die Mittel im Laufe von mehreren Monaten abgebaut wurden und eine persönliche Verbindung bestehen blieb, um sich über die weitere Tätigkeit der Ukrainer orientieren zu können und im Bedarfsfall die Verbindung wieder aufzunehmen.

Unter Minister v. Schleicher wurde die Verbindung zu Konovalec wieder aufgenommen. Ende 1932 fand zwischen apitun Potsig Konovalec Jary und mir eine Zusammenkunft statt, in der eine erneute Zusammenarbeit vereinbart wurde, die uns die militärische Mitarbeit der OUN im Kriegsfall mit Polen sicherte. Diese Vereinbarung, die von Kpt. Potsig als "gentlemen agreement" bezeichnet wurde, wurde sorgfältig abgeschlossen. Konovalec äusserte hierbei etwa folgendes: 1928 sind uns plötzlich, ohne vorherige Ankündigung die Subventionen entgogen worden, als fast 100 Ukrainer wegen Spionagezwecken Deutschlands in polnischen Gefängnissen saßen u. die Organisation wegen ihrer deutsch-freundlichen Haltung den schwersten Vorwürfen der ukrain. Öffentlichkeit ausgesetzt war. Wenn ich jetzt wieder Deutschland gegenüber Verpflichtungen auf mich nehme, und zu d. Zweck Leute anstelle u. geldliche Bindungen eingehe, kann ich die Gewissheit haben, dass ich nicht wieder von heute auf morgen vor ein Nichts gestellt werde? Kpt. Potsig antwortete hierauf, soweit mir erinnerlich: Sollten politische Umstände ein Ausserkrafttreten unserer Vereinbarungen erfordern, so können Sie sicher sein, dass Ihnen die Möglichkeit gegeben wird, die Beziehungen in einer für Sie tragbaren Weise zu lösen.

Geldlicher Einsatz: Die Höhe der monatlichen Zuwendungen wurde erst Anfang 1933, nach Billigung des Minderheitenfonds (200,000 durch den Herrn Minister festgesetzt, Die regelmässigen Monatszahlungen betragen 7000 RM, daneben liegen Zahlungen für Sonderzwecke. Von der Marine sind einige 1000 Mark für Sabotagezwecke eingesetzt worden. (Werkstatt).

Pages from von Foss' Memorandum revealing who financed OUN and its potentialities as an espionage and subversive organization.

Berlin, den 21. Dezember 1938.
Schi./Ba.

A k t e n n o t i z !

Betrifft: Ukrainische Vertrauensstelle.

Rücksprache bei Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Gegenwart von Stabsleiter Schickendantz mit Admiral Canaris, Oberstleutnant Lahausen und Major Stoltze am 21. 12. 1938, 11 Uhr.

Admiral Canaris erläutert dem Reichsleiter die Art der Arbeit, die das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht mit der Konovaletz-Jary-Gruppe oder OUN seit Jahren aufgenommen hat. Er betont, dass die Einigung auf diese Gruppe nach Rücksprache mit dem Auswärtigen Amt und in Übereinkunft mit den Japanern vor sich gegangen wäre. Die Arbeit selbst betrifft Ausbildung in verschiedenen militärischen Dingen.

Zur administrativen Zusammenfassung der ganzen ukrainischen Emigranten hier haben langwierige Verhandlungen mit dem Auswärtigen Amt und der Geheimen Staatspolizei zur Errichtung einer ukrainischen Vertrauensstelle geführt, als deren Leiter vom Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ein Dr. Nikolaus Suszko vorgeschlagen worden wäre. Admiral Canaris betont nochmals, dass dieser Dr. Nikolaus Suszko nicht Mitarbeiter der Konovaletz-Jary-Gruppe oder OUN in irgendeiner Form gewesen sei. Dieses wäre ganz genau seitens des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht und der Geheimen Staatspolizei überprüft worden. Bei Gerüchten, die das Gegen teil besagten, lage eine Verwechslung mit einem anderen Ukrainer gleichen Namens vor.

First page of the secret document on a conference held by Rosenberg on December 21, 1938 discussing ways of employing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in espionage and subversive activities for Germany (Photocopy).

Unsere nähere und ferne Zukunft verbindet sich unlosbar mit der des deutschen Volkes.

Wir teilen mit freudigen Herzen das unerschütterliche Vertrauen, das heute im Deutschen Volke dem Gross-deutschen Reich und seinem Führer entgegengebracht wird.

Aus diesem Vertrauen heraus und im Bewusstsein der alten deutsch-ukrainischen Freundschaft wissen wir, dass wir bei Ihnen, Herr General-Gouverneur, Verständnis und wohlwollende Unterstützung unseres organisatorischen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Aufbaues, sowie unsere administrativen Mitarbeit finden werden.

Heil Hitler ! Slawa Ukraini !

Kraksu, den 17 November 1939.

Alfa *Visiting* *Spudko*
Mr. Lubomyrski *Hat*
Kepetzki *Dr. Stefan Wanawody*
Pelenkij *Dr. Wacław Biernacki*
M. Lubomyrsky *Dr. Stefan Wanawody*
Eugen P. Pelenkij

The last page of the letter sent by the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists to Adolf Hitler in which they gave an oath to closely collaborate with the "Great Third Reich" and asked for permission to create in Cracow the "Ukrainian Central Committee", 1939.

Paragraph 3 of the ill-famed "Akt" of June 30, 1941 after the War "revised" by Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. (Photocopy).

AN USSEREN FÜHRER.

51

Dem allgemeinen Willen der Ukrainer entsprechend, wurde heute die Unabhängigkeit und Vereinigung von sämtlichen ukrainischen Gebieten verkündet.


Die sehnsvollen Wünsche von vielen Geschlechtern haben sich erfüllt. Dein Kampf hat sich mit Erfolgen bekämpft. Das gesamte Ukrainische Volk hat sich zum weiteren Kampf um die volle Freiheit der Ukraine unter Deinen Fähnen eingefunden.

Wir glühen heute vor Wonne, beseelt von einer Idee, und einigen uns im Gedanken mit unseren Volksgenossen der gesamten Welt.

Ellen wir nach der ukrainischen Hauptstadt - dem goldkuppeligen Kyjiv! In diesem grossen Augenblick senden wir Dir, unerstümmlicher Held der Nationalen Revolution, unsere innigsten Wünsche. Wir sind überzeugt, dass Dein Vorhaben und das sehnliche Begehr des gesamten ukrainischen Volkes bezüglich der Wiederherstellung eines mächtigen Ukrainischen Staates sich verwirklichen wird.

HEIL DER UKRAINE!

Telegram sent to "our Führer Adolf Hitler"
by the nationalist rally held on June 30, 1941.



A Nazi criminal and a nationalist traitor on the same platform. June 1941. Tarnopol.

Тарас Бульба-Боровець
Полісся

ПЛАН

9. акції по боротьбі з большевицькими партизанами, сконцентрованою в Поліській кітловині в межах: Бересте - Мінськ - Гомель - Житомир.

На підставі інформаційних матеріалів зібраних нашою розвідкою, сила большевицьких парашутно-партизанських відділів, сконцентрованих в лісисто-багатистих теренах Полісся, складається в межах: Бересте - Мінськ - Гомель - Житомир, обчислюється на день 15.3.1943 року в 10 - 13.000 людей, плюс півмільйон 7.000 мобілізованих на місцях та всіх інших боях.

Парашутні відділи сильно озброєні автоматично-мінною зброєю та снарядами, а також регулярне постачання повітряними десантами з Москвою та районами з'язку. Мобілізовані на місцях банди озброєні слабко різноманітною зброєю, але так їх озброєння як і організація діяльності доповнюється від парашутістів через постачання до кожної наявної банди коміандного складу та снайдерів зілітаків на висоті 3000 метрів.

Банди мають заставлені головним чином вести всебічну розвідку в дільницях, не лісистих теренах, що робиться малими групами та поодинокими особами дуже конспіративно, а дальше виконувати до можна десантів. Десантів ведеться в загальному по лінії виканування на окупованих хімічною армією теренах абсолютного відсутності і германського підпорядкування. Приміт того десантів має заставлені за всяку ціну витягти в свою орбіту хомайдільські місцеві елементи та ініціювати як в цих організаціях.

Лімітаций згаданої сили виникає що найменше 2-3 хоп-партизанів на кожного першопризначника, так само як вони озброєні.

Лімітаций постулюється переважно по лінії виканування на місцевих теренах здійснення терорів сильними гарнізонами як забезпеченням перед новими десантами.

Основні принципи лімітаций акції:

1. Акцію веде українська партизанів під кодом коміандування, на підставі якого посвідченні з хімічною владою складається української партизанами 40.000 л.

2. Кінецька влада обіцяє поборіти одну й другу партизанську, а неофіційно підтримуючи українську партизанську і тільки постачає її військовими матеріалом.

3. Висадкова база акції - Пінськ округа. На якість зам.станиці українська партизанська маршує захопленням призначених для неї ешелонів військового матеріялу і з відмінною акцією відповідає її військовим.

4. В посвідченні з хімічною владою українська партизанів опановує діякії кількох центрів для організації там своїх штабів, постачання і т.д. Акція сконцентрується на Поліській кітловині.

5. На випадок зустрічі з фронтом по лінії Одеса-Хіз-Вітебськ-Ріго, українська партизанська влада Поліській кітловині по лінії фронту.

6. На випадок дальнішого маршу червоної армії на захід, українська партизанізається для десантів на большевицьких тилах, опановуючи дільниці з хімічною армією.

Полісся, дія 15.3.1943 р.

Тарас Бульба-Боровець



Taras Borovets' ("Taras Bulba") plan to counter Soviet partisans in Pollesia. (Photocopy).

"Volunteers" to SS Division "Galicia." Kubiovich is between two Nazi officers.

Der Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
für den Distrikt Galizien.

Nachrichten Übermittlung

Aufzeichnungszeit Jahr Monat Tag 8. Juni 1944 durch	Raum Nr. Elektrogrampel - 1. Jl. 1944	Befehlserhalt Zeit Tag Monat Jahr am durch
Geheim!		
Ü. Nr. 11862		
Telegramm - Funktelegramm - Fernschreiben Fernschach		
BLW. NUE. NR. 57404 8.6.44 2155 CSM		
AN DEN KDR. IN LEMBERG - Z. HD. V. SS - O STUBAF. DR. WITSKA - OVIA -		
GEHEIM -		
BETR: BERICHT V. 5.5.44 - IV N - 90/44 G. RS. ERBITTE UEBERSENDUNG GESAMTABSCHRIFT DES VORGANGES. IN ZUKUNFT VERBINDUNG MIT FRAU L. NUR UEBER MICH. -		
RSHA - IV B 2 KL. A - NR. 131 / 44 G. RS. 1. VM. GEZ. MUELLER SS - GRUF. +		
<i>H. Müller für Lebid</i>		

Telegram sent by Gestapo chief Meuller stating his interest in Lebid-Hnatkivska. (Photocopy).

Überhaupt nicht denkbar. Das von der UPA zur Verfügung gestellte Material auf militärischem Sektor sei äußerst umfangreich (10 bis 15 Meldungen täglich) und militärisch von der Truppe zum größten Teil verwertbar. Dazu komme, dass Einheiten der ukrainischen Banden in einigen Fällen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht gegen die Rote Armee bzw. bolschewistische Banden gekämpft hätten. Über den Wert dieses Fronteinsatzes bestehne noch keine genaue Übersicht. Jedoch hätten die UPA-Verbände bereits hohe Verluste und der Truppe an einigen Stellen in kritischen Momenten nicht zu unterschätzende Dienste geleistet. Entscheidend sei, dass erreicht werde, dass die ukrainischen Banden in der Frontzone den Kampf gegen die Deutschen aufgeben. Andernfalls wäre mit erheblichen Störungen des Nachschubs zu rechnen.

Abwehrkommando 202 (Oberstlt. Seliger).
Oberstlt. S. vertritt ähnliche Ansicht. Seine Aufgabe, Störungen hinter der Front durchzuführen, können nur mit der UPA gelöst werden. In den von den Russen besetzten Gebieten bestehne die UPA als einzige Gegnergruppe. Ihre Stärkung durch Lieferung von Waffen und Ausbildung von entsprechenden Kräften liege daher im Interesse der Wehrmacht. Die Verbindung zu den Verbänden hinter der Front könne jedoch nur durch die im deutschen Raum bestehenden Einheiten hergestellt werden. Es müsse daher in der Praxis aus dem galizischen Raum UPA-Leute erfassen und sie nach Ausbildung und Ausrüstung entweder durch Flugzeuge im russischen Raum abwerfen oder größere Gruppen durch Frontlücken durchschleusen. Die Genehmigung der Berliner Stellen liege dafür vor. Er stehe seit längerer Zeit durch einen Mittelsmann mit Schuchiewitsch in Verbindung und habe bereits einige Personen zur Ausbildung erhalten. Der Vorschlag des Soh., alle UPA-Verbände im Distrikt Galizien auszurüsten und sie allmählich durch Frontlücken durchzuschleusen, habe er vorsichtshalber nicht angenommen. Jedoch werde er in nächster Zeit im Einvernehmen mit Berlin eine ca. 100 Mann starke Gruppe im Frontabschnitt Delatyn-Stanislau unmittelbar vor der HKL bewaffnen und mit Hilfe der dort eingesetzten deutschen Einheiten hinter der Front bringen. Der Plan sei technisch durchaus durchführbar. Nach diesem ersten Experiment würden weitere folgen. Er, Oberstlt. S., sei sich durchaus im klaren, dass die auf diesem Wege ausgerüsteten Einheiten bei weiterem Vormarsch der deutschen Truppen evtl. den Kampf gegen die Deutschen aufnehmen könnten. Jedoch komme es z.Zt. dar auf an, Störungen im Rücken des Russen durchzuführen. Konkrete Aufträge würde er den UPA-Leuten

Second page of the document on a conference held by the German Intelligence officers in Lvov on April 19, 1944 in which OUN's activity for Abwehr was "highly praised".

Geh. Reichssache Eine Ausfertigung!Bericht!

Die 2. Zusammenkunft mit Herasimowskyj verzögerte sich dadurch, dass H. aus nicht bekannten Gründen nach Sniatyn gereist war und auf der Rückreise von Sniatyn nach Lemberg durch die augenblicklichen wehrmachtstransporte, Störungen auf der Ostbahn usw. länger als gewöhnlich aufgehalten werden war. Ferner war hindernd, dass der Mittelsmann B o l u c h z. Zt. nicht in Lemberg anwesend ist und eine neue Vermittlung nicht übernehmen konnte. Sie kam durch den Ukrainer M u d r yj nunmehr am 23.3.1944 zustande. Es konnte eine Zusammenkunft mit Herasimowskyj für den 23.3.1944, 15.00 Uhr, in der Wohnung des M u d r yj, Wojtowskastrasse 8/1 vereinbart werden.

Zu Anfang der Besprechung stellte Herasimowskyj fest, dass bei seiner Organisation über die mit mir in der ersten Besprechung vom 6.3.1944 behandelten Fragen völlige Klarheit herrsche und dass die im einzelnen abgesprochenen Punkte von der OUN definitiv anerkannt und angenommen würden. Die OUN erwarte von den Vereinbarungen mit der Sicherheitspolizei sehr viel sowohl für die Organisation selbst als auch für ein gegenseitiges Verständnis mit Hinsicht auf die zukünftige Entwicklung im großukrainischen Raum und vor allen Dingen auch mit Hinsicht auf die derzeitige Lage und den gemeinsamen Kampf gegen den Erfeind Bolschewismus. Man sei daher in der Führung der OUN überzeugt, dass die Sicherheitspolizei ihrerseits ebenfalls zur Anerkennung und Annahme aller in der ersten Besprechung behandelten Punkte bereit und bevollmächtigt sei.

Da auf den Bericht des Herrn Kommandeurs vom 13.3.1944 an den BdS. bisher weder von BdS. noch vom Chef der Sipo eine Entscheidung eingegangen war, dies jedoch im Interesse des Ansehens der Sicherheitspolizei und mit Rücksicht auf die offensichtlich gesetzte Bereitwilligkeit der OUN-Bandera-Gruppe, mit der Sicherheits-

Geh. Reichssache Eine Ausfertigung!

1.) Bei der Zusammenkunft des Herrn Kommandeurs mit Herasimowskyj am 27. März 1944 erwähnte Letzterer beiläufig, dass es einer UPA-Einheit hinter der Front gelungen sei, verschiedene bolschewistische Agenten festzunehmen. Der Anführer der drei oder vier Mann starken Agenten-Gruppe sei mit der Uniform eines deutschen Wehrmachtsoberleutnants bekleidet gewesen. Die Agenten-Gruppe habe außerdem Material bei sich gehabt, das mit dem Mord an Amtschef D. Bauer in Zusammenhang zu bringen sei.

Weiterhin sei es einer UPA- Einheit gelungen, 2 Agenten des bekannten Generals S e i d l i t z , des Führers der "deutschen Offiziers Vereinigung" in Moskau, mit erheblichem Material abzufassen.

H e r a s i m i w s k y j w i s s e n t i c h t , o b d i e v o n d e n U P A - E i n h e i t e n a b g e f a s s t e n A g e n t e n n o c h a m L e b e n s i n d . E r h a t s i c h j e d o c h d e m H e r r n K o m m a n d e u r g e g e n ü b e r b e r e i t e r k l ä r t , d a s e r f a s s t e B e w e i s - M a t e r i a l a n d i e S i c h e r h e i t s p o l i z e i a u s z u l i e f e r n u n d u. u. a u c h d i e A g e n t e n , w e n n s i e n o c h a m L e b e n s i n d , u n d d u r c h d i e F r o n t h i n d e r c h g e b r a c h t k ö n n e n . A l s G e g e n l e i s t u n g v e r l a n g t e H e r a s i -

Anweisung erteilen, dass die mit dem Transport beauftragten UPA-Kräfte gar nicht oder mässig bewaffnet sind. Herasimiwskyj wird sich persönlich in den Nähe aufhalten, um ggf. Schlichtend oder erklärend eingreifen zu können. Ich habe mich mit diesem Vorschlag einverstanden erklärt und soll am 9.5.1944 von Herasimiwskyj endgültigen Bescheid bekommen, wann und wo die ersten Fallschirmagente von der Sicherheitspolizei übernommen werden sollen.

Herasimiwskyj erbot sich auf Anfrage ferner, mir Material über die neue Stellung der sowjetruss. Politroks in den Roten Armeen und Unterlagen für die Tätigkeit des sowjetruss. Generals und Befehlshabers Zopajew zu liefern.

2.) KOA. G. Einmeeck

zur sofortigen Rückspache.

-Obersturmführer und
Kriminalkommissar.

IV N - 90/4446a.

Lemberg, den 11. Juli 1944.

1.) Schreiben:

An das

Reichssicherheitshauptamt

- IV N -

z. Hd. v. H-Stab u. Amtsgr.

-o. V. i. A. -

in Berlin.

Betrifft: Führungnahme der sowjetrussischen Aufständischen Armeen mit Dienststellen der Wehrmacht, Polizei und zivilen Verwaltung.

Vorgang: Laufende Berichterstattung.

Anlagen: Ohne.

Am 7.6.1944 hatte der N-Referent mit Herasimskyj einen weiteren Treff und besprach vornehmlich mit ihm den Einsatz von S- und F-Agenten hinter der sowjetruss. Front sowie die Abstellung von F-Agenten für den Fall, dass Teile des Distrikts Galizien im weiteren Verlauf des militärischen Geschehens noch geräumt werden müssten. Diese Besprechung diente auch den Interessen des hier stationierten Sonderkommandos "Zeppelin" sowie denen des dort. FS-Erlasses Nr. 63773 vom 27.5.1944 - IV A 2 b - 227/44g.

Hinsichtlich der Abstellung von F- und S-Agenten zum Einsatz hinter der sowjetruss. Front erklärte Herasimiwskyj, dass die UPA eine Verbindung zur Wehrmacht unterhalte, wie die Sicherheitspolizei, sie zur OUN-Bandera-Gruppe habe. Zwischen Wehrmacht und UPA sei bereits seit langerer Zeit vereinbart, dass der deutschen Wehrmacht F- und S-Agenten aus den Reihen der UPA zur Verfügung gestellt würden. Es erübrige sich daher, die in Betracht kommenden UPA-Angehörigen auch noch der Sicherheitspolizei bekanntzugeben. Vielmehr möge die Sicherheitspolizei der Wehrmacht konkrete Aufträge, die im sicherheitspolizeilichen Interesse lägen, bekanntgeben, damit sie von den F- und S-Agenten der Wehrmacht gleichzeitig mit erledigt werden könnten. Ich bitte um baldige Mitteilung, ob das dort. Einverständnis zu einem

Documents on the meetings between the Security police and SD and OUN Provid representative Hrynoch (Herasimiwskyj) in Lvov from March to July, 1944



Victims of OUN reign of terror in Ivano-Frankovsk Region.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE SWASTIKA

On June 22, 1941 Nazi Germany treacherously unleashed war against the USSR. One hundred and ninety German army divisions delivered a surprise attack on the Soviet frontier and breaking through the heroic resistance of Soviet border guards and front units of the Red Army started a wide offensive on Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev.

From the very beginning of the Nazi aggression nationalists in the anti-Soviet underground in Western Ukraine, acting on instructions from the OUN head offices in Cracow, launched a campaign of sabotage in the Red Army rear.

On July 28, near Przemysl, Lvov region, armed OUN gangs attacked convoys which mainly consisted of women and children being evacuated and small Red Army units. The same OUN gangs helped the Nazis occupy the town.

In the district of Rudky, the Nazis faced by fierce resistance from Red Army troops had to halt their advance. However, the information received from OUN agents who knew the locality very well enabled the Germans to skirt and move in from the rear of the Red Army positions. "The Germans profited from the information the local (nationalistic — *author*) youth gave about the enemy," boasted the nationalists, "and it was why the Bolsheviks were so soon defeated."¹

¹ За українську державність. Хто буде, а хто руйнує українську державність. (For an Ukrainian Statehood. Who builds and who destroys Ukrainian Statehood), 1941, p. 9.

In the town of Koziv, Tarnopol Region, armed nationalist cutthroats had already massacred the inhabitants before the Nazis came. OUNites also ambushed Red Army men, fired at their army trucks, and welcomed the Nazis with swastikas, and yellow-blue banners.¹ "Tarnopol Region (the nationalist organization of Tarnopol Region — *author*) not only helped the Germans", it is written in the brochure "For an Ukrainian Statehood". "It cleared the area of the enemy."

There were OUN gangs in Kosiv and Dolina districts, Stanislau Region (now Ivano-Frankovsk). "The Kosiv branches", it is further stated in the same brochure, "are flushing out and liquidating communists hiding in the surrounding woodlands. In the outskirts of Dolina partisans (OUN thugs—*ed.*) annihilated small Red Army units. Dolina district was combed and under control by our partisans long before the Hungarian troops came."

In Drohobich district Ukrainian nationalists tried to wage anti-Soviet propaganda among Red Army men and in Soviet institutions. OUNites seized Soviet activists, set fire to munition dumps, and in some areas even clashed with retreating Red Army divisions.

The same kind of activity was carried out by other nationalists in Volyn, Rovno and Chernovtsy Regions.

The Ukrainian nationalists rejoiced at the first Nazi victories. "At last the hour has come!" wrote the newspaper "Krakivski visti" in 1941. "Our dreams, our ambitions are now reality. This is our resurrection... The German Army is bringing us our cherished freedom".

The leaders of the Third Reich were buried under the laudatory messages coming from every Ukrainian nationalist organization. Those days Skoropadsky cabled Hitler: "Welcome personally and on behalf of the Hetmanite organization the war declared on the Moscovite International.

¹ The colours of the Ukrainian nationalists.

Accept our most earnest desire for Germany's total victory."¹

"Every one of us now is very happy," declared the Bander-a-controlled newspaper "Samostiyna Ukraina" which was printed in Stanislau. "We are all so happy that tears well in our eyes. Some of our people were so shocked by the good news that they fell ill from sheer happiness... Our liberation in the existing political atmosphere would have been impossible had not the Fuhrer made his historic decision." The newspaper went on to say that "the heroic German Army is helping to create an independent Ukraine and is bringing freedom to all the nations. Hence our deep emotions, our simple gratitude to the Fuhrer and his triumphant army, an army in which Ukrainians take pride (??). All our people, all over the country (??) are cheering their liberators... Glory to Adolf Hitler, the Fuhrer of the German nation! Glory to the heroic German Army!"²

The Ukrainian nationalists started their murderous march under the Nazi swastika. "Nachtigall" moved into Soviet territory together with the "Brandenburg" Battalion. By evening June 29, the legion drove into the suburbs of Lvov and its landsknechts spilled out into the streets killing everybody in their way.³

"Nachtigall" commander-in-chief R. Shukhevich and Chaplain J. Hrynoch had an audition with Sheptitsky, the Greek-Catholic metropolitan in Lvov. Informed about nationalist plans of forming a government Sheptitsky "gave his blessings" to all the legionaries and the future Ukrainian nationalist "government".

On June 30, OUN Provid led by Stetsko arrived in Lvov in Abwehr cars. The same day, in order to be the first to show their allegiance to the occupational forces, the Bandarites called a rally to read the "Akt" proclaiming an

¹ "Natsiya v pokhodi", No. 9—10, 1941, p. 1

² "Samostiyna Ukraina", June 7, 1941. Stanislau.

³ W. Brockdorff. Op. cit., SS. 130-131.

"independent Ukraine", and the formation of a "government" that in actual fact was Bandera orientated and wholly subservient to the Germans.

Documents give us a fuller description of these events. One of them stated that in the premises of the Ukrainian cultural-educational association "Prosvita", on June 30, 1941, "a big meeting of Ukrainians of Western regions" was held, where the "Akt" proclaiming an Ukrainian state and the first regional committee were passed.¹ Nothing is said in the document about the delegates at this rally. The fact is that all those present were Nazi SS and army officers, Ukrainian interpreters and representatives from Goebbels propaganda ministry, landsknechts from "Nachtigall" and nationalist bosses who had come to Lvov in the wake of Abwehr. Not a single representative from the working masses participated in this rally.² Hence, neither the population of Western Ukraine nor the more so the whole Ukrainian nation vested authority in OUN. The ill famed "Akt" of June 30, 1941 was really the Ukrainian nationalists' oath of allegiance to fascism, the dire enemy of all humanity.

"The newly-formed Ukrainian state," reads Paragraph 3 of the "Akt", "will closely collaborate with National-Social-

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine, Fund 3833, Specification I, File 207; Sheet 8. A well-known Ukrainian nationalist Pankivsky who attended this so-called "big rally" said of it: "Small, dark rooms, lighted only by flickering candles. The rally was badly organized: guests were ignorant of the reason for calling the rally. The puzzling atmosphere of urgency, the nervous bustling... At last the arrival of Stetsko, who, despite the warm summer night had rolled up the collar of his army mackintosh. He created no impression and he spoke so softly that people in the adjoining room could hardly hear him". (K. Pankivsky. *Biđ deržavu do komitety* (From a State to a Committee), p. 31.

² Pankivsky attempts to straighten out the situation by the fact that the rally was held at night and it was difficult to invite other people, since the Nazis had enforced a curfew forbidding persons to be out after 9 p. m.

list Great Germany led by her Fuhrer Adolf Hitler to create a new order in Europe and the whole world, and to liberate Ukrainians from Moscovite subjugation. The Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army, being formed on Ukrainian territory, will join the German Army in the common front against the Moscovite occupation of our sovereign and Christian country to create a new order all over the world."¹

The pompous ceremonies held each year by nationalists abroad to celebrate June 30 contrast with their reluctance to publish the full and unabridged version of this "Akt". The above-quoted from the "Akt" are rather too exposing and compromising. When forced to refer to the "Akt" the nationalists either completely omit Paragraph 3 or reinterprets its meaning. For instance, the editors of the nationalist newspaper "Homin Ukrainsky" which is printed in Toronto, Canada, in its July 14, 1962 issue "revised" Paragraph 3 of the "Akt" as follows: "The Ukrainian Army will continue to fight... for... a new and just order all over the world". Thus the first part of the paragraph covering the close collaboration with Nazi Germany in establishing a "new" order was completely omitted, as well as other "irrelevant" words from the second part of this paragraph. When on July 25, 1962 the progressive Ukrainian-Canadian newspaper "Ukrainske Zhittyia" published an article "Facts and Documents Correct the Shameful Big Lie of the Banderites" and gave the full text of the "Akt" of June 30, "Homin Ukrainsky" started a campaign of slander against "Ukrainske Zhittyia". In article "Moscow Agency in Action" "Homin Ukrainsky" declared that the "Ukrainske Zhittyia" reporter had never seen the original "Akt" of June 30 and had only opportunely used flyers and newspaper articles. Alas! The nationalists are trumps down. The text of this "Akt" written in hand by Stetsko, one of its main authors, can be found in the

¹ "Samostiyna Ukraina", July 10, 1941. Stanislau.

Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine.¹

The nationalist rally sent greetings to all the leading Nazis of the Third Reich. In their letter to the Führer, the Ukrainian nationalists wrote that his "struggle" has "triumphed" and that they, would continue to rally round his "call for further struggle." "Now we must move further on", said the Ukrainian nationalists "towards the Ukrainian capital, gold-cupolaed Kiev."

Those years, when Ukraine was scorched to the earth, when her people were fighting a life and death battle with fascism, the nationalist traitors called "the greatest moment", that gave them another occasion to extend to Hitler "their deepest gratitude."²

G. Koch and Keit, Canaris' confidential agents, attended the Ukrainian nationalist rally in Lvov. Koch made a speech on behalf of the German Army High Command. He congratulated the nationalists on their "independence" and called for a more active collaboration with the Wehrmacht and the Nazi occupational administration.

On the occasion of the occupation of Lvov by the Nazis and the declaration of a "sovereign" Ukraine, the Greek-Catholic metropolitan Andrei Sheptitsky issued on July 1, 1941 his "Pastoral Letter" in which it was said that "the rally of yesterday confirmed and proclaimed... a historic event." The metropolitan appealed to the population to "show gratitude to the Almighty, obedience to His Church and loyalty to the "government". "In time of war," he wrote, "much sacrifice is demanded, but the cause (verbatim — the cause of the Nazi aggression — author) begun in the name of God and with His Blessings, will come to a just end."

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 3, File 7, Sheet 34.

² Ibid.

The head of the Uniate Church went on further to say: "We greet the victorious German Army as our deliverer from the enemy. We render our obedient homage to the government which has been elected. We recognize Jaroslav Stetsko as Head of the state administration of the Ukraine."

At present, nationalists and the Uniate clergy abroad make attempts to twist the meaning of Sheptitsky's "Pastoral Letter" as well as that of the "Akt" of June 30. In post-war nationalist publications it is difficult to find the full texts of these documents.

Texts of the "Akt" and "Pastoral Letter" were printed as posters and billed to railings and buildings all over Lvov. For some days the nationalists broadcasted readings of the "Akt" and "Pastoral Letter" interluded by Nazi marching cadences.

True enough, Banderite leaders now dispute the fact that the Germans allowed them to use the radio station in Lvov. However, other Ukrainian nationalist sources, that then were not involved and thus, to a certain degree, can be said to be objective, give the opposite. For instance, R. Lissovy in his book "The Break-up of OUN" writes: "...the Banderite publication "The Liberation Policy" (Визвольна політика) (No. 4-5, 1946) included an article "The June Days" (Червні дати) in which it was stated: "For two days the radio station in Lvov transmitted to the rest of Ukraine news of the reinstatement of independence and the "Pastoral Letter" by the metropolitan Andrei Sheptitsky"... Could they have broadcasted the news of Ukraine's independence without the German's consent? Hardly likely, since the Germans are known for their orderliness and the radio station was right in Lvov not in the Gorgonne Forest.¹ It would be just as naïve to say that the Germans had the situation out of control. The first thing the Germans always did was to seize the most important objects which included

¹ Forest in the Carpathian Mountains.

communication (radio stations). In this instance, in Lvov, the fact that the Banderites were allowed to use the radio station for two days in no way committed the Germans.¹

There was a delay in the publication of the epistle by the head of the so-called Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church Polycarp Sikorsky. The nationalists said it to be "through technical reasons" at the print-shop in Lutsk. This Nazi collaborator wrote that "the road to our resurrection, the resurrection of the Ukraine, lies only in a close and honest co-operation with the Germans... We, ourselves, must work hard to hasten the triumphant end of this war for the future of our nation depends on it... Ukraine must sacrifice as her destiny undoubtedly, is closely interwoven with that of Germany."

Newly-baked nationalist newspapers gave wide publicity to these disgraceful documents. "...We Ukrainians," reads the article "Building a State" in the Stanislau nationalist newspaper "Samostiyna Ukraina", "must proceed to restore an Ukrainian statehood on our liberated land. This, in fact, is being carried out by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists headed by Stepan Bandera. Stepan Bandera is now the leader of our Ukrainian nation... as Adolf Hitler is of the German, as Mussolini is of the Italian, as Generalissimo Franko is of the Spanish, as Atatürk was of the Turkish, etc."

On the mainmast of the tower of Lvov's town-hall hung the swastika and four yellow and blue banners flanked each side. The building on 20 Rus Street in Lvov sheltered OUN headquarters under the direction of M. Lebed, Bandera's second secretary. Soon the building became the

Ukrainian nationalists' Mecca. OUNites from all corners of Ukraine came here to register "for history" their names and code-names and length of service in the organization. The building of 30 Valova Street in Lvov was used as a propaganda centre headed by S. Lenkavsky. The "George Hotel" (now Hotel "Intourist") served as an education centre supervised by B. Kordiuk. Eugene Wrencion was Lvov's police commissioner. The nationalist bosses drove about Lvov in German "Opels", "Wanderers" and "Volkswagens" that bore SD (security police) registration numbers.

Stetsko to make himself heard sent on July 7, 1941 another letter to Hitler, who had up till then ignored former congratulatory messages. It was stated in this letter that Ukrainian nationalists were aware of the Führer's wish... to create a new order on a foundation OUN appreciated to be only just. "We are deeply convinced and extend our most sincere wish that the cause initiated by you comes to its triumphant end,"¹ wrote Stetsko to Hitler or as he called him "the great Führer", "the leader of the struggle for a new world order". At the same time Stetsko sent his "most hearty greetings and great pleasure" to Mussolini and expressed his hopes for a "quick and complete victory" and his "strong confidence" that the Duce would recognize the Ukrainian "government" that through its "due service" occupies an "appropriate" place in the fascist camp. Similar letters and telegrams were sent to Goering, von Ribbentrop, Franko and other fascist leaders.²

To celebrate the "liberation" of Ukraine OUN held sittings, rallies and demonstrations. OUNites armed with cudgels and bayonettes herded people to these gatherings where

¹ R. Lisovy. *Розлом в ОУН. Критичні нариси до двадцятиліття заснування ОУН* (The Break-up of OUN. Critical review on the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of OUN), 1949, pp. 193-194.

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 3, File 7, Sheet 28.

² Ibid., Sheets 25, 30—33.

they were bullied into approving resolutions congratulating the Nazis and their allies on their victory. The nationalists also praised the Nazis through radio broadcasts, newspapers, leaflets, notices and bulletins. Lieutenant I. Klimiv a "commanding officer" of a non-existent "army" wrote in one of his orders distributed to nearly every town and village in Western Ukraine that "the German Army has come to Ukraine as an ally... We must regard it as such and aid the German Army in every way possible."¹ The nationalists took pains to make the Nazis feel masters of the land and mercilessly squashed any actions that could infringe upon their interests.

In the instructions to its branch offices, OUN exemplified that "towns and villages... must be decked with German flags and in the main streets arcs of triumph must be erected bearing the inscriptions: "Heil Hitler!", "Glory to OUN!", "Glory to Bandera!", "Long Live the German Army!", "Long Live Adolf Hitler!" Orders were also given to confiscate Soviet literature and portraits of Soviet cultural workers and political figures. The confiscated matter was to be heaped up in public squares and set to fire after appropriate public speeches had been made before a gathering. Instructions also demanded from the population the laying of fresh flowers on the graves of German soldiers as such a gesture would be one of "most profound respect". All OUNites visiting these graves were ordered to give the Nazi salute.² In every town and village of Western Ukraine nationalists organized "thanksgiving days for the "liberty" bestowed on them by Adolf Hitler and the German people". These ceremonies usually ended in bloody massacres. Children, women and old people were killed with unprecedented bru-

tality. In the cellar of the building on 12 Mokhnatsky Street in Lvov the nationalists had their "inquisition chamber". Scores of Poles and Jews were murdered there. Some of those doomed were thrown from the balcony onto the cobbled courtyard below. OUN boss M. Lebed and Nazi officers were responsible for the tortures and murders. On the night of July 3-4, 1941 "Nachtigall" legionaries together with the Gestapo executed many prominent scientists and cultural figures in the Vuletski Hills in Lvov. Among those killed were Professor Boj-Zielenski, a Slavivist; Professor K. Bartel, former Polish premier; I. Ostrovsky, R. Rencki, G. Hilarowicz, prominent physicians; Professor R. Loncian de Berier and many other intellectuals.

On October 22, 1959 a press-conference for German and foreign correspondents was held in Berlin. During the press-conference it was stated that on July 1-6, 1941 Ukrainian nationalists from the Legion "Nachtigall" under the command of A. Herzner and T. Oberländer killed 3,000 Poles and Jews in Lvov. Bonn in an attempt to exculpate Herzner and foremostly Oberländer¹ immediately published the text of the "Attorney's Conclusion" in which Bonn's jurists shifted the blame for the crime onto the Ukrainian nationalists, who, they said, acted arbitrarily and counterwise to the orders of the German commander-in-chief... The murder of Lvov citizens, the "Attorney's Conclusion" reads, were committed by soldiers and officers from "Nachtigall" and the Ukrainian police in Lvov. Such acts were part of the plan of exterminating the Jewish population in Lvov, and first of all Communist Party members and their sympathizers, as well as a large section of the Polish intelligentsia, in particular, the professorate of the university... Mass arrests were made with the Ukrainian police in Lvov participating... Most of the arrested... were shot on orders of...

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 1, File 41, Sheet 6.

² Ibid., Specification 9, File 90, Sheet 20.

¹ Oberländer was then West Germany's minister in charge of displaced persons.

Doctor Rosch, the commander-in-chief of the SS Einsatzgruppe (task force).¹

Thousands of dead bodies were left behind the "Nachtigall" legionaries in Zlochov, Tarnopol, Sataniv, Vinnitsa and other places in Ukraine and Byelorussia. Massacres committed jointly by the Nazis and the Ukrainian nationalists took place also in Stanislau (now Ivano-Frankovsk). During the first few days of German occupation 250 people, mainly teachers, engineers and lawyers were killed in this town.

OUNites were especially savage with the Jewish population. The first few months of German occupation of Western Ukraine saw the death of thousands of Jews in Lvov, Stanislau, Lutsk, Tarnopol, Nadvirny and Zlochov.² "We saw ditches five metres deep and twenty metres wide in which were men, women and children, mostly Jewish. There were about 60 to 80 people in each ditch," wrote a former Nazi general Doctor Otto Korfes. "We could hear their moans and screams as the hand grenades exploded among them. Alongside the ditches stood up to 12 men in plain clothes and they were throwing the grenades into the ditches ... Later Gestapo officers told us that those men were Banderites."³ This atrocity was committed in Zlochov near Lvov on July 3, 1941.

In response to the mass executions and massacres an attempt on Stetsko's life was made in Lvov on July 8, 1941.

An unidentified man shot at Stetsko as the latter was climbing out of his car. But the bullet missed Stetsko and

¹ Archives of Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine Institute on Party History. Fund 57, Specification 4, File 338, Sheet 510.

² In a trial held in Münster (West Germany) in 1966 G. Krieger was accused of killing 26,000 Jews while acting as Chief of the Security Police and SD in Stanislau during the period July 1941 — July 1942. Ukrainian nationalists were also accused with him. ("America", Sept. 2, 1966).

³ "Mitteilungsblatt", Berlin. No. 11, 1959.

injured the driver. The would-be assassin escaped. Later Stetsko evoked this incident in his biography: "The appropriate German authorities (the security police SD — author) promised that reprisals would be taken against the Poles since the German Stellen considered the distribution of the anti-German and anti-Ukrainian (???) leaflets and the assassination attempt to have been instigated by Polish circles." The promise was kept and the Nazis shot about 200 Jews and Poles in Lvov.¹

It would be difficult to find a town or village in the western regions of Ukraine where during the occupation the Ukrainian nationalists did not mutilate, torture or kill innocent people. The bloody reprisals continued for over a month ... And then the nationalist Provid received the shock of their life.

While "premier" Stetsko grovelled before the mad Führer and begged him for official recognition of his "government", Berlin was deciding the matter to its own taste. Hitler ordered on July 17, 1941 the transfer of administrative power on occupied Soviet territory to the *Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete* headed then by Rosenberg. Ukraine was carved up by the Nazis. Galicia was included as a separate district to the so-called General-Gouvernement. Odessa Region, the southern part of Vinnitsa Region and the western part of Nikolaev Region were merged into a "Transnistria" and handed over to Romania. The greater part of Ukrainian territory made up the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine and was divided into five General-bezirke. Other occupied territory was directly controlled by the German Army.

Hence, the "state" proclaimed by the OUN "Akt" of June 30 turned out to be mere fiction. Except for Stetsko's "regional committee", denied by the Germans even in

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification I, File 207, Sheet 179; Specification 3, File 7, Sheet 4.

premises, there were no other "state" institutions. All power was in the hands of the Germans. Ukraine was ruled by Nazi gauleiters, gouverneurs and general-kommissars.

So, what did the Nazis do with Stetsko's "regional committee"?

They could easily liquidate its members, a practice frequently used against their political opponents. But this time they did not. The Ukrainian nationalists and their bosses — Bandera, Stetsko, Lebed and Lenkavsky in particular, were too good to lose. The moreso since developments on the Eastern front and on the occupied territory were turning against them. To find a way out of the situation Bandera and Stetsko were unceremoniously summoned to Berlin. It gave rise to rumours that they had been "arrested". However, as Stetsko put it in his biography, the "arrest" was terminated shortly.

"It was my roster day when at 4 p. m. the Gestapo came and told me that I was arrested and was to be convoyed to Berlin," wrote Stetsko, "On Wednesday they brought me to Cracow from where on Thursday I was already in Berlin and on Friday I was released."¹

In Berlin the Nazis reprimanded the Provid for its arbitrariness and demanded proposals to be worked out for the annulment of the "*Akt*", insisting, however, on a further collaboration. Such proposals were written by Bandera and Stetsko and handed over to the Nazis for approval.²

It was stated in these papers, among other things, that UVOD and later OUN had long collaborated with the Germans, first with the Weimar Republic, then with the Third Reich. It was also stressed that the foreign policy of the Ukrainian nationalists had always been based on accord

¹ Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Institute on Party History. Fund 3833, Specification 3, File 7, Sheet 5.

² Ibid., Specification I, File 39, Sheets 1—10.

with Germany. The success of our collaboration wrote Bandera and Stetsko can be confirmed by the German Intelligence Service, which maintained constant ties with OUN.

In helping the Nazis to spread fascist ideology the nationalists hoped to get little favours from the Third Reich. Such sort of activity was not the only way OUN displayed its loyalty to Germany. The "*Akt*" of June 30 outlined the general direction of the nationalists' policy in which prominence was given to an "eternal unity" with Germany. "What else can be a clearer proof of our friendship," was the pathetic cry from Bandera and Stetsko, "than the declaration of such a policy in our document which has been widely publicized all over the Ukraine?"

The nationalists repented of the events of June 30 and asked the Nazis to regard them as a blunder and not as "a lack of discipline". And they presented arguments of their loyalty, which are as follows: firstly, the Ukrainian nationalists were always consistent enemies of the Soviets; therefore it is evident that they are sincere in their desire to participate in this war and carry out any assignment whether it be killings, hangings, transporting people to labour in Germany, pillaging, blowing up factories and plants, rooting collective and state farms, disrupting transport and communications, stealing or spoiling cultural treasures, acting as a punitive police force, or as spies, saboteurs, terrorists on Soviet territory or on the front-line or in partisan detachments. They were also ready to infiltrate into the anti-German underground and work there as informers for the Gestapo. In other words the nationalists were ready for any job to retain co-operation with the Nazis.

Secondly, long before the war began OUN Provid tried to contact leading Nazis in order to receive direct instructions from them on their competency to act but failed. On the eve of the war with the Soviet Union Stetsko had tried to discuss the question in the foreign political department of the Nazi Party. Doctor Leibrandt a functionary of the

department to whom Stetsko applied, declined to discuss the matter. Another nationalist boss V. Stakhiv who tried to get in touch with him on the matter also failed. The Nazis did not want to condescend to discussions with the nationalists, neither did they want them to come knocking at the door. Convinced of the uselessness of such discussions the Nazi Party leaders sent the nationalists to intelligence service chiefs to whom OUN was devoted body and soul.

To soothe their loyal subjects the intelligence bosses promised them "Golden Days", a positive solution of the "independence" question, the formation of a nationalist "government", the appointment of the most helpful and zealous agents to key posts, benefits and big rewards. These were but promises since the Intelligence Service had no right to meddle in political matters, and, secondly, the politicians in charge had not authorized them to deal with such matters. Trusting naïvely the German Intelligence promises and hoping for the German government to yield to a compromise, OUN declared an "independent" Ukraine by the "Akt" of June 30. If there had been no misunderstanding between the German Intelligence and Bandera and Stetsko, the "Akt" of June 30 would have never been published. Therefore, there would have been no dissatisfaction on the part of the German Chancellor, and Bandera and Stetsko would not have had to argue of their loyalty. However, the fact remained a fact. The "Akt" of June 30 did exist as did the "regional committee".

And it would hardly suffice, reasoned Bandera and Stetsko, to have the "Akt" quashed as it would bring another blow to the morale in OUN ranks, "decline the ardour to work" and end their "joy of tasting the long-forbidden fruit". The annulment of the "Akt" would have had indeed "negative repercussions" for it would have been a clear demonstration of OUN venality which brought it the ill fame as an appendage of the German Intelligence Service. The nationalists as presented by Bandera and Stetsko feared that

the Soviet press and others sympathizing with it would use the incident "to suit their ends" as was with the annexation of Galicia, to the General-Gouvernement, when the Soviet press acidly commentated that "the Germans used the Ukrainian nationalists to gain their own ends" and then dumped them onto the rubbish tip of history.

Bandera and Stetsko being curbed by the *Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete* and fearing complications proposed not to annul the "Akt" of June 30, not to dissolve their "government" but create an "Ukrainian National Council" in Lvov which, in fact, would have no political functions. The "Ukrainian National Council" would fulfill the instructions of the gouverneur of Galicia and would assist the Nazis to establish a "new order" in the western regions of Ukraine. "We hope," wrote Bandera and Stetsko, "that such a solution on the one hand will satisfy Ukrainian nationalists, and on the other will not harm the prestige of Germany."¹

The Nazis accepted such a solution. The "council" was formed quietly without any acts, decrees or proclamations, without the fanfare and inaugural speeches. When passions had abated, the "council", obedient as it was, was dissolved.

The further collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis was dictated by the failure of the *blitzkrieg* and the growing anti-Nazi underground on occupied Ukrainian territory. OUN-Bandera was assigned the task of camouflaging its political image in the worsening situation.

At first, Stetsko and Bandera were under house arrest in Berlin. The leadership in OUN was transferred to Lebed, Bandera's second secretary. To instruct him "arrested" Stetsko met with Lebed in Cracow.

OUN-Bandera was instructed to adapt itself to the political scene in the western regions of Ukraine it was assigned

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 3, File 39, Sheets 1-10.

to survey. It also had to conduct a wide-scale nationalistic provocative and undermining campaign to enmesh the gullible and hinder the emergence of a full-scale anti-Nazi movement among the Ukrainian population. Stress was laid on stopping the possibility of a build-up of a Soviet resistance and the conduct of a partisan warfare against the Nazi butchers in Western Ukraine.

The Banderite propaganda continues to state that the "Akt" of June 30, 1941 was endorsed without German consent, and was a challenge to the German occupation. This is not true.

The third paragraph of the "Akt" of June 30, quoted above, exposes OUN attempts to change the direction of this document. Nothing is more clearly stated in this document than the fact that OUN would co-operate closely with Nazi Germany in creating a "new fascist order" in Europe and the world. Several representatives from Abwehr, among whom was G. Koch, specially entrusted by Canaris, attended the meeting where the "Akt" of June 30 was read. For two days the Banderites used the radio station in Lvov for their propaganda purposes. The Germans gave a free hand to the Banderites and their counterparts in the occupied city. "All this was done," writes R. Lisovy, "with the condescending attitude and tacit consent of the Germans. The situation was such that the public was under the impression and even positive that everything had been settled with the Germans.

"Could it mean that the Germans were shocked at the audacity of the Ukrainian nationalists or confounded as state the Banderites? Had the Germans been so shocked or confounded they would have quickly come to their senses and would have struck back immediately as only they were capable of doing. In actual fact, the reasons are much more simple. One cannot say that the Germans that occupied Lvov in those days had some singular political insight, but they were able to distinguish properly what was important. They permitted the Banderites to broadcast, to "celebrate"

and in general create an atmosphere of exhilaration with the streets decorated by Ukrainian national standards and plastered over with posters and "manifests." It in no way committed the Germans, nor did it incur expenses. However, the Germans did reap the harvest: the Banderite propaganda deceived the population as to the actual state of affairs."¹

In this instance, the Banderites acting as the Nazi accessories tried to foster a pro-German sentiment among the population, spread lies about the German plans and intentions. The Nazis, naturally, appreciated the situation. They had made a stake on the outcome the news of an "independent Ukraine" would have on soldiers of Ukrainian nationality in the Red Army, and on Ukrainians of the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

When it was evident that the stake was lost, that the Soviet Ukrainians, contrary to the Ukrainian nationalists' expectations, joined other Soviet nationalities to defend the Fatherland, the Germans isolated several of the most obsessed Banderite leaders and ordered the others to adhere to their principles and will.

Why was Lebed made OUN leader?

In 1935 the official Polish press as well as that of the Ukrainian nationalists' gave wide coverage to the assassination of Poland's internal affairs minister Peracki. Detailed information was given also about one of the assassins, a professional terrorist Eugene Skyba. Only a handful of people knew of the panic the arrest had caused in German military intelligence circles. The German military intelligence spy network in Poland was on the brink of failure. In a secret German document "On the arrests in Danzig (Gdansk — author) and Stettin (Szczecin — author) on the demand of the Polish Police" it is stated that "On June 23, 1934 an East Prussian steamboat sailing from Sopot to Swinemünde (Swinoujscie — author) carried a passenger,

¹ R. Lisovy. Op. cit., pp. 197—198.

a Ukrainian by nationality, Eugene Skyba ... He had with him important documents for the Germans ... The German intelligence in Swinemünde received a cable about his due arrival. Evidently the Polish police ... learnt about it ... only on his departure from Sopot ... otherwise they would have demanded his extradition in Danzig. Undoubtedly, the Polish police had had information about Skyba's espionage work and had done everything possible to arrest him. The Poles based their warrant for arrest on the fact that Skyba was involved in the assassination of Peracki. Skyba was arrested in the presence of G. Stark, the Polish consul-general in Stettin, who, claimed to have actually seen the documents and notebook on Skyba. The whole German spy network where Ukrainian nationalists were employed was jeopardized." The arrested spy had a forged passport under the name of Skyba which he claimed to have received from German intelligence officers in Danzig (Gdansk). The spy Skyba was nobody else but Lebed himself. Before extraditing him the Germans brought Lebed (alias Skyba) to Berlin to obtain from him the necessary information and to instruct him on how to behave during the trial.¹

During the trial Lebed did not betray his accomplices. Abwehr naturally was very pleased with his behaviour and it was one of the reasons for his appointment to the post of OUN leader.

Bandera was under house arrest somewhere in Berlin.²

¹ During the trial in Warsaw, G. Stark testified that after Abwehr the notebook owned by Lebed had considerably thinned from the one he had inspected during the arrest and search of Lebed in Swinemünde.

² Pankivsky, well-informed on the nationalists, wrote that Bandera and others nominally under house arrest were allowed to carry on their political activities in Berlin, though they were prohibited to leave the city. (K. Pankivsky. *Роки німецької окупації* (The Years of German Occupation), New-York — Toronto, 1965, p. 146); J. Armstrong reiterates this point in his book "Ukrainian Nationalism". The arrests he describes as an "honorary arrest".

Some assert that he was interned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp but isolated from other inmates. The Nazis did not arrest rank and files of OUN but fostered their transition to an "illegal" position. Strong support was given by the Nazis to one of "Nachtigall" commanding officers and cavalier of the Nazi Iron Cross R. Shukhevich, who together with his legionaries took part in punitive raids on the population and on partisan detachments in Byelorussia. Other leaders of an "illegal" OUN — D. Chizhevsky, M. Korzhian, M. Matvienko and others, were official agents of the German security and Intelligence Service during the German occupation of Ukraine. Lebed "toured" the western regions of Ukraine in a car that bore the security police and SD registration numbers and carried out tasks assigned to him by these bodies.

The OUN-Bandera Provid feared any signs of "spontaneous emotional reaction" against the Germans from OUN members for it displeased the German authorities and affected OUN-German relations. That is why the OUN Provid demanded from its activists that anti-German sentiments be nipped in the bud. For this purpose numerous communications, appeals and leaflets were distributed by the nationalists among the population.

On August 4, 1941 Stetsko sent from Berlin a special bulletin appealing to OUNites to "pursue with determination their struggle and use every method possible" against the Soviet Union, "to help the German Army conquer Moscow and vanquish Bolshevism."¹

In a declaration dated August 7, it was stated that OUN "will never accept the idea of an anti-German underground" and "will oppose any signs of spontaneous emotional reaction lacking any sense of reality and comprehension of the

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification I, File 6, Sheet 3.

present transient situation", and endangering the nationalist-Nazi co-operation. It was stressed in the declaration that OUN would continue "to co-operate with all of Germany's allies fighting the Soviet Union and would contribute to "the creation of a new order" with the Ukrainian nationalists, naturally, playing their modest role.¹

The nationalists regarded any assistance given to the Nazis in plundering Ukraine and deporting her people to slave labour in Germany as their contribution to the war against the USSR.

"History and geopolitical reality," wrote Stetsko in his biography, "determined the fate of Ukrainian nationalists and the Nazis... taking into consideration the fact that we win or lose together with Germany now fighting bloody battles... in the steppes of Ukraine for our common cause, we must, fully and unconditionally support her... since it is a question of common success or failure. Moreso... the great losses suffered by the German Army, we understand, must be remunerated. Ukrainian nationalism must, should and will remunerate."²

Millions killed, maimed and deported to slave labour, burnt in the crematoriums of Ausschwitz (Oswiencim), Majdanek, Treblinka and Buchenwald, thousands of ruined towns, villages, factories and plants, collective- and state-farms: this was their remuneration.

Much of it was the job of the Legion "Nachtigall". In the autumn of 1941 discussions were held in the front division of Abwehr that supervised operations by "Nachtigall" on a more effective use of nationalist landsknechts for anti-Soviet warfare. It was even proposed to send "Nachtigall" in full force or in detachments into Soviet territory for diver-

sive and terroristic activities. This proposal was strongly upheld by the Legion's nationalistic commanding body. However, the Nazis had other plans: they needed trained men to act as a punitive force in suppressing the resistance which with every day unfurled with an ever greater force. "Nachtigall" was remodelled into the *Schutzmanschaft-201* — a battalion of military police, and sent as an expeditionary force to comb out partisans in Byelorussia.

Soviet patriots, against whom this punitive unit was directed, were frequently able to strike back at the Nazi mercenaries. The battalion suffered heavy losses that seriously affected its morale. "The railroads are mined and sharpshooters often harass us," complained Chaplain V. Durbak. "September was full of such surprises. The partizan detachments have become a very dangerous regular army. On September 30 I gave funeral mass to twenty-six of our best and bravest boys. We did not expect matters to end this way... There seems no end in sight to it all. Wooden crosses is what one can see on our march which was intended to take us to Kiev. Instead, we are in the bog-land of Byelorussia and have already lost hope of ever seeing our gold-cupolaed (Kiev — *author*), more likely we shall lay our young heads on a foreign land, for an alien cause..."¹

In the years when the Ukrainian people together with other Soviet peoples fought a deathly battle with fascism, where for one killed ten came to revenge, OUN appealed to the Ukrainian population to be "alert and organized", and foremostly, to thwart attempts by Soviet patriots, and their anti-Nazi sympathizers, who, they said, on the one hand, wanted to exclusively use for this purpose Ukrainians (thus the impression is created that other nationalities of the Soviet Union did not participate in the anti-Nazi movement!), and on the other wanted the retaliating "superior

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 1, File 42, Sheet 2.

² Ibid., Specification 3, File 7, Sheet 6.

¹ The Central State Archives on the History of the Ukr.SSR in Lvov. Fund 201, Specification 4(b), File 2693, Sheets 40-41.

German forces to bleed white and weaken" the Ukrainian nationalist organization. "It is a fact," states OUN, "that for every dead German, scores even hundreds of Ukrainians die."¹

The nationalists reiterated that their only enemy and only target remains Moscow and the world communist movement.

The Communist Party and the Ukrainian government in their appeals to the population of the occupied regions exposed the vile deeds of these bourgeois-nationalist hirelings, revealed to the Soviet people all the abomination of their provocative activities. "Within the German Army," reads the appeal of the government of the Ukrainian SSR to the population of the occupied regions, "are Petliurist Judas fed on crumbs from the rich man's table in Berlin. They call themselves Ukrainian nationalists. Their leaders all those Skoropadskys, Melnyks and Banderas are simply Hitler's agents... They have given an oath of allegiance to the dirty flag with the swastika. The interests of Ukraine, of her people are strange and distant to them. As their Nazi mentors they, too, resort to lies, act as informers and provocateurs... They speculate on the nationalistic feelings of Ukrainians and this way hope to divert attention from the real need to fight the Germans."²

Three OUN-Bandera task forces were sent to the temporarily Nazi occupied territory of central and eastern Ukraine to launch a pro-German propaganda campaign among the population. They reached Kiev, Sumi, Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa. In these regions of Ukraine, regions the Ukrainian nationalists referred to as "jungles", "Eastern Ukrainian barren wake", populated by "dung" and "pleb society", they

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 2, File 18, Sheet 83.

² Zvernenya do naselenya okupovanych rayoniv Ukrayini. Ukrvidav Tseka Kape (b)U, 1943, p. 11—12.

began the job of "cultivating" the Soviet people in the spirit of fascism à la Doncow. Big was their surprise when instead of "beggars and slaves" the nationalists found a people with a culture superior to theirs.

In reports of Nazi *kulturträgers* quoted in the book by a well-known OUN member Shankovsky, we find further proof of that fact: "One can come across an ordinary village girl ... during our talk we discover that the girl is well-versed in mathematics, physics, chemistry ... had finished a secondary school and worked as a tractor driver ... In other cases one could meet a former university, medical institute or teachers' college student among the village girls. Such cases are frequent." Indignation was the reaction of Shankovsky to those facts he stigmatized as "corruption" as "the result of a twenty-year Soviet domination of the Ukraine." Shankovsky continues: "People are well-informed. Peasants can discuss any topic from politics to every-day matters ... Our fellows foundered in discussions on professional questions or knowledge of state structure ... I was showered with hundreds of questions ... I confess that ... it was not easy to find the answers ... Our people found themselves often in deep water especially when listeners got at them with their questions.¹

OUN members were really in a jam: they had to capitulate on ideological and political grounds. Honest people could not stand nationalistic trash. One Ukrainian nationalist priest Father Ohienko sent by the Germans to Kiev, complained in a letter to his friend: "I have been here for already a few months but I can find no spiritual peace. You cannot imagine how Bolshevism has changed everything ... People are malicious and take us for enemies; that way per-

¹ Shankovsky. *Похідні групи ОУН* (March Groups of the OUN), Munich, 1958, p. 72.

haps, their forefathers once treated the Tatars ... Complete disrespect ... Everywhere we find pointed hostility. All Ukrainians arriving from the outside i.e., us, they call fascist spies, Hitler's hirelings which I must admit is partly true... The Germans really do assign us the dirtiest jobs."¹

All sorts of declassed and criminal elements joined OUN. Shankovsky wrote of this: "...an Odessa bum... jauntily steps into the ranks of the Ukrainian underground and offers his unlimited knowledge of the locality and his ability and daring in difficult situations." So, Shankovsky candidly states that Odessa bums and criminals became first-rate Ukrainian nationalists. Some of the OUN songs sung later by OUNites originated from this strata.

The jingoistic slogan "Ukraine for the Ukrainians" once concocted by an Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist ideologist Mikhnovsky drove the OUNites to declaring as unholy everything and everybody not in support of them. This was done purposely since each crime was absolved by the OUN Provid "indulgence" known as "The Struggle and Activities of the OUN during the War", which is a document of treason and political subterfuge. Other Ukrainian nationalists, especially the Petliurists, also closely collaborated with them.

As soon as Germany declared war on the USSR, a number of groups of Petliura-orientated nationalists were formed. They began subversive activities in the marshlands of north-west Ukraine. These groups were led by the German spy Taras Borovets. Their goal, as T. Borovets put it in his Order No. I. of June 28, 1941, was "to create small insurrectionary groups for subversive activities in the Red Army rear." They were to blow up railways, communication lines,

disrupt transport, collect precise information on Red Army defense installations and pass on such information to Borovets personally, who then would communicate it to the Germans; prevent the mobilization to the Red Army, seize towns and villages left by the Red Army and form there a nationalist police, fly the yellow and blue banner and organize grand welcomes to the Nazis when they come.

On July 17, 1941 the German Army High Command rewarded T. Borovets for his "services" by appointing him *ataman* of a reserve armed force of nationalists that were to liquidate groups of Red Army men encircled in Pollesia, from whence the reserve armed force name "Pollesia Sich" originated. For five months up to November 1941, "Pollesia Sich" led by T. Borovets began to wipe out Soviet resistance in the forests and marshlands of the Pollesia "pot". Since the "Pollesia Sich" operatively fulfilled its task the Germans sent it to the east to Chernigov to liquidate there some Red Army units that had lagged behind and were trapped in the boggy forests.

Special Nazi units did not venture into these forests and had left the job here to the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. To exist, Borovets' band marauded and plundered everywhere and as this always carried with it an element of danger Borovets asked the Germans for provisions and weapons which was refused since it entailed the inclusion of "Pollesia Sich" to the Wehrmacht, an act counterwise the regulations and orders of the Nazi ruling clique, that in the first stage of the war with the Soviet Union was certain of the success of the *blitzkrieg*, and had no intention of sharing the booty with her vassals, important or minor collaborationists.

The Nazi Army command underestimated the growing resistance and disbanded the "Pollesia Sich". Part of its body worked as an auxiliary police force, the rest returned home.

¹ Quoted from the magazine "Suchasne i maibutnje", 1948, No. 4, p. 72.

² The Central State Archives on the History of the Ukr.SSR in Lvov. Fund 358, Specification 1, File 11, Sheet 6.

Prior to disbanding "Pollesia Sich", the Germans planned the mass murder of the Jewish population in Olevsk, Zhitomir Region, and used this armed band for the purpose. On November 19, 1941 the "Sich" shot 535 innocent men, women, children and the aged. SS Hauptsturmführer Gitschke, sent specially from Zhitomir as the Gestapo supervisor, commanded this operation.

With this bloody crime ends the first stage of the "Pollesia Sich" activity led by its Petliurist, Ataman Borovets.

Later on demand of the German Intelligence Service, Borovets summed up the activity of "Pollesia Sich" in his report "The History of the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (UPA)" which he wrote in 1944. "The Pollesia Sich," he states, "carried out many punitive operations against Soviet resistance in the forests and marshland of Pollesia. On orders of the German occupational administration, in regions directly "operated" by us the police was organized, starostas and burgomasters were elected. The German military supervision (113 Division and others) soon recognized these administrative measures.

The temporary disbanding of the "Pollesia Sich" was the result of Nazi miscalculations. They underestimated the Soviet resistance. Several months later, the Nazis once more ask for Ataman Borovets' help and he, with renewed energy, rushes headlong into the evil plans of his Nazi bosses.

Beginning from the summer of 1942 the Soviet General Staff and the headquarters of the partizan movement set up an anti-Nazi underground in Pollesia.

Borovets wrote about it to the Germans: "Since the summer of 1942, the Bolsheviks are troubling the Ukraine. They have formed new large groups for subversive activities. The centre of this Soviet banditism can be traced to the forest belt bordering the Ukraine and Byelorussia. An increasing number of paratroopers were dropped into this area, mainly commanding or political officers (*politruks*), who were to head these bands. These people have organized large insur-

rectionary units and reconnaissance groups all over the Ukraine".

These events forced Borovets' armed band to stalk upon the partizan and Red Army subversive task and reconnaissance groups that had mushroomed up in the Nazi-held Pollesia and Volyn. Borovets floods the Reichskommissar of Ukraine, E. Koch with proposals "to better German policy" towards the Ukraine and expresses apprehension that the Germans' ugly behaviour, their cruelty towards the population can only bring disaster for both the Nazis and their allies, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. Borovets tirelessly produces new master-plans to counter the Soviet patriotic movement in Western Ukraine. Of special interest is T. Borovets' "top secret" plan submitted by him on March 15, 1943. The plan, evidently, awaited Nazi approval. Following is the full unabridged version of it:¹

The plan is called "Action Plan against Bolshevik partizan movement concentrated in Pollesia in the square Brest-Minsk-Gomel-Zhitomir".

"On information received by our reconnaissance the main Bolshevik paratrooper-partizan group is concentrated in the forest and marshlands of Pollesia in the Brest-Minsk-Gomel-Zhitomir locality. Data received on 15/03/1943 gives from 10-13,000 men in paratrooper-partizan detachments plus about 7,000 men mobilized from the local population and all sorts of other minor bands.²

"The paratroopers are heavily armed with submachine guns and are regularly supplied by air-lifts from Moscow.

¹ A photocopy of this document can be found in "Ukrainska RSR u Velikij Vitchiznjajiv vijni Radjanskoho Sojuzu 1941—1945 rr". Kiev, 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 160—161.

² One can draw a parallel in the terminology used by the Nazis and the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. In July, 1942 SS Reichsführer Himmler ordered the word "partizan" and its derivatives withdrawn from official documents and replaced by the word "bandits".

They also have radio contact. Locally recruited bands are poorer armed but they are constantly helped in commanders and by equipment sent to them by planes.

"The bands have the task of reconnoitering outside the forest belt which they do either in small groups or individually in deep conspiracy. Their subversive activities are mainly aimed at creating chaos and anarchy on German-held territory, and involving the biggest possible number of local elements.

"In order to liquidate such groups we need for every Bolshevik guerrilla 2—3 of our guerrillas armed correspondingly.

"We should be most persistent in liquidating these groups. Freed territory must be patrolled by strong units to avert further enemy landings.

"Operational directives:

- 1) The operation must be carried out by Ukrainian guerrillas under my direct command and by tacit consent of the Germans. Our Ukrainian guerrillas must number 40,000 men.
- 2) Officially the German authorities regard both groupings as enemies but in fact support and secretly supply us with arms and equipment.
- 3) The action is to be in Pinsk district. At a predetermined railway station our Ukrainian guerrillas attack the intended army supply train and start action.
- 4) In complete accord with the German authorities our Ukrainian guerrillas take over some towns and organize there their hospitals, depots, etc.
- 5) In event of the front rolling up to Odessa-Kiev-Vitebsk-Riga line of defence our Ukrainian guerrillas must control Pollesia right up to the front-line.
- 6) In event of a further westward advance of the Red Army, Ukrainian guerrillas are to be left behind to carry out subversive activities in the Bolshevik rear to aid the German Army".

The above-mentioned facts are eloquent enough to unmask the nationalist falsifiers, who distorting the history of World War II try to represent themselves in the eyes of the world as active participants of the anti-Nazi movement.

Much of the undermining activity was assigned by the Nazis to OUN-Melnyk — the third camp of Ukrainian nationalists. OUN-Melnyk for certain reasons could not carry out provocative actions from a so-called "illegal" position. After the OUN split in 1940 Melnyk lost to Bandera many members, especially youth. Melnyk drew supporters mainly from the nationalist intelligentsia and professional people which the Germans used in their auxiliary occupational administration, commerce, the police and propaganda apparatus. In his "Pro memoria" sent to Reichsminister Rosenberg Melnyk outlined tasks for nationalists on occupied Ukrainian territory. "It is generally held by Ukrainian nationalists, Melnyk wrote, "that the Germans and nationalists have common interests in Eastern Europe ... The present situation demands the most active participation of Ukrainian nationalists in establishing a new order in the Ukraine". Melnyk envisaged the collaboration with the Nazis the following way:

"Since the Soviets continue to hold sway over Ukrainians the prerogative is to eliminate them and to reorientate the people towards Nazi Germany through an intensive propaganda of Nazism. The success of such propaganda work will depend not only on propaganda methods, but on the propagandists themselves. Therefore, the expedient is to employ Ukrainian nationalists as propagandists since they know how to reach the minds of this nation. A nationalist doctrine demands a "spiritual rapprochement" of Ukraine and Germany. Only, the Ukrainian nationalists brought up in the spirit of national-socialism can carry out this task.

"Stress must be laid on youth. Ukrainian nationalists must "cure" Ukrainian youth of their "spiritual barrenness".

We must give them an ideology which is in complete contrast to communism, to proletarian internationalism.

"Soviet-educated people continue to work in schools and in the fields of science and culture. It is in the interests of the "new fascist order" in the Ukraine, that these potentially disloyal elements be eliminated. Only Ukrainian nationalists can cope with this task.

"Among the Soviet people in the German-occupied territory, are those assigned to organize underground activities. To trace out and exterminate them was a task Melnyk considered of paramount importance. "To carry it out within a short period of time it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the locality and a security service to cover the population. The nationalists are eager to participate in such a security service".

Melnyk's propositions were approved by the Nazis and in August 1941 he circulated a "communication-appeal" urging Ukrainians to a closer collaboration with the Germans. "People who oppose actions of those fighting against the Soviet Union are irresponsible," he wrote. "On the contrary, they must sacrifice all for the Germans triumph".¹ In the Nazi-occupied Ukraine, the Melnykites joined the police, were appointed burgomasters, village elders (*starostas*), officers on the labour exchange, pressmen, tax collectors, etc. Their contribution towards establishing a "new order" was described in a secret report "Social Work of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Dnieper River Area" written by Melnyk and sent to Rosenberg in 1942.

"By permission of the German military authorities", the secret report reads, "the Ukraine was divided into regions, districts and municipalities. Village councils were formed and *starostas* were elected. The joint German-Ukrainian

administration was responsible for the requisition of food-stuffs from the peasants, the transportation to the Third Reich of riches from Ukraine, the introduction of forced labour at factories and farms".

The nationalists considered their greatest achievement the re-establishment of the system of exploitation and private property. "The foundation has been laid", they reported, "for private enterprise, trade in the form of joint or individual management of shops and enterprises. Privately-owned banks and credit companies have also been set up".

The police were organized to see to the protection of the Nazi-established "new order" on Ukraine. Terror, torture, bloody reprisals and a close surveillance over the social and private life of Soviet citizens living under Nazi rule were the order of the day.

The Nazis issued almost 150 daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in the occupied regional and district centres of Ukraine. The editorial staffs consisted exclusively of Ukrainian nationalists, mainly OUN-Melnyk supporters, Petliurists and Hetmanites, and carried out Nazi and nationalist propaganda. The nationalists verbally and by action demonstrated their loyalty to the Nazi occupation, concentrated all their energy to mould the outlook of the population of Western Ukraine and convert it ideologically.

There were many claimants in the Melnykite task forces for posts in the auxiliary occupational administration. These task forces followed in the wake of the German Army and helped to establish occupational administration in towns and villages. Melnyk sent two of his envoys Senik-Hrybivsky and Sziborski to form in Kiev a "Ukrainian National Council". The very possibility of such a "council" threw the Banderites into panic. They sent their terrorist S. Kosiy to stop those two ever reaching Kiev. Kosiy shot both of them in Zhitomir.

The murders revived discords within the nationalist ranks. Knifings and shootings were common. The Banderites

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 2, File 18, Sheet 70.

killed about 4,000 Melnykites, asserts B. Mikhailiuk in his book "Бунт Бандери" (Bandera Mutiny). The Melnykites, as asserted by the Banderites, also eliminated several thousand of OUN-Bandera members.

The Banderites and Melnykites in their rat-race for personal careers, in their obsession for glory and in their avarice sold Ukraine, betrayed her people and even annihilated their confederates.

Over 200 Melnykites arrived in Kiev during the first few weeks of occupation. Soon, their numbers increased considerably. Early October 1941 one could frequently see the "Bukovinia Kurin", led by P. Voynovski marching through the streets of Kiev singing their songs. This unit was sent to Kiev as a reserve force to help Melnyk form his "Ukrainian National Council" for which Melnyk had the consent of the Germans. The kurin was entrusted with special police punitive functions and carried out raids against patriots acting in the capital.

The "council" was made up of the Melnykites F. Velichkivsky, M. Kapustiansky, J. Boidunik, O. Kandyba, I. Dubinets, O. Oles and others. "This institution", wrote the Melnykites to Rosenberg, "will collaborate with the German authorities in creating a new order in Ukraine and will endeavour in conjunction with the Germans, to build a new society". Pankivsky testifies that the "council" was controlled by Abwehr's officers from the Sixth German Army, G. Koch and R. Fell.¹

The "council" worked out its statute in which Ukrainians were called upon to aid the German Army establish a "new order". A "memorandum" was sent to the Reichskommissar of Ukraine E. Koch in which the "council" executive, "aware of this important moment in history", wrote that nationalists would be willing to help fascism "through their offices in establishing a new society and liquidating Bol-

¹ K. Pankivsky. *Роки німецької окупації* (The Years of German Occupation), p. 147.

shevism on German-occupied territory". They also asked Koch to permit the formation in the Ukraine of the nationalist cultural-education association "Prosvita". Through "Prosvita" they hoped to "de-bolshevize" the population. They also proposed the formation of a youth organization which would "de-komsomolize" and 're-educate' youth. They informed Koch, too, of the "poor state of industry" in the Ukraine, and that "agriculture has been disrupted, crops left lying in fields, and sowing in some areas has been abandoned". They feared that such a situation could only "give grounds for communist propaganda and in the future could give negative repercussions". An analogous memorandum was sent to Rosenberg by the Melnykites on January 14, 1942. On January 28, 1942 a letter bearing the same contents was sent to Hitler.¹

Melnyk's "council" in Kiev existed but two months. On November 28, 1941 E. Koch authorized Reingard to summon the council's chairman F. Velichkivsky and read him a letter expressing "his satisfaction with the close co-operation of the Ukrainian nationalists and Germans" and ordering the dissolution of the "council", since it, just as the Bandera inspired Stetsko "government" in Lvov, was useless to the Nazis.

The Ukrainian nationalists were zealous followers of the fascist methods of contempt, cruelty, exploitation, torture and murder. "We see the German soldier as one, who led by Adolf Hitler chased the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine," wrote Melnyk in his "Word" (*Слово*) in January 1942, widely distributed in Western Ukraine as a leaflet. "It is our duty to help consciously and in an organized fashion their crusade on Moscow ... We are on the threshold of a new order in Europe, a Europe, restored and united with the aid of national-socialist Germany, Ukraine will be an equal among equals. She faces duties dictated by her geopo-

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 2, File 106, Sheets 3-6.

litical position and her age-old traditions".¹ The nationalists verbally and by action, consciously and in an organized fashion helped the Nazis in their "crusade", in their establishing a "new fascist order".

Melnikite Shipo, the burgomaster of Piriatyn, Poltava Region, was responsible for the execution of over 2,700 Soviet citizens and for the deportation of Ukrainian youth to slave labour in Germany.

Another Melnykite Zhuk, the town commandant in Vasiliv, Kiev Region was responsible for the execution of over 3,360 people and the forced deportation of about 2,000. He requisitioned for the German Army 5,420 heads of cattle, 8,170 pigs, 2,130 horses, and a large number of sheep, goats and poultry.

Abetted by Butsko, the district commandant in Rzhishchov, Kiev Region, the Nazis and the nationalist police hanged 1,247 Soviet patriots and deported 6,200 people to slave labour.

The chief of police of Brusilov district, Zhitomir Region, nationalist Kurilets took part in the execution of 46 Jewish families and more than 100 partisans.

On orders of a certain Plutch, a nationalist and then director of the Institute on Tuberculosis in Kiev (later he fled to the West to head the Ukrainian Immigration Centre in Germany) scores of T. B. patients were sent to be shot in Babiy Yar. Plutch personally murdered a sick doctor Vasilenko and an eminent professor Kucherenko by injecting benzine into their veins.

The Ukrainian nationalist police and a mixed German and Ukrainian special police force took part in punitive expeditions against Soviet and Polish partisans, in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, in the mass murder of people in concentration camps and in ghettos. They also

guarded military installations and patrolled German communication lines. The nationalist police were also employed by the Nazis in levying the so-called "contingents" (taxes) and forcing Poles from certain areas to migrate to the General-Gouvernement.¹

Crimes committed by the nationalists stigmatize them as the deadly enemy of the Ukrainian people.

"We will go on fighting together with the German soldier if not on the front-line then on the many fronts in the rear", wrote Samchuk, a convinced and arch Nazi collaborator. "In our total engagement we have sacrificed hundreds of people. We are managing the economy. We, after all, are politically obliged, politically included into the system created by the Germans from which there is no point of return. We have burnt our bridges and we must not think of any change. We must keep in step with the German people (i.e., the Nazis — *author*)... with Hitler's army, with his system, his ideology that has blessed us with inner vision. We must be firm and resolute".²

Throughout the war, Melnyk lived in Berlin, where he concentrated his efforts on obtaining approval from the Nazis to raise within the German Army an "Ukrainian military formation". He had applied with this to the German Army High Command as early as 1941. But the Wehrmacht deferred it. Melnyk, however, did not resign himself and methodically recurred his plan to other Nazis but was left without reply.

After Stalingrad, the Red Army advanced westwards and in the Nazi-occupied countries the anti-Nazi underground became more widespread and active. Such a situation forced Hitler to call upon the help of his vassals in the "total war against the communist threat". Melnyk's propo-

¹ Cz. Madajczyk. Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce. Warszawa, 1970, t. I, s. 471.

² Quoted from the book *Пост Ярослава Галана* (The Post of Yaroslav Halan). Lvov, 1967, p. 48.

¹ The Central State Archives on October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 2, File 18, Sheet 23.

sals to form an SS division of Ukrainian nationalists was accepted. On April 28, 1943, the gouverneur of Galicia O. Bechter issued a decree on the formation of such a division, which was to be in the hands of the Ukrainian Central Committee. This "Committee" was set up in Cracow in May, 1940. Abwehr financed its operation since the "Committee" was included into Abwehr's intelligence organization and was its source of information on the political situation in German-occupied Poland. The Nazis appointed V. Kubiovich as head of the "Ukrainian Central Committee". Key posts were given to Melnykites J. Boidunik, I. Tessel, A. Milianich and others. This information was given by Col. Bizantz, a German intelligence officer and the man actually behind the "Ukrainian Central Committee", who was taken prisoner by the Red Army in 1945. According to Bizantz the intelligence data was communicated to him by the Abwehr agent Kubiovich and his deputy Pankivsky. The 40 district and regional committees of this organization were headed by people, also employed by the Gestapo and Abwehr who informed the latters on the political sentiments of their localities.

On April 28, 1943 Bechter approved the formation of a military council recruiting men into the SS Division "Galicia". Bizantz headed this council. A noisy recruiting campaign that received the blessings of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptitsky and involved all the Uniate clergy in Western Ukraine was launched. Mitrate V. Labo, a Doctor of Theology at the Lvov Seminary, headed a group of specially selected priests, who were to act as the division's chaplains. Later Mitrate Labo was appointed the Vicar-general for Military Affairs. The Uniate Theological College as well as the seminary and village churches were converted into recruiting centres for the SS Division "Galicia".

To speed up the recruiting campaign, Bechter sent his army officers and men to towns and villages. The frantic campaign gave poor results — kulak sons, Uniate clergy and

Ukrainian nationalist activists. The authorities ordered forced enlistment.

Many Western Ukrainian youth to evade conscription fled to the forests. Reprisals were taken against families of "deserters". The nationalist police was enlisted and soon declassed elements were included: criminals, people with no profession and adventurists.

After a two and a half month back-breaking effort the Nazis and nationalists managed to scratch up enough men to deploy a division.

On July 18, the first batch of recruits left to receive training in Germany. To this occasion the nationalists held rallies in Lvov, Drohobich, Stryj, Zlochov and other towns and villages. The nationalists appealed to the "volunteers" to "carry out their duty with honour, with belief and through their deeds serve the cause of a new Europe". The "volunteers" were also asked "not to spare their lives for the Fuhrer and Chancellor of Germany who had summoned their help".¹

Training centres for SS Division "Galicia" were established in Neuhammer, Nürnberg, München, Metzi, Treskau, Gardelegen and Kinnschlag. The biggest training centre was in Neuhammer, a town that also sheltered Abwehr's spy school. The legion "Nachtigall" was formed in Neuhammer as well as the "Brandenburg 800" Battalion and Regiment (later reorganized into a division). The latter unit was mostly composed of folksdeutsche trained to carry out special subversive activities.

Soon, despondent letters from "volunteers of the SS Division "Galicia" reached their homes. The "recruits" begged their parents to save them from certain death. The contents of those letters quickly spread among the population and served as a premonition to those endangered with possible enrolment.

¹ "Lvivski visti", July 25-26, 1943.

The Uniate metropolitan A. Sheptitsky also received many tearful letters and petitions. The landsknechts scared stiff and pining to desert from the Division and escape certain death invented the most improbable reasons for discharge. "I haven't been to Mass for the third week running (our group was out on training exercise). I haven't made my confessions. I am in such need of the Holy Confession and the Holy Sacrement as never before," wrote M. Demchishyn¹, a former novice at the St. Basil Order who had volunteered for service in the SS Division "Galicia". The pleas and lamentations of these Nazi mercenaries were ignored by the polished aristocrat, count and former uhlans officer, Sheptitsky. The news got even worse when mothers and fiancées were allowed to visit their men in Germany. Their accounts on returning revealed that the Nazis maltreated the "volunteers": fed them badly, whipped them for the slightest fault, threw them into the lock-up and shot those trying to desert.

As the number of complaints on the rigid regulations in SS Division "Galicia" grew, visits were restricted. Typhus swept through the division. Fearing infection an increasing number of men began to desert. To avert an inevitable break-up of the division the Nazis divided it into regiments which were then sent to different parts of German-occupied Europe. The division newspaper "Towards Victory" (*До перемоги*) printed a warning to would-be deserters.² To save the day, the Nazi-controlled Ukrainian nationalist press began to print invented "letters from volunteers", as well as articles and reports of "eye-witnesses" about their "wonderful life" as a "recruit" in Germany, of how "well" they were fed. Simultaneously the "Ukrainian Central Committee" in order to somewhat "satisfy" the needs of the "re-

cruits", initiated a collection campaign for a so-called "division fund", which included items like food, clothing, money, through "charity" concerts, fêtes, etc.

By the end of July, 1944 SS Division "Galicia" was sent east to Brody, Lvov Region. A few days later the division was encircled near the villages of Belzets, Skvariava, Pochapy, Kniazhe.¹ About 10,500 Nazi mercenaries found their ignominious end here fighting for Hitler's diabolical plans. The commanding body of this division, some 500 surviving SS officers, fled to the village of Spas in the northern part of the Carpathian Mountains. General Freitag the commander-in-chief of the defeated division complained to Bechter the ex-gouverneur of Galicia, who had arrived on the scene, that the reason for the defeat lay in the cowardly behaviour of the Ukrainian landsknechts. He also stressed that after the rout, he had lost all respect for his superiors and that his career was finished.²

In November 1944 the Nazis to remain the division enlisted the nationalist police, burgomasters, starostas and the like fleeing from all over Ukraine. As the word "Galicia" no longer reflected the essence, Reichsführer SS Himmler on November 17, 1944 renamed the SS Division "Galicia" into the 14th Infantry SS Division (1st Ukrainian).

The Ukrainian nationalist press in the West till now continues to publicize the 14th Infantry SS Division as "the 1st Division of the Ukrainian Army". M. Kapustiansky, a nationalist bigwig, reveals the true picture of this "1st Division": "The officers were all Germans. Command of infantry regiments, artillery corps and of practically all the units was completely in German hands. German sergeants commanded also the battery and other mechanized units and

¹ The Central State Archives on the History of the Ukr.SSR in Lvov. Fund 418, Specification I, File 264, Sheet 4.

² K. Pankivsky. Op. cit., pp. 245-247.

¹ *Історія українського війська* (The History of the Ukrainian Army), Winnipeg, 1953, p. 608.

² Brody. Munich, 1951, p. 84.

corps. The Germans even were in charge of the mess and stores and the division's accounts."¹

The division was under the command of a former highly-posted Gestapo official Brigadefuhrer SS Freitag, who had taken a crash course for army commanders. All men wore the SS uniforms. Commands were given only in German. Division personnel gave an oath of allegiance to Hitler "throughout life" to carry out all tasks given to them by the German Army High Command.

Later this 14th Division took part in suppressing the Slovak Uprising. In January 1945 the division was sent to Yugoslavia to liquidate the partizan movement there.

Yugoslav partizans ambushed the division and nearly wiped it out. Its remaining troops fled to Austria. Its commander-in-chief Freitag shot himself.

Himmler appointed "General" P. Shandruk commander-in-chief of what remained from the 14th Infantry SS Division and ordered him to surrender to the British.

Himmler's order was obeyed. The British interned the nationalists from this division in Italy. Later they were transported to England where many of them settled down and continue to this day to contact each other. "General" Shandruk left for Washington where he worked for a certain period of time as a Pentagon adviser.

Returning to the days when SS Division "Galicia" was just being formed in 1943 the gouverneur of Galicia Bechter received an "open letter"² from Bandera headquarters.

The Ukrainian nationalists wrote that in the "venerable person" of Bechter they had the "wonderful opportunity" to know a man who fitted in with their "idea of a German nationalist". In this Nazi criminal the nationalists saw a

¹ *Історія українського війська* (The History of the Ukrainian Army), p. 608.

² An abridged version of this letter and its "criticism" can be found in a special issue of the Melnyk-owned magazine "Surma", November, 1943.

man loyal and devoted to the ideals of German nationalism. At the same time they acknowledged his merits as an administrator, who acted, they said, with justice and equanimity. (Actually, Bechter was involved in the assassination of Austria's premier Dolfus. He "guarded" the bleeding Dolfus and obstructed doctors in order to hasten his death). "To solve the Eastern problem Great Germany", said the Banderites, "can choose from among three alternatives. Firstly, the eastern territories could be placed under German administration and regarded as a colony for German settlers. Secondly, a new Russian state could be formed that would be Germany's ally and would co-operate within a new European framework. Thirdly, western regions of Russia could be annexed in the future to the Great German Empire. Only the third alternative could give effective results."

The Banderites also expressed their regret that the Nazis had waived aside the idea of creating an "Ukrainian state" under German mandate which could have made possible an overt employment of Ukrainian nationalists in the war against the USSR. The Ukrainian nationalists believed this to be one of the main reasons for Germany's defeat. They go on to assert that Banderites prepared the German-Polish campaign and the German-Soviet war while defying death in order to create conditions favourable for German intrusion into the western regions of Ukraine with little loss to their man-power and armour. Moreover, circumstances were so favourable that more could have been saved. Had the Nazi policy been more flexible the "new order" in Ukraine would have long been established and Ukraine would have long been converted into a German adjunct.

The lack of flexibility in the German policy, complained the nationalists, was evident "from the very beginning of the war... when without reason, the Nazis humiliated Ukrainians... maltreated them and so only knocked out any of their friendly sentiment towards Germans. Ukrainians were beaten everywhere: while selecting horses, in train

trips and at railway stations, in the streets, during requisitions... Ukrainians began to question the culture of the Germans... Later, Ukrainian returnees from P.O.W. camps added their impressions. Their accounts were too horrifying to believe... They were beaten, fed with rotting beetroots — the cause of their dying in thousands from dysentery and contaminating neighbouring villages with it. Many escaped to the Bolsheviks and told of the German P.O.W. treatment... The Bolsheviks used these accounts for their propaganda purposes."

"Therefore," the nationalists stated, "such a policy only hardened relations between the Ukrainians and Germans." The Banderites were shocked by the Nazis, who, while exterminating thousands of Soviet citizens made short work of some Ukrainian nationalists loyal to the Nazis. "The Germans shot... an Abwehr agent Father Vitvitsky, a German paratrooper Soroka, a German spy Lapunka and many others," they complained to Bechter. "Herr gouverneur," wailed the Banderites in their "open letter", "do not foul the well, you may need its waters, nor let us burn our bridges for a possible escape, then we are together with you."

In stressing their unbound loyalty to the Nazis the Ukrainian nationalists said that they contributed and would contribute their share to the struggle against communism and to creating a "new order". In their "open letter" the Banderites once more dotted their *i*'s when disclosing their role in deporting youth to slave labour in Germany "About ten per cent of the Ukrainian population is working in the Reich. "It is our contribution to the struggle for Europe's future, stressed the nationalists, "in collecting heavy "contingents" (taxes) from peasants." ("We ordered the "contingents" to be dispatched without delay", the nationalists reported to Bechter, "as it is also a part of our contribution to Europe's future. Those speaking of a negative Banderite attitude to "contingents" are plainly lying.")

In their "open letter" the Banderites solemnly declared that their "study" of Nazi literature was not a futile effort and that they "have a long experience of anti-Bolshevik warfare", which "cannot be underestimated" and which in the future "shall certainly justify itself." "There is still time," they told Bechter, "for you to weigh the great importance of actively employing Ukrainian nationalists in anti-communist warfare."

This is the candid way OUN-Bandera Provid wrote to one of the leading Nazis of the Third Reich. Their tone and the implications of their words when addressing common people differed. The Banderites became hypocritical, obscure and evasive. They publicly denounced the Nazi occupation, but when an urgent need arose to act they refused pointing at the uneven balance of defeats and triumphs." "Even when forced to flee to the forests, preached the nationalists, one should not fight for an alien cause against the Nazis for such a stand can only play into the hands of the Soviets and the allied forces."

While the partisan movement deployed its front against the Nazis, and all honest people rallied around them, the Banderite clique regularly published appeals, letters and leaflets to the Ukrainian people calling upon them to refrain from supporting the partisans and resisting the Nazis. In one of their appeals, printed in December 1942, an explanation was given as to why the Ukrainian nationalists were against an anti-Nazi guerrilla movement. "At the present moment," they explained, "a partisan movement in the Ukraine can only help the Soviets to bring back socialism..."

Talk about "prematurity" and "inopportunity" of an armed uprising continued up to the summer of 1943 when the Nazis finally allowed the Banderites to change their tactic of "illegal" underground activity to open action. The change-over was done mainly to suppress the rising anti-German underground movement.

The defeats on the front, the heavy losses in men and equipment forced the Nazis to intensify their methods of subversive warfare. At a secret conference held in Strasbourg, they drew up special plans for a "scorched earth" policy which meant bombing, sabotage, razing and ruining. For this purpose they planned to use for diversionary purposes quasipartizan commando units made up of Banderites. Such commando units were to stem the mass partizan movement and reinforce the German punitive expeditionary forces without withdrawing regular army units from the front. In event of a Red Army take-over of Western Ukraine, the Nazis planned to use these commando units for subversive activity in the Soviet rear.

The first of such bands of Banderites known as UPA (Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) appeared late spring 1943 in the northern marshy reach around Volyn and Rovno. Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists abroad claim that UPA was a "regular army". However, UPA was just a band of armed Ukrainian nationalists set up to carry out subversive anti-Soviet activities, sabotage and terrorism. It plundered, and murdered innocent lives. UPA consisted of nationalistic middle-class elements, the clergy and men of no professions, that had sold themselves to the Nazis. UPA men were enlisted through blackmail, fear of repression of relations and family, through sheer deceit and demagogic. Such stayed within UPA while the Nazis dominionned over Western Ukraine and deserted as soon as liberation came.

At present nationalists abroad try to argue that UPA was formed as a means of armed struggle against the Nazis. If this be so then it is inconsistent with the fact that the first nationalist armed groups appeared only in spring 1943, almost two years after the Nazis occupied the western regions of Ukraine. Why were these groups located in the forest and marshlands of Pollesia and Volyn and not in regions under absolute Nazi control (Lvov, Tarnopol, Stanislau (now Ivano-Frankovsk), Chernovtsi, Carpatho-

Ukraine)? Why did they begin operations in Pollesia and Volyn, then in Tarnopol and Stanislau regions, where Soviet partizans concentrated? These were the regions from where S. Kovpak led his partizan formation in the famous "Carpathian Thrust."

The Ukrainian nationalists fail to give a more or less justified answer to these questions. The clumsy explanations of nationalist historians always come to one and the same conclusion: that the Banderites in the early stage of the war were in want of trained men, arms, ammunition, equipment, medicine, etc. They also claim that the Banderites were in need of time (two years was not sufficient — *author*) to study the Nazi moves and tactics. Time was also needed they say to prepare their men "politically" and "psychologically" for armed struggle. Their final explanation is the absence of an ally that would support them or generally give them some sort of outside help.¹

These explanations are desperately short of truth. OUN as UVÖ, its predecessor, was a military organization that carried out subversive activity, espionage and terrorism. All its members were trained for armed assault and banditism. Top priority was given to training men in subversive activity, espionage and military know-how.

Nazi Germany planned to war on the Soviet Union and used OUN to form the legions "Nachtigall" and "Roland". Men enlisted in these legions were well-trained in the art of military espionage and subversion. Moreover, every Ukrainian nationalist that had come with the German Army or had infiltrated into an anti-German underground knew how to use weapons, knew the tactic of individual and group action better than many of the Soviet partizans.

¹ M. Lebed. УПА (UPA), München, 1946; P. Mircuk. *Українська повстанська армія* (The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army), München, 1952.

Complaints that OUN had no arms, ammunition, equipment, medicine are nonsense since the Ukrainian nationalists received all this from the Nazis.

As for OUN lamentations about the time needed to study the moves and tactics of the Nazis one need not be a wily politician to understand how unscrupulous are the nationalists. The year 1943 was already in progress. The Nazis had occupied Ukraine for already two years and there had been enough time to study their "moves" and "tactics", which were aimed at exterminating the Ukrainians as a nation and converting Ukraine into a German colony.

When forced to answer the question, why the first UPA bands were formed in Pollesia and Volyn and not in Lvov, Tarnopol, Stanislau, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovinia — areas of black Nazi terror, the nationalists revert to their quizzical "tactical deliberations" asserting that such areas made up a "unique home front" for requisitioning goods and enlisting men. This is nothing but another forgery. There is another reason for their "tactical deliberations". Namely, the spring and summer of 1943 when the Nazis and Melnykites were recruiting Ukrainians to the SS Division "Galicia". The Germans wanted to man the SS division with the most efficient men and only after that allow the Banderites to enlist those remaining into their UPA.

The Germans were in a tight situation with partisans ruining their communications and destroying much of their man-power and armour. UPA was thrown against the partisans in an attempt to destroy their fighting efficiency. UPA used in punitive operations by the Germans was able to safe-guard the German rear.

Roman Shukhevich, UPA commander-in-chief, began his career in the UVOD when a young man. He served as a cornet in the Polish Army. Later he was recruited to an espionage school in Germany. He showed himself active in attempts on eminent Polish politicians, in raids on post-offices and savings banks. He was one of the instigators of an

OUN attack on the Soviet general consulate in Lvov in 1933. Later he was appointed a commander of the Legion "Nachtigall". For his part in savage reprisals against the population in Byelorussia, he was promoted to the rank of Captain of the Wehrmacht and awarded the Iron Cross.

The Banderites were active in carrying out tasks set for them by the German Army High Command.

From summer 1943 through winter 1944 the partisans of Rovno Region had 35 clashes with the Banderites. Kovpak's partisan formation fought with them 21 battles in the period from January 5 through April 1, 1944.

The nationalists infiltrated into the Soviet partisan detachments. Their task here was to liquidate the commanders and collect information on partisan dislocation, landing sites, munition stores, the amount of arms, equipment, medicine. The information was to be passed over to the Nazis. For example, by May, 1943 partisans in Rovno Region shot 57 nationalist infiltrators.

In skirmishes with partisans the Banderites lost many of their men. In the districts of Elny, Tomashgorod, Kosorich and Derty, Rovno Region, Soviet partisans exterminated over 250 nationalists.¹ Despite losses, the Banderites blatantly spoke of their "clashes ending in victory". "Bolshevik partisan detachments centred mainly in Pinsk, Sarna, Kostopol, Kovel and Brest districts can be easily dealt with by our UPA," they announced.² However, day by day, nationalist illusions as to their might faded away. The partisan formation led by S. Kovpak after breaking through the Nazi and Ukrainian nationalist defense line in Pollesia and Volyn moved west to Galicia ruining enemy communication lines on their way.

¹ Z. Bogatyr. *В тылу врага* (In the Enemy Rear), Moscow, 1963, p. 285.

² "Do Zbroi", July, 1943.

The German Army High Command and the Gestapo tried frantically to straighten out the situation. And once again it was the Banderites they had to resort to. The Banderites began to form in the Carpathian Mountains a Galician version of UPA, a so-called "Ukrainian National Defence" (UNC).

"For some weeks, Western Ukraine was rocked by the news that a several thousand strong partisan army led by Kovpak, was moving into the Carpathian Mountains," wrote the Banderites. "Despite her great losses and exhaustion Moscow continues to fight on the front-line and in the German rear." Soviet partisans were "on the one hand to conduct sabotage and stop the German Army from advancing eastwards, and on the other, to mobilize the masses onto their side." Kovpak's partisans were "creating havoc in Galicia. They were blowing up bridges... instigating the Ukrainian population against the Nazis thus bringing about mass reprisals." The Ukrainian nationalist Provid they said, "is organizing a "Ukrainian National Defence" to combat the Soviet partisans in the Carpathian Mountains.¹

The formation of UNC was entrusted to the German agent Lutze.² By terror and demagogic, he managed to "mobilize" five "kurins" (units) of UNC. The first kurin "Chorny Chorty" was stationed near the villages of Mikhlichin and Berezin, Jaremcha district, Stanislau Region; the second kurin "Trembita" was garrisoned in the villages of Dolina district; the third kurin "Siromantsi" was dislocated in the region of Chorna Shila Mountain in Bolekhiv district; the fourth kurin was stationed near Magura Mountain, Drohobich district and the fifth kurin — in the area of Staryi Sambor, Lvov Region. Lutze formed also the UNC General

¹ The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 2, File 18, Sheet 13.

² Lutze was sentenced by a Soviet court in 1945.

Staff to direct UNC operations. Included in the staff were the commandant of the joint German and Ukrainian police in Stanislau Banakh, the burgomaster of Stanislau Golimbovsky and also the commandant of the joint German and Ukrainian police in Tismenitsa, Stanislau Region.

UNC bands were sent as a reserve unit to the 4th, 6th, 13th and 26th SS regiments and special police forces. These forces together participated in a number of fierce clashes in Subcarpathian Ukraine. These clashes revealed the weak morale of the nationalists. When finding themselves in a difficult situation most of them threw away their weapons and fled back home. However, the same fate awaited them as those who had refused call-up in Volyn — the nationalist gestapo ("security police — SB") retaliated with terror.

UPA and UNC, diligent in the accomplishment of tasks set for them by the Nazis, not only carried out raids against the partisans but also brutal reprisals against the Polish population that in any way displayed "disloyalty" to the Germans.

The General-gouverneur of Poland Hans Frank wrote in his diary in 1942: "I must confess that German policy is aimed at causing friction between the Poles and Ukrainians. The four or five million Ukrainians living here act as a counterbalance to the Poles. And I invest a lot of effort to foster a politically cool atmosphere between them to prevent their banding together."¹

A year later UPA began to put the words of the Nazi butcher into action. Ukrainian nationalists forced the mass migration of Poles. In 1943 in Grubeshof district, an OUN notice ordered all non-Ukrainians to leave their villages within a week. It was stated that all disobeying the order would be shot. "Either a Ukraine or a bloodbath," it was stressed in the notice.²

¹ S. Piotrowski. Dziennik Hansa Franka. Warszawa, 1956, s. 145.

² Agencja Informacyjna "Wieś", Nr. 34, 1943.

The Banderite terror (1933—1944) in Western Ukraine resulted in the forced migration of 300,000 Poles.

A nationalist group "Zavyi Khvist" led by German agent Stelmashchuk (code name "IV-Nord") on August 29—30, 1943 killed 15,000 Poles. This genocide was committed by them in Golob, Kovel, Storovizhiv, Luboml and Lutsk districts of Volyn. Livestock, valuables and food-stuffs were taken away and the houses burnt to the ground. In the villages of Ostrivka and Ostrivetska Volya, Volyn region, "Zavyi Khvist" murdered 2,000 Poles. The same was done in the villages of Rivne, Lisnyaki, Stavinsky Smolyari, Velika Guta, Nudizhe. Incomplete reports reveal that in the northern part of Rovno Region Banderites burnt 25 settlements.¹ Villages in Stara Guta, Mosty, Kuty, Zabara, Zaluzha-Shumska, Chervonograd-Tovstenko and Barish-Buchach districts of Tarnopol Region; Troisya-Zabolotiv, Lyatsko-Shlahetske (now Lipivka — *author*), Tismenets districts, Stanislau Region were partially or completely destroyed while its population shot or tortured. The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists killed about 40,000 innocent people of Polish origin.² These are the results of the nationalist terror against the Polish population.

Polish fascist elements acted on Nazi orders. They were armed by the Nazis and made short work of the Ukrainian population in the Lublin area. During one year in Khelm district they razed dozens of villages and massacred its population.

What the gebeitkommissar of Lublin wrote in his diary reveals the disgraceful Nazi methodology, machine and tactic of mutual Ukrainian and Polish annihilation in regions bordering Poland and Ukraine: "It was necessary to have both these nationalist groupings at discord as such a situa-

¹ L. Kisya. *Правди не затъмарити* (You Cannot Hide the Truth), Kiev, 1965, p. 62.

² Cz. Madajczyk, *Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce*, s. 479.

tion was of use to the Germans. We adopted the British methods. "Let them cut each other, and we can rule then with ease!" are words belonging to Colonel Thompson, a dashing English colonialist, said in 1918 when Britain fanned hatred between Armenian and Azerbaijanian nationalists in Baku. These laconic words were not only instructive but were inspirational for the Nazi colonialists. The results were catastrophic. In some areas it resulted in a total annihilation of Poles and Ukrainians. Such were the results in Grubeshof and neighbouring her districts".¹

By the end of 1943 the nationalist Provid ordered UPA to start a campaign against Ukrainians "disloyal" to OUN and its "armies" UPA and UNC. The nationalists regarded "disloyal" persons to be those who helped the partisans or had members of their families or relatives with the partisans or in the Red Army. Such people were traced, rounded up and convoyed to the place of execution. Before being shot, they were forced to dig graves and undress.

The nationalist terror was mainly aimed at suppressing anti-Nazi sentiment or nipping in the bud any sign of disturbances among the population and rank and file Banderites in UPA. The nationalist "security service" liquidated even those who just expressed in some form or other the idea of an armed resistance to the Nazis. "Special attention must be paid to spontaneous protests of UPA men against the Germans. In such cases reprisals are obligatory and capital punishment is not excluded", read the instructions issued by the nationalist "security service" on October 27, 1943. Besides this, a "brainwashing" of nationalist rank and file was begun. Demagogic and outright eye-washing were widely used here. "UPA and UNC", wrote the Banderites, "must concentrate above all on educating. This is the main direction of their activities".² "Our tactic, adopted in 1943

¹ Cz. Madajczyk, *Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce*, s. 479.

² "Ideja i tchyn", November, 1943.

is absolutely correct..." (i.e., on stopping the Ukrainian population acting against the Nazi occupation — *Auth.*), wrote another nationalist paper.¹ "A Germany faced with defeat cannot be dangerous to us", announced another paper. "A defeated Germany, using an old saying is not worth a penny to the Ukrainian nationalists. However, even then an armed struggle against the Germans would not be expedient".²

The above-quoted taken from nationalist publication dated November, 1943, January, and June, 1944 respectively, clearly outline the nationalist tactic towards the Germans aimed at a non-interference into the armed struggle conducted by the people against the Germans, at "body-guarding" the Nazis and at restraining mass impulse to struggle.

It was difficult for the nationalists to tame people enmeshed in UPA through terror, torture and deceit, to suppress hostile sentiment towards the Germans. Rank and file Bandera followers were beginning to realise how they had been double-crossed by their leaders. Despite the prohibition and the element of danger their actions involved, these people began to liquidate Nazis whenever the chance arose. These sporadic and singular acts were not strong enough to really give the Nazis trouble. But the nationalist leaders used these incidents for their own ends trying to present them as an anti-Nazi struggle enspirited by them. They had no option but to do so.

With every coming day the Red Army drew closer to the western regions of Ukraine. The Nazis and nationalists were troubled at the turn of the tide. The security police and SD of Galicia authorized Hauptsturmführer and the Kriminalkommissar Pape to tighten contacts with the Banderites for more effective use of them in the war. The Banderites readily agreed to send their representative to talk over the

¹ From a proclamation by OUN Provid published on January 1, 1944.

² "Ideja i tchyn", June, 1944.

matter. Their representative was Hrynoch,¹ whom the Nazis for conspiracy's sake called Herasimivskyj. Documents from the offices of the security police and SD in Lvov later seized by the Red Army attest this fact.

Ivan Hrynoch (the Reverend John Hrynoch) was an ordained priest. He had studied at a theological college in Innsbruck. For his service as chaplain in "Nachtigall" Hrynoch was awarded the Iron Cross. He describes his services for the Third Reich in his autobiography: "Together with the legion (in the legion "Nachtigall"— *author*) I participated in the front-line campaigns during the first weeks of the war when the German Army made its thrust on Radymne-Zavoriv-Lvov-Tarnopol-Proskurov - Zhmerinka - Brajlov-Vinnitsa. For my service in this operation I was awarded the Iron Cross...² Hrynoch took an active part in reprisals against the intelligentsia in Lvov in July, 1941. On June, 30 he was the man who read the notorious "Akt" and Sheptitsky's "Pastoral Letter" over the air in Lvov.

The same Hrynoch after the war began to collaborate with the American Intelligence Service and helped them train spies later to be dropped on Ukrainian territory from planes.³ In 1955 he became the consistorial adviser to the Ukrainian Catholic Church in West Germany. At present he heads the so-called "Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council" (ZP UHVR).

All talks Hrynoch had with Pape and other Gestapo officials were stenographed and recorded. This alleviates pos-

¹ S. Danilenko. Dorohoju hanbi i zradi. Kiev, "Naukova Dumka", 1972, p. 234.

² The Central State Archives on the History of the Ukr.SSR in Lvov. Fund 201, Specification 4(b), File 2689, Sheets 26-27.

³ Hrynoch trained Ukrainian nationalists Okhrimovich, Kyt, Khashchivsky, Chapelle later dropped into Ukraine from US planes in 1951-1952. All of them were arrested and sentenced by a Soviet court.

sibilities to give a fuller account of the talks and point out the most interesting passages.

The first meeting Hrynoch had with Pape was on March 6, 1944 in Tarnopol at the residence of a security police and SD chief Hauptsturmführer SS Krüger.

Hrynoch told Pape that the Banderites welcome a close co-operation with the German intelligence for which he was sent by them to act as their resident at security police and SD headquarters. He stressed the fact that OUN "only regards communists as enemies". All OUN directives were aimed at assisting the German Army and the occupational administration. OUN's sole policy, continued Hrynoch, was to observe German interests.

OUN believed events in Eastern Europe would not have turned out the way they did had Germany not restricted the Banderites anti-Soviet activities to actions suppressing the anti-Nazi movement. It did not stop anti-Nazi sentiment. A quisling state on the other hand with its "independent administration" could have put a stop to it. OUN would have been "perfectly satisfied with the status of a protectorate" a status that complied with Germany's colonial policy towards Ukraine. The Nazis had refused the Banderites such a chance.

However, went on Hrynoch, as in the past, Banderites would continue to campaign for a "traditional contiguity with Germany" and will intensify efforts to protect Germany's interests. Pape and Hrynoch discussed in detail a plan to extend the participation of the Banderites.

Hrynoch promised that the nationalists would help the Germans transport their men, equipment, arms and provisions. "Unconditional loyalty" would be displayed in the fulfillment of the tasks of requisitioning horses, livestock, grain, etc. The Banderites also were to continue to provide the German intelligence with the needed information.

Pape reported the results of his talks to the chief of the security police and SD of "district" Galicia Obersturmbahn-

fuhrer SS and senior adviser Dr. Witska. On March 13, 1944 Witska sent a confidential letter to the chief of the security police and SD of the Gouvernement. Oberfuhrer SS and police colonel Bierkamp. In this letter he wrote that Hrynoch had promised to report his meetings with Pape to OUN and UPA bosses and to send in a few days some supplementary proposals on the anti-Soviet warfare.¹

On March 23, in Lvov, in a flat of an Ukrainian nationalist V. Mudry Hrynoch held his second meeting with Pape. Hrynoch told Pape that OUN had reposed its hopes in collaborating with the security police and SD. It was stated that UPA would intensify its activities in the Soviet rear and would communicate by all possible means, including radio and messengers, intelligence on the military and political set up.

Hrynoch asked to keep in strict confidence his talks with Pape, especially the complete submission of the Banderites to Nazi interests. Hrynoch stressed that OUN wanted the Germans to supply them with arms and explosives for an escalation of the war. It had to be done in such a way as to allay Soviet suspicion that Ukrainian nationalists in Soviet-held territory were German agents or sympathisers... It is inadmissible to use for this purpose planes with identification marks... OUN wishes future treaties to be ratified by OUN headquarters and a German representative from the security police and SD".

On March 28, Hrynoch had a third meeting with Dr. Witska. At this meeting he reiterated his former proposals and statements and assured Witska that OUN would apply its efforts to make the ruling Nazi élite and Hitler in person duly estimate OUN anti-Soviet warfare and assign them their rightful place among the "builders of a new Europe". Hrynoch also told Dr. Witska that the Gestapo

¹ V. Cherednichenko. Natsionalism proty natsii, p. 142.

could wholly rely on the Bandera nationalist organization as far as mobilization of recruits to the SS Division "Galicia" was concerned. This nationalist leader assured the Nazis of active OUN-Bandera assistance. He stated that the population of Western Ukraine "was numerous enough for Nazi and OUN conscription".

A telegramme sent by Dr. Witska to the German commander-in-chief of SS Division "Galicia" Oberfuehrer SS Freitag reveals once again how treacherous OUN was even to its UPA men. In this telegramme Witska stated that one OUN bigwig (Hrynoch — *author*) agreed to name deserters from SS Division "Galicia" if the Nazis would guarantee their safety. Pure perfidy on the part of the nationalists. Hrynoch knew only too well that deserters from a German Army were shot on the spot without preliminary investigations or a trial. However, Hrynoch and the OUN Provid needed such a "guarantee" from the Nazis simply to deceive deserters into turning up. All deserters that did turn up, naturally, were shot immediately.

In another meeting with Pape, Hrynoch reported on UPA undermining activities on territory liberated by the Red Army. After a careful analysis of the matter Witska informed Bierkamp that "OUN and UPA could do much more if secretly supplied with arms by the security police and SD..." "I hope", he wrote later, "to personally receive arms from SS chiefs and the police and from the army commander-in-chief in northern Ukraine and have the arms air-dropped by the Sonderkommandos "Zeppelin"¹ into Soviet territory". Hrynoch also wanted to know whether it was reasonable to create in Galicia a secret ammunition and arms dumps for UPA in event of a further Soviet army move into Galicia. Witska, though agreeing in principle, favoured stationing

¹ "Zeppelin" — a centre for subversive and sabotage activities of the Main Imperial Intelligence Board created by Himmler early 1942. The task of this centre was to inspire subversive activities deep in the Soviet rear.

German guards to stop any attempt to steal the arms. "I would be very glad", concludes Witska in his letter "to obtain approval for the above measures directed at disrupting Soviet supply lines and the Bolshevik administration".

While Hrynoch negotiated the Banderites acted. They communicated information on Red Army moves, liquidated or handed over communists, as well as members of the underground organizations, partisans and other Soviet patriots captured by UPA to the Nazis.

The name of the Hero of the Soviet Union and famous partisan reconnoiterer Mykola Ivanovich Kuznetsov is known by many.

Kuznetsov, alias Oberleutnant Paul Ziebert, was the most-wanted man for the Germans. In 1943 in Rovno, he shot the German adviser and chief of the central financial bureau of the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine, Gel; the political secretary and inspector, Winthers; the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine secretary, Knut, and wounded a government official, E. Koch's under-secretary, Dargell. In November, Kuznetsov shot the Chief Justice Oberfuehrer SS Funk in a German court of justice. Funk was the man behind the brutal reprisals. A group of Soviet partisans led by Kuznetsov kidnapped the commander-in-chief of the special task forces, General von Ilgen. In January, 1944 in Lvov, in the offices of the army and air-force, Kuznetsov shot Oberstleutnant Peters, and in February, gravely wounded the vice-gouverneur Bauer and the director of the general-gouvernement chancellery Schneider.

The Gestapo and its Ukrainian nationalist agents were dead bent on capturing this courageous reconnoiterer. The Nazis promised a 25,000 Reichsmark reward for his capture. However, all their efforts failed. Kuznetsov and two others had started for the east towards the Red Army.

For nearly a month they made their way through forests and only on March 2, 1944 ventured into the village of Boamatyn, Brody district, Lvov Region. They entered one of the

cottages to warm themselves and rest. A patrolling UPA group "Chornogora" burst into the house. They immediately recognized Kuznetsov from descriptions circulated by the Nazis. They tried to seize him but Kuznetsov was not easy to take. As he shouted: "This is the way Soviet partisans die!", he undid the safety catch of his hand-grenade and blew himself and the other two partisans to bits.

A secret Gestapo document reveals the dirty role the Banderites played in this case. Pape wrote that during the talk Dr. Witska had with Hrynoch on March 28, 1944, the latter mentioned that an UPA group had captured a Bolshevik agent dressed as a German oberleutnant. The group also had in its possession documents that shed light on Bauer's murder. Another UPA group had captured two agents from General Seidlitz, the chief of the "League of German Officers" in Moscow,¹ and documents. Hrynoch had promised to hand over the documents and the agents, if they were alive, to the security police.

A secret note by Poland's general-gouverneur Hans Frank on a conference held in May 12, 1944, in a Cracow palace also reveals the part played by the nationalists in the death of Mykola Kuznetsov. During this conference, it is stated in the note, UPA "justified itself" as a retaliatory force against Soviet reconnoiterers and paratroopers, and that UPA captured and shot in the eastern regions of "district" Galicia a Soviet spy involved in the murder of the vice-gouverneur Bauer.²

The treacherous designs of the Banderite Provid were also exposed in another note by Pape dated May 3, 1944. On that day Hrynoch told him that UPA had captured 20 Soviet paratroopers that included, also, radio-operators.

¹ German P.O.W.s and German communists in the Soviet Union formed in Krasnogorsk in 1943 the "Committee for a Free Germany" that conducted propaganda among soldiers and officers of the German Army.

² This is not true. As already stated Kuznetsov blew himself up with a hand-grenade when the Banderites tried to capture him.

The nationalists were ready to hand over the paratroopers, their documents and their radio-transmitters to the Gestapo. To keep this hand-over in utmost secrecy Hrynoch outlined the following plan to Pape: UPA would convoy the Soviet paratroopers to another place. Pape informed of their route would then send his men to ambush the convoy and take the Soviet paratroopers prisoners. OUN promised to arm their guards lightly to prevent incidental killing of the Gestapo agents taking part in the ambush. It was also agreed that Hrynoch would be in that vicinity to "interfere" if events took the wrong turn. On May 9, Hrynoch delivered to Pape final information on the route and promised to obtain data on the status of *politruks* in the Red Army as well as information about Kovpak. Hrynoch kept his promise: the Soviet paratroopers and the promised intelligence were handed over to the Gestapo.

On July 14, 1944 Witska reported to Sturmbahnfuhrer and adviser Pommerening in the Main Imperial Security Board in Berlin that the Banderites excelled in their subversive activities. Besides subversive agents, Witska wrote that the Banderites procured Abwehr spies and radio-operators to carry out special tasks in the Soviet rear. Witska expressing his certitude in the possible use of those people by the security service and SD, stated that he had Hrynoch's consent to this. Witska also asked Pommerening to cable him the tasks the nationalists had to carry out on Soviet territory.

On April 19, 1944 in Lvov, the chiefs of the *Abwehrkommandos 101, 202, 305* and the army group "Süd" gathered to exchange experience in dealing with the Ukrainian nationalists. The *Abwehrkommando* chiefs were unanimous to point out that they recruited agents to be sent into the Soviet rear mainly from the Banderites, as such agents were more capable of obtaining valuable information. The commander-in-chief of the *Abwehrkommando 101* Oberstleutnant Lindhart read his report in which he stated that

reconnaissance and espionage for them was done by recruited P.O.W.s. But with the Red Army quickly forcing its way west and the larger part of the USSR liberated, P.O.W.s grew more reluctant to be involved in espionage activities. The *Abwehrkommando* was forced to resort to the Banderites. Without their participation it would actually be impossible to conduct reconnaissance. The *Abwehrkommandos* got from the Banderites up to 15 communications daily. UPA, told Lindhart, was also used as a reserve force on the front and against partisans in German-held territory.

The commander-in-chief of *Abwehrkommando 202*, Oberstleutnant Seliger agreed with Lindhart. Seliger stressed that in regions taken over by the Red Army only the nationalists were left to oppose the Soviets. This was reason enough to supply UPA with arms, ammunition and medicine. Seliger had organized the training of UPA men later infiltrated in small groups into Soviet territory. For some time Seliger had upheld direct contact with Shukhevich, UPA's commander-in-chief who had sent his men for training purposes. In the nearest future, informed Seliger, over 100 Banderites would be armed and with the support of German divisions would cross the front-line in the region of Delatyn-Stanislau.

Besides Hrynoch, Shukhevich, Lebed and other OUN bigwigs, many bosses from local UPA groups also maintained ties with the security police and SD and the German Intelligence Service. Bandera headquarters left the initiative to its branch offices which began to contact the German Intelligence Service, and certain Wehrmacht officers and, naturally, were supplied with arms and other military items.

A secret message to the Main Imperial Security Board in Berlin proves this fact. The message was addressed to Gruppenfuhrer and Generalleutnant of the security police and SD in Berlin, Meuller, and copies of it were sent to the chief of the security police and SD in Cracow, Bierkamp, and Brigadenfuhrer and Generalmajor of the police

in Lvov, Dimme. The message stated that late January, 1944 many UPA groups had established direct contacts with I-C (reconnaissance branch — *author*), the group led by Prutzmann.¹ In particular, Sturmbahnfuhrer Schmitz had got in touch with the commanders of the nationalist armed groups in the regions of Postiny, Kremenets, Verby, Kopichintsi, Berezno, Pidkamenya and Derazhny. Those groups gave valuable information about Soviet partisans. Schmitz doubted the expediency of these groups on the front-line believing their engagement in reconnaissance and sabotage more suitable since they were not trained in the use of new weapons and were ignorant of tactics.

The message referred to a circular "How to Deal with UPA men" issued by Prutzmann's group on February 12, 1944. It was stated in this circular that UPA chiefs would send spies, mostly women, into territory liberated by the Red Army to collect information and communicate it to Prutzmann's group. Captured Red Army men and partisans were supposed to be handed over to Prutzmann, too. To avoid misunderstandings, the German front-line divisions were ordered to let everybody with documents signed by "Captain Felix" or confessing to be a UPA agent pass unharmed. If such people demanded immediate contact with I-C — Prutzmann's group — their demand had to be met. To be recognized, such agents had to raise their left hand with fingers open wide before their faces. "Because of our incompetency," it was stated in the circular, "we must now make a stake on UPA as a means of liquidating the communist partisan movement."

Of a similar content was a report of the reconnaissance branch of the 4th German Panzer Corps command written on

¹ H. Prutzmann was the Inspector-General of the SS, a chief of the SS and police in the southern occupied territory of the Soviet Union.

May 22, 1944. The report stated that: "The army group 'Nord Ukraine' is conducting talks with regional units of UPA. *Abwehrkommandos 202* are already actively co-operating with UPA and receiving from its agents information to be used in actions behind enemy lines." The report ends with a statement that the 4th Panzer Corps command had concluded with the Banderites a "gentlemen's agreement" on joint action against Red Army men, reconnoiterers-paratroopers and partisan detachments."

In May, 1944, the 1st German Panzer Corps command also established contact with UPA near Tarnopol. The Kommissariat of the border police in Drohobich issued a secret instruction "Policy towards UPA" on May 26, 1944 that lay stress on co-operation with UPA and on supplying it with arms and ammunition.

The Banderites also established tight contacts with the Intelligence Services of Horthy's Hungary, and Romania.

To deceive the public, the Bandera Provid kept on reporting that those of their members temporarily isolated by the Nazis were interned in "concentration camps" under "terrible conditions": "dying of starvation, cold and exhaustive work." This was an attempt to draw a parallel between their comfortable "internment" and the death camps of Auschwitz, Majdanek, Buchenwald and Dachau.

Actually Bandera and Stetsko were allotted large rooms with a good library at the special barracks in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. It is assumed that these special barracks were displayed in 1943 to fascist gruppenleiters from other countries. In 1946 the Nazi war criminal Standartenfuhrer SS Count Riodern testified during the Nuremberg Tribunal that the gruppenleiters believed that "all the stories in circulation abroad about concentration camps were fabricated..."¹

¹ Protokoll des Nürnberger Prozesses gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher, Bd. XXI, S. 510.

The Nazis played host to their nationalist allies in these barracks one hour's ride by car from the Main Imperial Security Board in Berlin and 200 meters from the Freidantall Palace where Banderites were taught espionage.

Daria Hnatkivska, the wife of the OUN boss and Nazi agent Lebed was also interned at a concentration camp. The conditions in which she lived there can be judged from the letters she passed through the Gestapo to her husband who was then as the nationalist press asserts, acting from the "illegal" position. "Our daughter Zorka is developing normally," she writes. "I myself, am not bad off... We are both together all the day. We are supplied with good food... There is plenty of free time... We go for long walks. I've forgotten already... my internment by the Poles; we did not take walks there... I feel calm but sad."

Thus Daria Hnatkivska "was not bad off." But what about those honest people living under the Nazi yoke? What about the people in the concentration camps?

Despite his wife's assuring letters Lebed from time to time sent her food and money. "With the permission of the Main Imperial Security Board," reads his telegramme to Dr. Witska, "I have sent by express some food parcels. I am asking you to hand them to Frau Lebed." Himmler's aide, General-Leutnant Meuller, in Berlin, cabled to Dr. Witska, in Lvov, on June 9, 1944: "Please send copies of the file (the file on Lebed-Hnatkivska — *author*). In the future contact Frau L. (Lebed — *author*) through me exclusively." "I am very pleased with the food," writes Hnatkivska to Lebed. "I really am in little need. We receive good food: daily milk, white bread, sugar whatsmore."

This is the retribution for the blood and tears of the Ukrainian people. This is the retribution for the jesuitical work done by a handful of bourgeois nationalists in Ukraine. This is the retribution for the death of millions of the better sons and daughters of Ukraine, for the suffering of young

boys and girls working as slaves in the coal mines of the Ruhr or as farmhands for German farmers.

Late July, 1944 the Red Army forced the Nazis out of Lvov. Most of the nationalist Provid, Lebed and Hrynoch included, fled to the West together with the Germans. However, on territory still under occupation the Banderites, guided by the German intelligence, continued to set up spy schools and bases from which UPA agents, armed and ready, could be thrown into Soviet territory.

In Cracow the Nazis ordered the Bandera Provid to organize within *Abwehrkommandos 202* a staff supervised by Hrynoch that would deal with espionage.

This period of the Bandera-Nazi collaboration was fully described by the German spy Siegfried Müller who was then the assistant chief of *Abwehrkommandos 202* whose testimony was cited above.

At the beginning of the war against the USSR, Müller was sent to the East with *Abwehrkommandos 304*. In 1944 he was transferred to *Abwehrkommandos 202* then stationed in Cracow as the assistant chief to Captain Witzel (pseudonym "Kirn"). Before Müller's departure from Berlin, the chief of the intelligence branch of the General Staff, Captain Lammerau and Captain Stoltze informed him that Witzel had established concrete ties with UPA that was conducting sabotage behind Red Army lines. Lammerau and Stoltze believed that given "qualified" leadership UPA could if not halt the advance of the Red Army then cause damage at least in the Red Army rear. Müller was commissioned to help Witzel in this.

In December 1944 the Main Imperial Security Board sent to *Abwehrkommandos 202* Bandera, who had just been given a villa outside Berlin and "worked" there under the surveillance of the chief of 4-D department Obersturmbahnfuehrer SS Wolf. On arriving in Cracow, Bandera and Stetsko instructed a group trained by Müller which included such Ukrainian nationalists as Lopatinsky, Chizhevsky, Sko-

robagaty. Through this group Bandera passed the order to the commander-in-chief of UPA, Shukhevich, to step up undermining activity in the Red Army rear and to establish regular radio link with the *Abwehrkommandos*. Berlin appointed Captain Witzel the commander of the group. On December 27, 1944 the group was flown from Cracow into the western regions of Ukraine, freed by the Red Army. The group was to hand over to UPA five million roubles, arms, medicine and a radio-transmitter. The Nazis were worried that the Soviet counter-espionage service would trace and liquidate the strong radio station "Vira" they had given to UPA. Therefore, the Nazis sent UPA commanders portable radio-transmitters that could be used more safely. Early 1945, with the task successfully carried out Witzel's group returned. Witzel was awarded a golden cross studded with diamonds while Ukrainian nationalist agents were given large sums of money.

Müller admitted that nationalists gave much help to the *Abwehrkommandos*. One of the five schools patronaged by the *Abwehrkommandos*, and ciphered "Moltke" trained men consisting exclusively of Ukrainian nationalists in espionage up till April 1945. Hrynoch's men and Nazi intelligence officers hired agents from the former police force, starostas and the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* (Labour Exchange). UPA agents also sent men to these schools. Before Germany's capitulation there were 45 Ukrainian nationalists training at the "Moltke" school.

Under the pressure of the Red Army the Nazis were forced to retreat further west. By late April 1945 *Abwehrkommandos 202* was stationed in Kolin near Prague.

In Kolin Bandera made his last inspection of the Ukrainian nationalists and discussed with Stetsko and Hrynoch their future collaboration with the Nazis. It was decided to ask the German Intelligence Service for a print shop, a large stock of printing paper, a strong radio-station, a

plane and a place to print anti-Soviet literature and leaflets and dump this printed matter into Soviet territory from the plane. The Ukrainian nationalists planned to use the radio station for communication with nationalists left behind in Western Ukraine. It was hoped to step up the undermining activities against the USSR this way. However, the Nazis were no more in a position to help the Ukrainian nationalists as the fall of the Third Reich was imminent.

As the Red Army advanced, Bandera made plans to flee to the Tyrols and leave Stetsko, Hrynoch and Stakhiv in Kolin under the command of *Abwehrkommandos*. Those three together with German intelligence officers began stacking secret hoards for the Nazi underground in mines and disused bunkers.

Early May, 1945 some army vehicles drove out of Kolin. In one of them — a car — sat Stetsko, Hrynoch and an Abwehr representative R. Fell. In the other vehicles — transport trucks sat Banderites and SS officers. With them were hermetically shut containers with food and civilian clothing. As the convoy was making its way to the mountains American planes attacked. The result of the American air-raid was a heavy toll of deaths and casualties (Stetsko and Fell¹ were both injured). The vehicles were also out of order.

Germany capitulated. The Ukrainian nationalists were forced to look for new patrons. However, they started investing efforts in this direction a little bit earlier, or to be more precise in 1944, when the tide had turned with Germany receiving more and more defeats. OUN Provid in an attempt to appease the Nazis began to mould UPA to the new situation. "When the German Army was leaving the Ukraine," testified Stoltze, "Abwehr or to be more precise Canaris ordered the formation of an underground that would continue the war against the Soviet rule in the Ukraine by means of terrorism, sabotage and espionage. For this purpose

officers and agents would be left behind to direct these acts. An order was given to create munition dumps and premises for provisions. Contact agents were infiltrated through the front-line. The subversion groups were supplied with arms and ammunition."¹

In an agreement between the Nazi Intelligence Service and OUN-UPA a number of joint Ukrainian and German armed police units were to aid these Banderite gangs.

UPA was also joined by forest and railway guards employment officers, *starostas*, clerks, tax collectors, and some members of the "national branches" of the Nazi-created "Russian Insurrectionary Army" (RVA).²

The Nazis left behind as military advisers their officers and men who spoke Ukrainian.

Much attention was given to supplying UPA with arms, ammunition, radio equipment, explosives, printing equipment for publishing anti-Soviet literature.

A notice by UPA chief Roman Klashkivsky (known under the nick-name "Klym Savur") asked the Nazis for 20 field and 10 anti-aircraft batteries, 500 Soviet automatic rifles, 10,000 hand grenades, 10,000 cartridge belts, 250,000 cartridges.

A former chief of the 2nd intelligence branch of the staff of the Nazi occupational forces in Ukraine, Captain Lazarek, when taken prisoner told that in the summer and autumn of 1944 he had sent to UPA from the village of Muszcino near Cracow up to 4 transporters with arms. Lazarek said that all in all he had sent them 20,000 items.

Very often retreating Nazi divisions left for the Banderites complete stocks of arms and provisions. On April 15,

¹ Archives of Central Committee of Communist Party of Ukraine Institute on Party History. Fund 57, Specification 4, File 338, Sheet 286.

² After Western Ukraine was liberated many RVA members began to desert UPA. The nationalist Provid gave orders to shoot them all.

¹ V. Cherednichenko. Natsionalism proty natsii, pp. 155—156.

1944 in Kamin-Kashirsky, Volyn, the Nazis left a large amount of arms, provisions and medicine to the Banderites.¹ The same was done in Ratne and Lubeshof.

For communication purposes the Nazis supplied the nationalists with radio-transmitters and radio-operators. There also existed armed couriers who were to transport military equipment through the front-line and return with intelligence.

The retreating Nazis ordered the Bandarites to disperse and avoid for a time any clashes with the Red Army. The Bandarites hid in the forests and after the Nazis had retreated sparked off a chain of sabotage activities: ambushed supply trails or raided stores, blew up railway bridges, killed soldiers and officers, tried to disrupt mobilization campaigns, killed those volunteering to serve in the Soviet liberating forces, wiped out their families, terrorized the population.

UPA also hindered the restoration of Soviets in liberated regions, shot Party and Soviet workers, tried to disrupt reconstruction works, spread nationalist propaganda and rumours about a "planned retreat" of the Nazis and their harsh reprisals against those aiding the Red Army when they return. Naturally, this handful of Nazi collaborators could not work openly. They worked usually at night, underhandedly. The Nazi press often praised the undermining job conducted by the nationalists.

The official newspaper of the Nazi foreign affairs ministry "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" wrote in December, 1944 that OUN and UPA had "come to life" after the Nazi retreat. UPA, it was stressed, now embraces the "most active" Ukrainian nationalists who entered the most ferocious battles with the Soviets and had become a tangible threat

to the USSR. The newspaper admitted that OUN activity was not "limited to guerilla warfare" but included also "espionage for the Third Reich."¹

Events were changing rapidly and it was evident that Nazism was doomed. With the coming defeat of fascism the truth about the Nazi collaborationists and the Ukrainian nationalists in particular was slowly coming to light.

OUN-UPA commanders had no chance of influencing the political situation. The nationalists comforted themselves with the hope of emerging contradictions when the Red Army confronted the American and British forces. The nationalists heeded every nuance in the situation to add to the slightest chance of the occupation of Ukraine by the Americans and British.

The Bandarite underground was full of "top secret" instructions, orders and directives with detailed descriptions of possible political alternatives and recommendations on how to act in one or another case. A superficial analysis of their contents makes it clear that the OUN Provid just re-edited with some amendments their old instructions dictated to them by the Nazis prior to Germany's intrusion into the USSR. In case of a new war erupting the nationalists had ready-made speeches and appeals to the nation.

The nationalists did their best to create the impression that the Ukrainians were not against a new war and were waiting for it. They seized every opportunity to demonstrate before the imperialist powers their zeal and potential abilities as espionage agents, saboteurs and terrorists.

"The deployment of effective and wide-spread insurrectionary (*verbatim* — espionage and subversion — *author*) activity in the last stage of the war is a good start for entering into relations with the Western powers," wrote Stepan Bandera.

¹ Archives of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Institute on Party History. Fund 63, Specification 63-1, File 3, Sheet 60.

¹ "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", December 5, 1944.

Bandera pointed out the need to "publicly display and stress the point" that Ukrainian nationalism, as an anti-Soviet subversive force, had good grounds to hope for support from reactionary circles in the West, which could properly estimate their activities and include them as "allies in the stand against the USSR."¹

The list of crimes committed by the Banderites rose steadily. In 1943 they murdered over 2,000 innocent people.²

To protect the population of Western Ukraine terrorized by the nationalist bandits and to ensure the normal state of affairs for the population i. e., repairing the ravages of war, reconstruction, and development of economy and culture and the raising of living standards in Western Ukraine, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Soviet government made certain arrangements.

Organs of power, aided by the population and special army units, began a decisive struggle against the Banderites. A whole network of expeditionary forces was created to combat the nationalistic bands.

The Communist Party and Soviet government understood that not all OUNites were Nazi agents; many of them were forced to enlist for fear of the safety of their families, many were persuaded by the nationalist propaganda. The majority of them were blind tools in the hands of the Nazis and the OUN Provid. On realizing to what abyss they were drawn by their nationalist bosses these people were only too willing to lay down their arms and go home. Most of them stayed in the grip of their bosses for fear of Soviet reprisals for their crimes. This was reason enough for the Soviet Ukrainian government to announce a guaranteed pardon to

¹ "Vyzvolny Shlyakh", No. 3, 1970, p. 93.

² Соціалістична дійсність і націоналістичні вигадки (Socialist reality and nationalist inventions), Kiev, 1968, p. 150.

those completely tearing with the Banderites. Such a guarantee was stated in the first appeal to the population of Western Ukraine by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukr.SSR on February 12, 1944; the second appeal by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.SSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukr.SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on November 27, 1944; and the third appeal by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukr.SSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukr.SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on May 19, 1945.

These appeals were an important factor in revealing the truth about Ukrainian nationalism, its followers and helped the liquidation of a Banderite underground. As a result many OUNites left their bands, came out of the forests and surrendered to Soviet officials. They were given jobs and the chance to begin a normal life all over again. Many former OUNites took part in smacking out the remaining UPA bands.

The anti-Soviet underground, which became known as the "OUN underground" was left with only a handful of reckless men. The state security backed by the population eliminated the remaining bands. The most inveterate OUNites finding themselves in a desperate situation in groups of 4-5 men tried to cross the border to West Germany. Many found their end during such attempts.

In the first post-war years OUN bands caused much trouble to Poland. I. Blum in his book "The Role of the Polish Army in Strengthening the People's Power" gave some figures concerning OUN criminal acts. In April, 1947 152 civilians and 61 military personnel were shot. One hundred and thirteen civilians and ninety-one military personnel were injured. Then civilians disappeared without trace; 1,118 cottages and 3,929 hectares of forest land were

burnt; eleven bridges were destroyed and two railway stations were gutted. OUN committed 460 criminal acts.¹

The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists were responsible for the death of an eminent Polish army commander Karol Swierczewski — a veteran anti-fascist fighter and former commander of the International Brigade in Spain.

NEW ALLIES

The defeat of the German Army stirred a feeling of diffidence in nationalist circles. Both the Banderites and Melnykites sought ways of approaching the Intelligence Services of the USA and Great Britain.

Late 1943, two Yugoslav officers escaped from a concentration camp for P.O.W.s in Stryj, Lvov Region. One of them was Captain Novak. The name of the other remains unknown. In the Carpathian Mountains near Skole, Novak and his companion were captured by the Banderites. For several days they were questioned and later moved to the Bandera headquarters in Lvov. The questioning continued with Lebed's personal participation. He promised Novak and his companion documents, food, clothing and money, if they agree to help their messenger reach Yugoslavia and get in touch with Mikhailovich and the British Intelligence Service." OUN Provid knew that Churchill's government had been supporting Mikhailovich for already three years. They, evidently, also knew that a British military mission was stationed at Mikhailovich's headquarters in Yugoslavia.

The two Yugoslavs agreed to co-operate and asked UPA chiefs to back the escape of other interned Yugoslavs from the death camp in Stryj. The Banderites agreed to agree but since they made no moves in this direction the two Yugoslavs tried to help their compatriots themselves. However, their very first attempt failed. Captain Novak was buying arms at the black market in Lvov when he was shot

¹ «Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny», No. 1, 1959.

dead by the Gestapo. The nationalists did not venture to ask the services of the other P.O.W. Lebed ordered his murder.

However, attempts to contact the British "Intelligence Service" in Yugoslavia did not stop. Heeding the advice of the two Yugoslavian P.O.W.s Lebed sent some of his messengers to the Balkans. Having in their possession skilfully forged documents these men had no difficulty in reaching Yugoslavia via Italy. But as fate had it: instead of meeting with Mikhailovich's men they walked right into the hands of Tito's partisans. Naturally, it was their last stop on the way to the British "Intelligence Service".

Despite these drawbacks, the Banderites continued to search for ways of getting in touch with Western Intelligence Services. They tried to get in touch through the Polish underground *Armia Krajowa*. But the Polish nationalists laid down unacceptable for OUN-UPA conditions in which they proposed contact through their government-in-exile in London and under control of representatives from the *Armia Krajowa*. Thus, the talks were suspended.

The Melnykites on their part were "evaluating the situation". Through one of their agents B. Kentzhinsky, who was in Finland at that time, they began to secretly seek for a possible establishment of contacts with Ukrainian nationalist organizations overseas.¹ Their first attempts annoyed the Gestapo but when the Melnykites openly and persistently began to sound their followers abroad the Nazis lost patience and in February 1944 put Melnyk and his closest followers under house arrest.

The main reason for the arrest of the leaders of OUN-Melnyk was based on the information received by the Gestapo on the "moves by the hitherto passive group led by Melnyk and its internal activization," as also on the rather

active work conducted by the "Ukrainian Information Bureau" in Helsinki, and the "secret talks and agreements" carried out with Germany's enemies in the West. One top Gestapo official told Ukrainian nationalist K. Pankivsky of the arrests: "Looks like the men from OUN want to skin the German bear alive."⁴

The arrests forced the nationalists to become more cautious and at the same time more active. As Germany's defeat drew near the nationalists were even more dogged in their effort to contact the well-known intelligence officer of the American "Strategic Studies Board," Allen W. Dulles who worked in Switzerland at that time.

The rapprochement of the Ukrainian nationalists with the western Intelligence Services was much due to the changes in the foreign policy of the USA and Great Britain towards the USSR.

This can be illustrated by the following facts:

In February, 1943 in Switzerland, the chief of the American Intelligence in Europe Allen W. Dulles met with Hitler's emissary Prince Hohenleuer. Dulles proposed a plan to revive the anti-Soviet "sanitary border" around East Europe. The "border" would consist of Poland, Romania, Hungary. He also touched on the question of extending the Polish frontier "to the East".² This meant a new annexation of the western regions of Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Soviet Baltic states.

The German ambassador to Turkey von Papen wrote in his memoirs, that early October, 1943 he met for talks with American government officials. Von Papen writes that the Americans suggested the Nazis sign a separate peace treaty that would by-pass and disregard the interests of the Soviet Union. The conditions of peace would be as follows: "The

¹ K. Pankivsky. *Роки німецької окупації* (The Years of German Occupation), p. 422.

² *Фальсифікатори історії* (Falsifiers of History), Moscow, 1948, p. 73.

¹ "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists", pp. 318, 319.

former frontiers were to be restored in the West, and Poland must be assured of an independent existence in the East... that the Allies realized Germany was not self sufficient, and therefore suggested that the Ukraine should be made an independent State, though associated somehow or other with Germany.”¹

The Polish government-in-exile in London also contributed to the anti-Soviet tendency. Its hostile actions towards the USSR were coordinated with the foreign policy of Great Britain and the USA. The US government toyed with the idea of setting up in post-war Europe a so-called “East European Federation” — the equivalent to the “sanitary border”. The US State Department envisaged preserving the capitalist system in Poland, Romania and other members of the “East European Federation.” The State Department also planned to cut a part of Western Ukraine from the Soviet Union and annex it to Poland. Northern Bukovinia they planned to hand over to Romania.

In November, 1954 the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, speaking in Woodford (USA) stated that towards the end of the war when the Germans were surrendering in thousands, he ordered Field Marshall Montgomery to stack weapons in a way that would facilitate their quick redistribution, if the need arose to use the German soldier in event of a war with the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1945 President Truman of the United States publicly declared his “hard-line policy” towards the USSR, a policy in its core aggressive.

Anti-Sovietism was the rallying call of the imperialist powers and the Ukrainian reactionary emigration — former burgomasters and starostas, consultants and commandants, police and Gestapo agents, officers from the *Reichsarbeitsdienst*, cutthroats from the SS Division “Galicia” and other fascist riff-raff.

¹ Franz von Papen. Memoirs. London, 1952, p. 505.

After the war, the nationalists heightened the anti-Soviet activity of their new centres and those set up prior to the war in the USA, Canada, France and other western countries.

However, such activity did not embrace all the body of the Ukrainian emigration. Such activity was solely in the hands of a small group of nationalist leaders working with foreign intelligence services and arch reactionaries in the imperialist world.

Having “Foreign Branches of OUN” (Zakordoni Chastiny OUN) in Munich, the Banderites wormed their way to key posts in the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc. (UKKA) and began to knit together the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). Melnyk’s “Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists” (PUN)¹ with headquarters in Paris, got the majority in the “Ukrainian Canadian Committee” (KUK — Komitet Ukrantsiv Kanady). Other Ukrainian nationalist groups created the “Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council” (ZP UHVR), directed by Lebed and Hrynoch. “The Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP — Ukrainska revolutsiyno-demokratichna partia) is just another of the many more nationalist groupings.

These anti-Soviet activities of nationalistic parties abroad, naturally, do not mean that the bourgeois nationalists hold sway over all of the body of the Ukrainian emigration. On the contrary, it only shows their political infantility and inability. Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalism abroad never was monolithic. A perpetual internal struggle among them reflected in some way the competition between the different secret services of the imperialist powers and especially that of their intelligence services. The squabbles between the nationalist parties as a rule, were continued by factions within, which

¹ After the war the Melnykites renamed their organization the “Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists”.

resulted in their further division and heightened disputes and feuds.¹

The split between Bandera and Stetsko of the FB-OUN and Lebed and Hrynoch of the ZP UHVR added to the already long list of discords of the pre-war years.

These splits originated from the desire of each side to outdo one another before the foreign secret services and thus guarantee themselves a securer existence.

Early 1946 Lebed and Hrynoch were introduced by a Catholic cardinal to an American intelligence officer Nowak. Lebed and Hrynoch handed Nowak spying information on the USSR, sent in the autumn of 1945 by OUN ringleaders in Western Ukraine.

Practically at the same time other representatives from ZP UHVR Eugene Wrencion in Switzerland and V. Stakhiv in Munich contacted the American Intelligence Service. Another ZP UHVR leader V. Okhrimovich in Nuremberg offered his services to the American Intelligence.

The FB-OUN headquarters under Bandera and Stetsko proceeded to bargain with the American branch of the "Strategic Studies Board" in Frankfurt-am-Main. The headquarters was represented in the talks by Klimishin, a former official Abwehr agent.²

The Americans had also registered the Melnykites as their agents which included Melnyk the PUN leader.

In the autumn 1946 mass arrests took place in the American zone in Germany. Those arrested were several hundred displaced persons who wished to be repatriated back home to the USSR. ZP UHVR headquarters took a hand in these arrests by handing over to the American counter-intelligence

¹ "Komunist Ukrainskii", 1972, No. 10, p. 65.

² M. Klimishin in 1941 supervised an Ukrainian nationalist group of spies. He worked under the direct control of an official from Abwehr Major Jost. The Central State Archives on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction in Ukraine. Fund 3833, Specification 1, File 14, Sheet 47.

files on these people. All arrested were charged with contacting the Soviet Repatriation Commission and were questioned and beaten up to force their abandoning the idea of repatriating.

The Banderites, however, outrivaled their counterparts in cruelty towards D.P.s. On approval of the American agent Bill, contacted by Klimishin, FB-OUN created a special department for "executions" coded "Ohio" with branches in D.P. camps in Kornberg, Munich, Mittenwald, Regensburg. All of them had "execution chambers" in specially equipped cellars and disused bunkers. The first post-war years saw the death of over twenty people in the "Ohio" execution chambers. Among them D. Chizhevsky who died in Mittenwald, A. Pechary, M. Mushak, Y. Moroz, I. Chaikovsky tortured to death in Kornberg. B. Bulavsky and Danke died in Regensburg and T. Charnetska, Y. Stelmaschuk, T. Rikadchuk and Yu. Gorliks-Gorsky in Munich.¹

ZP UHVR soon became the main Ukrainian nationalist agency for the Americans. FB-OUN led by Bandera went to serve the British "Intelligence Service".

The American Intelligence Service established in West Germany many schools training men in espionage and sabotage. Lebed, Hrynoch and Lopatinsky helped the Americans to choose men from the Ukrainian nationalist body. Such schools were in Munich, Badwerisgofen, Kaufbeuren and Oberbeuren. Men trained there were then sent as agents into the Soviet Union.

Copying the American example, the British "Intelligence Service" also established schools for espionage and sabotage. After completing the training course, agents were parachuted into Soviet territory or landed by submarines or sent in by balloons.

¹ Maksimenko. *Teror na sluzhbi 3Ч ОУН* (The Use of Terror in FB-OUN), Kiev, 1962, p. 11.

One of Bandera's closest associates and the special representative of FB-OUN at the British intelligence, B. Pidhainy wrote to nationalist agents in Ukraine in the summer of 1953. "FB-OUN Provid has assigned you a very important task to procure us the needed information. This assignment must be regarded as duty to our organization... FB-OUN is collaborating with the British (intelligence — author). Our collaboration is based on their positive attitude towards... our struggle against the USSR, and their practical steps in this direction which in the future could grow into a military union. FB-OUN is helped in training and equipment in a way only a strong power can afford... In return FB-OUN must give intelligence collected by our agency to be used in projecting war against the USSR. It is a form of anti-Bolshevik activity and thus for FB-OUN receives primary rating as the only way of receiving arms and other requirements needed for our struggle. What FB-OUN now demands and gets from a foreign country is in proportional to what it can do and give".¹

Backed by western powers and the USA, in particular, West Germany was quick to militarize. This process was accompanied by the consolidation of ties and co-operation of the Ukrainian nationalists with the West German intelligence "Bundesnachrichtendienst" (BND).

On April 19, 1966 during a press-conference in Kiev S. Dzugalo, a former member of FB-OUN revealed the subversive activity of nationalist centres directed by BND. Dzugalo told that he had worked at the secret department of FB-OUN, coded K-3, that was engaged in recruiting and training agents from within the nationalist body to be sent later to the Ukr.SSR. Dzugalo personally took part in training several groups sent in 1957-1959 into the Soviet Union through Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. A group of spies (Malisevich, Nebesny and Tsiper) was trained in Italy,

Austria and the FRG under the supervision of the Italian Intelligence Service.¹ Another group (Davidiuk, Levitsky and Geniak) were trained in Aschau, 20 kilometers from the Bavarian town of Rosenheim. For their training BND paid 27,000 Deutschmarks and sent them equipment, i.e., radio-transmitters, arms, uniforms, etc.

The "foreign centre" of Melnyk's PUN tightly co-operated with the Intelligence Services of the USA, FRG and Italy. Contact and the communication of fabricated information during the "cold war" was carried out by the chiefs of PUN Gaivas, Andrievsky, Suliatsky, Boidunik. Melnyk's representative to the Italian Intelligence is Fedoronchuk (code-name "Pierro").

In post-war years neo-fascist organizations and groupings have mushroomed up and unfurled their activity in the West and in the USA especially. American press reports give over one thousand "ultra" organizations in the USA. These groupings receive fabulous financial backing from big business. Dr. Westin, a professor at the Columbia University in the USA, and researcher into the extreme right activities in the country states that during 1961 about 10 million dollars were granted to American "ultra" by big business. In 1964, he states, the sum reached 30 million dollars. The assassination of President Kennedy, the death of his brother, and other acts of political terror put in the forefront the problem of a revival of neo-fascism with its threat to mankind.

In the post-war years the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist counter-revolution found itself in a deep crisis. It had compromised itself by its ties with the Nazis, its pro-Nazi activity and policy. The nationalist bosses attempt to create the impression they had nothing in common with Nazism. Every nationalist lucky to escape being tried as a war criminal concocts a tale of his "internment" in a Nazi concentration camp or of his "examination" by the Gestapo in an

¹ V. Cherednichenko. Natsionalism proty natsii, p. 173.

attempt to disown the slightest relation with the Nazis. Some of them even began to boast of their "important" role in organizing the resistance movement. It was done to appease their new imperialist bosses and to make Ukrainian nationalism more attractive to emigrants, especially those neutral to nationalism.

A distinctive feature of Ukrainian nationalism in the late 40's and early 50's was its careful selective and demagogical criticism of some of the principles of nationalist ideology, the abandonment of some pointedly fascist concepts and the formulation of "new ideas". Actually, the process saw a swing from racism and anti-Semitism, "Führerism" and a hierarchical administrative order in OUN to a system of "collective leadership"; and their war calls to restore capitalism in Ukraine were forgotten as they softly spoke of the probability of establishing an "independent Ukraine", "a harmonized non-class society". The nationalist's "orientation towards foreign sources and their aid" changed to an "orientation towards internal forces". These new pseudo-slogans and pseudo-ideas, that slightly masked and gilded the doctrine of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, gave them "reasons" to speak of real "democratization" of nationalism. However, the anti-popular essence of this ideology and practice remained unchanged. Violent anti-communism, malicious insinuations against the USSR, crafty provocations and intrigues, enmity towards other nations, medieval cults, the idea of the division of society into the strong and weak, and the exaltation of the ruling "élite", are the features pertaining to Ukrainian nationalism.

These clumsy attempts by OUN leaders to refute their participation in the Nazi war crimes, "convince" the public in their "alibi" were shortly stopped. Even in the 50's there was a marked neo-fascist tendency in the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist movement. As world politics changed and the "cold war" inserted itself nationalist leaders fever-

ishly began to renew their ties with the neo-fascist extreme right-wing organizations.

The process of adaptation of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism in the anti-fascist bloc did not last long. By the end of the 50's its ideology and practice showed signs of neo-fascism. The political situation changed and the nationalist leadership proceeded to restore its "ideological postulates". The newspaper "Kanadiysky Farmer" wrote that "some nationalist bosses had begun to sympathize with the extreme right-wing American groups since they saw in them the "sole resolute" enemy of communism. For this reason, they said, there is a tendency to manifest solidarity "with such outright fascist groups as the "John Birch Society", the "Minutemen" and the "Young Americans for Freedom". "One" Ukrainian nationalist group though not invited, participated in an American neo-fascist rally in New-York sponsored by the "Young Americans for Freedom".¹

The leader of the so-called "Ukrainian Liberation Union" (CVU) in Toronto, L. Gladun was instructed by the Centre to contact leaders of neo-fascist organizations in the USA. He inclined the leader of the "John Birch Society" R. Welch to extend his society's anti-communist activity to all countries and continents of the world. Welch agreed with Gladun's suggestion. To start with Gladun was entrusted to form among Ukrainian nationalists a branch of the "John Birch Society" in Canada. CVU's Centre praised Gladun for his work and stressed the necessity of "finding common ground for co-operation with important right-wing organizations in American politics".²

A good illustration of the tight "union" of the Ukrainian nationalists and the American ultra-right was and remains the election campaigns in the USA. In 1964, most of the nationalist organizations and groups voted for the ultra-right

¹ "Kanadiysky farmer", March 28, 1962.

² "Kanadiysky farmer", November 7, 1964.

candidate Barry Goldwater. The nationalist magazine "Visnyk" carried an article by a certain Bistritsky, who claimed that Ukrainian nationalists estimate the movement led by Goldwater to be one of "ideological and moral revival" of the USA. "A new generation is being brought up in America and Ukrainian nationalism must follow this new generation for it will win if not in 1964, then 1968. This is the only way Ukrainian nationalism can triumph".¹ Stetsko wrote of a "potentially strong movement in existence capable of gaining victory in the future". This movement of which he claimed was "procreated" by Ukrainian nationalists and therefore needed all round support by them. "We are not alone, neither are we isolated or separated", admitted Stetsko. "We are procreating a new movement, a new trend, a new current".² Stetsko was apparently referring to neofascism.

The nationalist chiefs worked hard to unite the Ukrainian emigrants in the USA to vote for Goldwater. Stetsko, who had come from Munich, a colonel-in-reserve of the American Intelligence Service³, one of the bosses of the American ultra right-wing, and the president of the "Ukrainian Congress Committee of America" L. Dobriansky and others put the campaign on a broader footing. They toured the country, spoke before crowds of Ukrainian emigrants and at nationalist rallies, gave interviews to the press, radio and television calling people to vote for Goldwater. However, the campaign to elect Goldwater failed because his policy was directed at racism, national strife and discrimination, at instigating acts endangering world peace. The majority of American electors voted Goldwater down.

The nationalists nevertheless continued to hope fascism would once again conquer the world. In 1965 at a rally of the Banderite "Association of Young Ukrainian Students"

¹ "Visnyk", October, 1964, p. 4.

² "Visnyk", February, 1965, p. 8.

³ "Congressional Record", July 18, 1959, p. 14760.

(TUSM) in New-York, one of its leaders K. Savchuk delivered a report on the congeniality of American "conservatism", the OUN wording for fascism, and Ukrainian nationalism. Savchuk provided, as he put it, "philosophically based reasons" for Ukrainian nationalism and American ultra-right solidarity. According to Savchuk the most important task faced by overseas Ukrainian nationalists was to "penetrate American conservatism" by raising Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist ideology from obscurity and showing its likeness to conservatism⁴.

Canvassing in the USA in 1968 and 1972 once more clearly demonstrated the Ukrainian nationalist orientation towards the most reactionary circles of the American monopoly and its politically reactionary groupings.

The nationalist organizations persistently call their supporters to fight "with all means at hand" the policy of peaceful coexistence since the increase of tension between the West and the East "creates an atmosphere politically favourable for Ukrainian emigrants".²

The nationalist leaders and press know no bounds in praising the aggressive policy of the American imperialists. They wept over the fact that the USA while being the only nuclear power in the world did not dictate its conditions to the Soviet Union. Nationalists were among those warmongers criticising the U.S. government for its "lack of more active operations in Vietnam". They even proposed forming an "international legion", including a Ukrainian one, to fight in Vietnam. Stetsko went even so far as to recommend a nuclear war against the USSR. In one of his speeches he said that only people "weak and godless", only politicians "depending on electoral votes" can fear a nuclear war. Stetsko declared that those not fearing such a war are "crusading politicians". He included himself into this cate-

¹ "Homin Ukrayny", May 29, 1965.

² Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. I. Toronto, 1963, p. 915.

gory. In Stetsko's mind many people were exaggerating the consequences of a nuclear war. "In reality", he said, "such a war cannot bring harm to Ukraine since merciful God will save her from nuclear destruction",¹ i. e. will save her for the nationalists to rule. Some of the nationalist ultraright even attempted to "prove" that the Soviet Ukrainian people were in favour of a war, and were ready to suffer... one more new and frightening war".² War, assert the nationalists, is the only way to reach their goal.

The Ukrainian nationalists support all the subversive acts instigated by imperialism: the Hungarian Uprising of 1956; the American aggression against revolutionary Cuba in 1961; anti-socialist disturbances in Czechoslovakia in 1968; Israel's aggression against the Arab states. During the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 some armed bands of Ukrainian nationalists were infiltrated through the Austro-Hungarian border. In South Vietnam, several scores of Ukrainians died in action. They fell in with nationalistic demagogic and volunteered for service.

The nationalist chiefs tour Taiwan, Saigon, Tokio, Seoule, Madrid, Lisbon, and talk with people from the reactionary circles there; settle on joint anti-communist propaganda and anti-Soviet action.³ They established tight contacts with the "Asian Anti-communist League" in the Far East. In 1965 Stetsko invited from West Germany to New-York T. Oberländer, the notorious organizer of mass murders in Lvov in 1941, to meet supporters of the "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations".

A typical manifestation of anti-Soviet hysteria provoked by the Ukrainian nationalists was the discussion in the US Congressional committees of such wholly invented problems as a so-called "Soviet aggression against non-Russian na-

tionalities" (Ukrainian SSR also considered to be subjugated — *author*), and the "occupation of Ukraine", etc.

In 1959 the US Congress passed a law on holding a "week for enslaved nations"⁴ (the Ukrainian SSR is considered by them to be "enslaved" — *author*).

When writing that the resolution was endorsed by Congress through lobbying by émigrés and that the text was written not by the US Congress but by the Ukrainian nationalist, L. Dobriansky, G. F. Kennan² loses all sense of proportion.

Every holiday, every historical date or event of these latter days in Ukraine is used by the nationalists for their own political ends. The unveiling of the statue of Shevchenko in Washington turned out to be a base political and subversive manifestation. "Washington Post" quoting Dobriansky, said that the aim of the unveiling ceremony was not so much aimed on honouring the poet as "using Shevchenko as a weapon in the cold war". The same flavour the nationalists try to impart to the decision of the Post Office Department in the USA to issue a stamp commemorating Shevchenko.

The Ukrainian nationalists strive to obstruct the growing tourist trade, scientific and cultural exchange between the USSR and the USA asserting that such an exchange corrupts and demoralizes Ukrainian emigrants. They denounce any contact with the Soviet Union and declare a "traitor" anyone yearning to learn more about Soviet Ukraine.

Tours of Ukrainian performing art groups, visits by writers, scientists and students from the Ukr.SSR Banderites usually meet with press-racketing anti-Soviet slogans and leaflets. Sometimes they resort to acts of hooliganism as it happened during a tour of the Virsky Dance Ensemble in Canada, when the Banderites set fire to a van with costumery and stage effects.

¹ "Svoboda", February 3, 1965.

² Збірник підпільних писань (Collection of Underground Literature), Munich, 1959, p. 230.

³ "Homin Ukrainy", November 19, 1966.

⁴ "Congressional Record", August 20, 1964, p. 20054.

² G. F. Kennan. Memoirs 1959-1963, Boston-Toronto, 1972, p. 98.

Commissioned by reactionary circles in imperialist countries the nationalists read to the public anti-Soviet reports, expanding on the American policy towards the USSR and other socialist countries, speaking on T.V. in an anti-Soviet spirit, screening slanderous films against the USSR and distributing anti-Soviet literature, etc. Unmasked propaganda fills the pages of all the nationalist newspapers, magazines, books and radio programmes.

The nationalist chiefs are good hands at fabricating all sorts of inventions, while unscrupulous American politicians, among them congressmen, use this propaganda for their irresponsible speeches.

As examples one can cite speeches made by congressmen Daniel J. Flood, Edward J. Derwinski, Edna F. Kelly, Charles G. Diggs Jr., Gerald R. Ford Jr. and senators Milton R. Young, and E. Brook on the occasion of annual "jubilees" of the "Ukrainian People's Republic". On March 9, 1967 Derwinski bluntly stated in the USA Congress that Shevchenko Day in Soviet Ukraine was marked illegally and that the poet's name and literary heritage were under a ban.¹ Soviet citizens understand that such statements are absurd but for the ignorant American it is a sensation.

The Ukrainian nationalists and their imperialist bosses set their hopes in a so-called "World Congress of Free Ukrainians", held in New-York in November, 1967. This Congress turned out to be a crowd of political adventurists, void of ideals or moral integrity and only heated rivalry among different nationalist groupings.

Progressively-minded people in America denounced this anti-Soviet congress as another provocation organized by the Ukrainian nationalist emigration. In connection with this nationalist sabbath the Executive Council of the League of American-Ukrainians denounced this outright provocation and on November 4, 1967 wrote:

¹ "Congressional Record", March 9, 1967, p. 38.

"Sponsors of the "congress" represent neither the progressive Ukrainian community in America, nor the majority of people of Ukrainian origin. When taking the membership of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and other groups whose leaders supported this "congress" and compare them to the one and a half million or so people of Ukrainian origin living in this country we see that the former does not represent even 10 percent of the whole. Moreover, the participants of the "congress" hold different views on the aims and needs of this congress.

"The sponsors of this "world congress" do not speak on behalf of all Ukrainians because progressive Ukrainian organizations of this country and of other countries were not invited.

"The sponsors of this "congress" do not represent the will of the Ukrainians of Soviet Ukraine as they received no mandate for it. They themselves usurped the right to speak on behalf of these people.

"Their verbiage on some "solidarity" with a "Liberation Movement of Ukraine" is aimed at deceiving people ignorant of the real state of affairs. There is no liberation movement in Ukraine. On the contrary, foreign correspondents and visitors on private tours are unanimous in their estimation of the peaceful endeavours of Soviet Ukrainians, of their pride of accomplishment of the past fifty years.

"Only representatives elected by Ukrainians have the right to speak on their behalf and not a handful of political businessmen covering individuals who had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and together with the Germans fled to the West.

"Thus we are certain that the "congress" is an anti-Ukrainian gathering of political speculators convoked to intensify the sinister "cold war"; discredit the Ukrainians and their sovereign country, a member of the United Nations Organization. At the United Nations, the Ukr.SSR, together with other countries invests all effort to uphold and

strengthen peace in the world and good-neighbourly relations...

"As citizens of the USA, we believe that the "congress" cannot serve America's interests, for what the American people need is neither hostility, nor an aggravation of the international atmosphere and want to live in peace and harmony with other peoples including the 40 million Ukrainians who had lived through the Nazi terror during World War II and sacrificed much to deliver mankind from its foe — fascism..."¹

This statement was supported by progressive Ukrainians in Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and other countries.

The Ukrainian nationalists were given the task of abetting the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in their policy aimed at splitting the socialist unity. This task was included into the overall plan against the socialist countries, the world communist, workers' and national-liberation movements.

Some of the nationalist leaders say that "the Ukrainian (nationalist — *author*) policy during World War II ... and after it, was marked by our liberation movement with bankrupts. Such was Nazi Germany ... Another example is our flirting with Chiang Kai-Shek. It would be better if we were aligned with Mao Tse-tung and Red China. Red China firstly, is a strong power and secondly, is preparing a war against Moscow".²

Some nationalist centres started mailing newspapers, books, and brochures of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet content to addresses of all the government offices they know in China. They expect, and not without reason, that the Chinese leaders will use the literature for their splitting tactics. The nationalist ringleaders stress that the anti-

Soviet declarations of the Chinese leaders ring in unison with nationalist propaganda.

During the Israeli aggression in the Middle East the Ukrainian nationalists from the organization the "Ukrainian National Council" (Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada) sent Israel's Prime Minister Levi Eshkol a letter expressing "sincere sympathy and solidarity". Their letter contrasted greatly with the indignation of the Soviet people. The Ukrainian nationalists tried to convince Levi Eshkol that the Ukrainian nation is on 'Israel's side',¹ and also attempted to justify the Israeli aggression.

In May, 1971 a group of English supporters of Meir Kahan's "Jewish Defence League" raided the Soviet consulate in London. The group was led by Alan Frimen, leader of the students' Jewish Defence League. When hastily leaving the consulate, Frimen dropped his portfolio carrying bank cheques and mail. These documents prove that the Israeli Embassy in Great Britain in close contact with other overseas zionist centres sparked off a chain of zionist provocations against Soviet representative bodies abroad.

The main task of the zionist provocateur is, as Frimen's letters prove, "to create the biggest noise possible", and to uphold in the bourgeois press the "campaign for the defence of Soviet Jews". Pursuing these tasks the zionists use every possibility including psychological pressure on people of Jewish extraction. In one of his letters Alan Frimen bitterly admits that the zionist brownshirts "clearly cannot mobilize mass support from people in Great Britain" and suggests that co-operation with the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists should not be neglected. "The fact that they always hated us can be ignored", cynically states Frimen.

Why is it that zionist leaders have allied themselves with the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, known all over the

¹ "Ukrainski Visti", New-York, November 9, 1967.

² "Vilne Slovo", September 14, 1963.

¹ "Svoboda", June 9, 1967.

world as the most hardened anti-Semites? And why is it that the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists are willing to band with the Zionists? For a more comprehensive explanation it is necessary to transgress into history.

Anti-semitism in Ukraine is a historical product of Ukrainian nationalism. For a long period of time it was implanted by the Ukrainian landowners and bourgeoisie and their political bodies — the nationalist parties and organizations. Hatred towards the Jewish population and the readiness to carry out pogroms and violence were constantly fostered by these parties and organizations. They also strived to poison workers and peasants with nationalism and jingoism. From time to time the anti-Semitic balloon would go up and the Jewish population suffered persecution, jeerings, pogroms and other violence.

Anti-semitism was especially rife during the period of the Centralna Rada of Hetman Skoropadski and the counterrevolutionary Directorate. During the Civil War anti-semitism became the backbone of all the undermining activities of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists against the Soviets.

One leading ideologist in OUN, M. Sziborski pointed out the necessity of "strict correction" as to "national minorities" permanently settled in the Ukraine. He also said that it was imperative to "confiscate their property" as soon as an "independent" Ukraine was proclaimed. Even under these conditions M. Sziborski treated the "Jewish problem" separately. For the solution of this problem it was necessary, he believed, to have "a special plan and method".¹

At that time, however, Sziborski evaded answering what "methods" he had in mind and what actually lay behind the "plan". An answer to this is found in the autobiography of the "premier" of the puppet "regional committee" Yaroslav Stetsko. He stressed that his position lay in the

extermination of the Jewish population in Ukraine using Nazi methods. He ruled out any assimilation of Jews. These statements were not Stetsko's whim nor show of bravado. It was reality, a reality in which the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists washed their hands in a bloodbath that accounted for thousands of innocent, defenseless people. Never will time erode the memory of the Nazi concentration camps in Treblinka, Sobibor, Belsen, Oswiencim and Babiy Yar. Many Ukrainian nationalists worked here as guards and executioners.

As for the Zionists, they also adopted analogous violent methods and used them against nations, countries, parties and persons. It was this sort of activity that brought together the Zionists and the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. Hatred of socialism, of the Soviets was the basis for their alliance. It is widely known that the Zionist leader Zabotinski organized a "Brith Haahat" to help S. Petliura fight the Ukrainian working masses. In 1921, Zabotinski was asked by S. Petliura to form a Jewish police force to be used in the new intervention into Soviet Ukraine.

Ukrainian nationalism and Zionism always act in accord against the USSR, the socialist countries, the working people's movement and the national-liberation movements. What united them here is their common stand against the proletariat, their mutual hatred of Ukrainians and Jews alike.

Both Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists are tireless in carrying out subversive anti-Soviet activities. They both cherish the hope if not to reinstate the old capitalist order, the restitution of private property and seizure of political power, then at least bring detriment to the Soviet power.

Both Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists from a stand-point of pathological chauvinism fan among their following the instinct to destroy, foster hatred towards other nations, spread the myth about a "super race", and their special place in the world.

¹ "Prolom", 1941, No. 7—8, p. 419, 428, 430.

A song approved by the Israeli government goes to say that the whole world had always been against Jews and that their ancestors had prophesied that everybody doing wrong to Jews would end up in Hell.

The song, actually a unique hymn of hatred and obscurantism, can be compared with the nationalist "decalogue": "Not to waver from committing sin ...", "To fight the enemy you hate...", "Endeavour to strengthen, glorify, enrich and expand the Ukrainian state even by means of subjugating foreign lands..."

This is the essence of the Zionist and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist ties. In all their actions lie anti-communist and anti-Soviet sentiments.

* * *

The USSR has already been in existence for more than fifty years. It is a multinational country, an example of the successful embodiment of the Leninist national policy, of proletarian internationalism, of friendship of nationalities. And also, for over fifty years the imperialist powers have never stopped their attacks on the USSR.

In his speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in July, 1972 V. V. Shcherbitsky, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine stated that "under conditions of a further sharpening of ideological warfare Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist and Zionist organizations serving with foreign intelligence services are livening up their subversive activities and are trying to unite their efforts. Besides their anti-Soviet activities on the international scene, they are consolidating their strength to search for new ways. They make attempts to shift the core of their undermining activity onto Soviet territory and to discredit the nation-

al policy of the CPSU and break the fraternal union of our country's nationalities."¹

At the present moment the anti-Soviet reactionary forces concentrate much effort on ideological subversion against the vanguard of social progress. Ideological subversions are aimed at undermining the social and political unity of the peoples of the USSR and that of the socialist commonwealth; to sow dissension among the socialist countries and weaken their position as a world force.

Large-scale anti-Soviet activities are usually timed to important political events in our country and countries of the socialist commonwealth. In the past few years such were the cases when the Soviet peoples together with progressive humanity marked the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the centenary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the 50th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Anti-Soviet ideological subversions involve research institutions, travel companies and commercial bodies, youth organizations and ideological and propaganda departments. An important part is assigned to "experts" from among the anti-Soviet emigration and, in particular, to the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists of all hues.

By permission of governments of imperialist countries the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists carry out their anti-Soviet propaganda through many government and "pirate" radio-stations, among them the "Voice of America", the "BBC", "Radio Rome", "Radio Free Europe" "Liberty" and the "Vatican Radio". The Ukrainian nationalists print scores of magazines, newspapers and bulletins. They try to distribute this trash in our country using for this purpose the post, tourists, students, etc. In the summer of 1971, on visit to the USSR was a group of American tourists of Ukrainian origin, among them Anna and Roman Protsik,

¹ "Radyanska Ukraina", July 28, 1972.

Maria Fecil and Steve Osadets, who immediately began to search for people willing to work. They believed their task of finding persons politically immature and morally weak willing to exchange "information", distribute anti-Soviet nationalist literature and commit on instruction from abroad acts of sabotage, to be an easy one. However, the intention of these nationalist emissaries were quickly revealed by Soviet people and the "guests" were quickly expelled from the country.

In 1972, the State Security Committee arrested a tourist from Belgium, Yaroslav Dobosh.¹ The interrogation proved that Dobosh was sent into the USSR by OUN, this dependent of imperialist intelligence services, to organize undermining activities here.

During the investigation Yaroslav Dobosh admitted his guilt and asked permission from the Soviet state security to publicly expose the activity of Ukrainian nationalist foreign centres against the Ukrainian nation. Dobosh's request was satisfied.

In July, 1972 a press-conference was held in Kiev for journalists, radio and television reporters and also representatives from various enterprises, art unions and civil organizations of the city. At the press-conference Yaroslav Dobosh made a statement to the effect that, commissioned by the Bandera organization of Ukrainian nationalists, he had arrived in Ukraine to discover some "oppositional elements" and with such backing initiate enmical activity. Dobosh was also instructed to collect political tendency reports on Soviet Ukraine to obtain anti-Soviet material that could be used by nationalist newspapers abroad.

His confession and protestation to abandon anti-Soviet activities taken into consideration, Dobosh was relieved of responsibility and expelled from the country.

Shortly after Dobosh was expelled from the country

another nationalist Marko Horbach, a member of the Ukrainian nationalist youth organization "Plast" arrived in Ukraine. This 19-year-old student studied physics at the university in Frankfurt. This was his second trip to the Soviet Union. His mother and sister also were frequent guests. His father was an officer of the Nazi SS during World War II. At present he is a functionary of a foreign Banderite centre, and thus, considers it better to stay there.

Young Horbach was not interested in the monumental changes in the life and work of the Ukrainian people, nor was he interested in the achievements of the Soviet economy, sciences, literature and art. The main aim of his journey to the Soviet Union was, in accord with instruction from foreign Ukrainian nationalist centres, to carry out subversive activities.

During his sojourn in the USSR Horbach defied all norms of hospitality. In the border town Chop, when custom officers referred to his rather heavy baggage as being above the standard, Horbach released a tirade against Soviet life and justice. During the trip from Lvov to Kiev Horbach was keen on entangling people in discussions on the national question. Naturally, he found himself talking to a bare wall. This, however, did not stop Horbach. In Kiev Horbach quickly set about spreading nationalistic distortions, attempted to bribe people. Since Horbach's activity was directed against our country, the government decided to expell him from the Soviet Union.¹

Foreign Ukrainian nationalist centres continuously bombard our country with bourgeois and bourgeois-nationalist ideas that are alien to Soviet modes and traditions. The centres are always on the look-out for people politically acceptable to anti-Soviet activities. But they always find themselves on barren ground. On November 9, 1973 the newspaper "Literatura Ukraina" printed a statement by Ivan Dziu-

¹ "Radyanska Ukraina", January 15, 1972.

¹ "Radyanska Ukraina", March 13, 1973.

ba, whose book "Internationalism or Russification" published abroad in 1965, was used in the ideological warfare against the Soviet Union. Ivan Dziuba understood his mistake and full of remorse wrote: "...we must not forget that we are living in a world stricken by a class, ideological and political struggle, where there cannot be a "neutral territory," where we cannot be "a little" for Soviet power, for the policy of the Communist Party, and "a little" against them. Stark reality sooner or later will force us to decide once and forever.

"We must understand that to be a real citizen, a real patriot in our age means to be a self-conscious Soviet person, a patriot of our socialist society, of our Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: it means to be an internationalist. In our day and historic age there is only one way of working for the benefit of the Ukrainian people i.e., dedicating all our talent, all our strength to Soviet Ukraine, our common Soviet Fatherland, to the task of building communism." Ivan Dziuba is now working on a book in which he wants to seriously prove the groundlessness and shortcoming of his principles that led to mistakes prevalent in his previous book "Internationalism or Russification."

Ukrainian nationalist organizations were directed by their imperialist patrons to transfer the centre of anti-Soviet activity to Soviet territory. This aim is pursued by the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in the USA, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany and France.

Ukrainian nationalism in emigration is going through a deep crisis. It is going through a stage of decadence and moral dissolution. This state of affairs is admitted by some of the nationalist bosses. At a so-called "Big Gathering of OUN" it was stated that "our membership is rapidly falling. We are witnessing the end of the political urgency of our cause, a big mutation among our youth."¹

¹ "Ukraina spilne dobro vsih ii gromadyan". Paris, 1971, p. 15.

The same is written by the nationalist newspaper "Ukrainske slovo": "Among our members, in parties and groupings exist tension and quarrels. More fractions are formed though in many cases they are headed by old members. The lesser the people in every fraction, the more absurd become these groups. Sometimes, inside these fractions occur splits. With every split the quarrels become more heated."¹

The question naturally arises as to why Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism beaten during the October Revolution, the Civil War, the Intervention and the Second World War, being progressively paralyzed still remains in the out-of-the-way place of imperialism that still supports its debris on the ideological and political battleground?

The reason is that anti-communist and anti-Soviet forces are attempting to sow bourgeois nationalist ideas among our people to fan strife and intolerance.

Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism is needed by imperialism. Ukrainian nationalists are needed for ideological subversions, for propaganda purposes and for provocation and espionage. On the other hand, the Ukrainian nationalists cannot exist without the financial backing given by the imperialists.

The Ukrainian nationalists are trying to drive a wedge into the unity and fraternity of the nationalities of our country — one of the most important achievements of socialism, through their politically and ideologically subversive activities.

During a speech at the joint celebration meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Leonid Brezhnev said: "A great brotherhood of men of labour, united irrespective of national origin, by a community of class interests and aims, has emerged and has been consolidated in

¹ "Ukrainske Slovo", March 27, 1970.

our country; the relations between them have no equal in history and we have every right to call them the Leninist friendship of peoples. This friendship, comrades, is one of our invaluable gains, one of the most important gains of socialism, which is most dear to the heart of every Soviet citizen."

This unity, fraternity and friendship of nations of the Soviet Union is the natural result of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the rapid development of a socialist society. This fraternity and unity is also the result of the colossal work of the Communist Party that following Lenin's behest, wisely and consistently worked to create and strengthen the Soviet Union, bring up the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

The fraternity is the huge moving force of our socialist society, the never-ending source of the creative energy of the working people. The great changes in economy and in social fields, in ideology and culture, the glorious achievements in industry, agriculture and education, everything achieved by the republics of the Soviet Union is the result of the joint effort of the friendly family of nations, their general co-operation and mutual aid.

The achievements of the Soviet Ukrainian people gained through the fraternal commonwealth always gave rise to dire attacks from Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. Goaded by reactionary circles of the imperialist world they believe in turning the wheels of time back to those days when nationalist sentiment blocked rationality, when national strife, suspicion and prejudice was the source of bloody battles and civil wars, when big and small nations fell victims to jesuitical enemies or become puppets in the hands of imperialist colonizers. But their attempts are all in vain.

For the working class, the peasantry and all working people of Ukraine Lenin's words that "given united actions of the great Russian and Ukrainian proletarians a free Ukraine is possible, without such unity it is out of the question" are the guiding light.

The working people of Ukraine faithfully adhere to these words by Lenin. They are proud to have gone in step with the great Russian nation in war and peace, in building a socialist society and in laying the foundation of communism in our country.

In an united friendly family of nations of the Soviet Union the Ukrainian people direct all their creative energy and initiative at achieving the aims of the programme outlined at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU. Steadily approaching the cherished goal — the building of a communist society — the Ukrainian people demonstrate their full understanding of their patriotic and international duty, the social and political unity of the Soviet society, the monolithic adherence to the principles of the Communist Party. No strength on earth can swerve them from this road.